Oppressive Praise
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5206/fpq/2021.4.13967Keywords:
praise, stereotypes, blame, moral responsibility, esteem, distribution, shifting standards, ameliorationAbstract
Philosophers have had a lot to say about blame, much less about praise. In this paper, I follow some recent authors in arguing that this is a mistake. However, unlike these recent authors, the reasons I identify for scrutinising praise are to do with the ways in which praise is, systematically, unjustly apportioned. Specifically, drawing on testimony and findings from social psychology, I argue that praise is often apportioned in ways that reflect and entrench existing structures of oppression. Articulating what is going wrong here helps us to see what to do about it.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2021 Jules Holroyd
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
The authors of work published in FPQ under the Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 License retain copyright to their work without restrictions and publication rights without restrictions. However, we request that authors include some sort of acknowledgement that the work was previously published in FPQ if part or all of a paper published in FPQ is used elsewhere.