Abstract
The psychologist-philosopher B.F. Skinner and the physicist-philosopher P.W. Bridgman, both dedicated empiricists, initially entered into an intellectual relationship that seemed destined to be warm and fruitful. Yet, it ended up unfulfilled. Since I am now perhaps one of the few who knew both men as colleagues for many years, I might be able to throw some unique light on their interaction, and on what I consider to be one of the missed opportunities in the history of ideas.
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Notes
What follows draws on well-known sources, including of course Skinner’s own books, and L.D. Smith and W.R. Woodward, eds., B.F. Skinner and Behaviorism in American Culture (London: Associated University Presses, 1996), and in particular the essays in it by Nils Wiklander, “From Hamilton College to Walden Two: An Inquiry into B.F. Skinner’s Early Social Philosophy,” and John Cerullo, “Skinner at Harvard: Intellectual or Mandarin?”.
Scientific World Conception: The Vienna Circle.
E.A. Vargas (1994). Prologue, perspectives, and prospects of behaviorology. Behaviorology, 3, p. 112. 1 have written on the effect of Mach and Skinner in Chapter 1 of my book Science and Anti-science ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993 ).
B.F. Skinner, review of Smith (1978) Behaviorism and logical positivism, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 23, pp. 204–209, on p. 209.
For detailed descriptions of these meetings and the movement behind them, see Chapter 1, “Ernst Mach and the fortunes of positivism” in my book Science and Anti-science, and in my two articles on the subject, “From the Vienna Circle to Harvard Square: The Americanization of a European world conception,” in F. Stadler (Ed.), Scientific philosophy: Origins and developments (pp. 47–73) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993); and “On the Vienna Circle in exile: An eyewitness report,” in E. Köhler, W. Schimanovich, F. Stadler (Eds.), The foundational debate (pp. 269–292; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995 ).
Among other participants in these meetings were Karl Deutsch, Frank, Edwin C. Kemble, Hans Margenau, Ernest Nagel (as visitors), Harlow Shapley, Laszlo Tisza, and Paul Samuelson.
See endnote 1.
From the Harvard Archives’ Skinner Collection; still incomplete and being supplemented, it now contains 30 feet of letters and manuscripts.
The proceedings of the conference were published in the Scientific Monthly in 1954 and 1955 and then republished as a book by Beacon Press in 1956 under the title The validation of scientific theories,edited with an introduction by Philipp G. Frank. A glance at the book will show how difficult it would be to bring together today such a high-powered set of thoughtful speakers on such a variety of aspects of the culture of our time.
I have written on Bridgman as scientist and philosopher on a number of occasions, most recently in Chapter 11, “Percy W. Bridgman, physicist and philosopher,” in my book Einstein, history, and other passions ( New York: American Institute of Physics Press, 1995 ).
P.W. Bridgman, “The present state of operationalism,” in The validation of scientific theories.
Bridgman’s sense of isolation comes through in a letter of March 30, 1938, to Philipp Frank, whom Bridgman expected to see with “great pleasure”: “My work is done practically alone. I have no students [in philosophy of science] and have practically no contact with members of the department of philosophy and, in fact, most of them are not at all sympathetic with our point of view. The only young philosopher here whom I have particularly interested is Dr. Quine.”
P.W. Bridgman, “New vistas for intelligence” in Reflections,p. 370. In the end he pronounced that famous definition, “The scientific method consists of doing one’s damnedest with one’s mind, no holds barred” (pp. 57–58).
The quotations are from Maila L. Walter, Science and cultural crisis, pp. 188–191. They refer to Bridgman’s article “Rejoinders and second thoughts,” Psychological Review, 52, September 1945, pp. 281–283.
Harvard Archives, Skinner Papers, HUG(FP) 60.10, Box I.
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Holton, G. (2002). B. F. Skinner and P.W. Bridgman: The Frustration of a Wahlverwandtschaft . In: Heidelberger, M., Stadler, F. (eds) History of Philosophy of Science. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [2001], vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1785-4_26
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