Abstract
In this paper we will discuss constraints on the number of (non-dummy) players and on the distribution of votes such that local monotonicity is satisfied for the Public Good Index. These results are compared to properties which are related to constraints on the redistribution of votes (such as implied by global monotonicity). The discussion shows that monotonicity is not a straightforward criterion of classification for power measures.
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Holler, M.J., Ono, R. & Steffen, F. Constrained Monotonicity and the Measurement of Power. Theory and Decision 50, 383–395 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010335410952
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010335410952