Padua), Joseph V. Femia (Machiavelli), Deborah Baumgold (Hobbes), Jeremy Waldron (Locke), Paul Kelly (Hume; Bentham; J.S. Mill on Liberty), Yoshie Kawade (Montesquieu), David Boucher [again] (Rousseau; Oakeshott), Terence Ball (see p. 18 for an editorial 'oops') (Federalist Papers), Carole Pateman (Wollstonecraft), Cheryl Welch (Tocqueville), Jennifer Ring (J.S. Mill on the Subjection of Women), Alan Patten (Hegel), Laurence Wilde (early Marx), Paul Thomas (Marx and Engels), Nathan Widder (Nietzsche), Kenneth Baynes (Habermas), Rex Martin (again) (Rawls), Paul Patton (Foucault).

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Republicanism in the Modern World
John W. Maynor
Polity, Cambridge, 2003, x + 230pp.
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This book aims to present a version of republicanism appropriate to the moral and cultural diversity of the modern world, based on the account of freedom as non-domination developed notably by Pettit. This sees politics as addressing domination: the threat of arbitrary interference, rather than interference *per se* (as in negative conceptions of freedom), or realizing the political nature of citizens in politics (as in positive conceptions of freedom). It has been taken to lead to an instrumental or neo-Roman republicanism free of the alleged dangers inherent in the 'Athenian' participatory republicanism of Rousseau, Arendt and others. While Maynor takes Pettit's account as 'a start that signals the direction that modern republicanism must take' (p. 32), and works systematically through the implications of freedom as non-domination, he advances an independent account of republicanism that, as it turns out, is not as purely instrumental as such a starting point might suggest. Already in the first chapter, Maynor shows that the contrasts between ancient and modern liberty, Athenian and instrumental republicanism, are not as sharp as often assumed, and reminds us, for example, of Constant's belief that the two kinds of liberty need to be combined, and that institutions need to bring about the moral education of citizens.

The author identifies and elaborates in some detail on what he sees as three central pillars of republican non-domination: democratic contestatory institutions, civic education and the social norms that prevail in society. Institutions are designed to disperse and balance power in order to minimize potential

domination by the state as well as by individuals or groups, and also to encourage deliberation and engagement among diverse citizens. Not only is government action open to contestation and periodic review, but extensive popular consultation and participation are understood as necessary to promote non-domination. As well as institutional provisions, citizens need to develop civic virtue — on this account, to formulate their ends in ways that do not interfere arbitrarily with others. Thus, they need to learn to take account of others in framing their ends and goals, in a way that goes beyond liberal accounts of toleration and respect. Civic education plays a key role in making the ideals of non-domination an integral part of the public culture.

An interesting chapter roots this pluralistic republican approach in a detailed analysis of Machiavelli's treatment of factions, which distinguishes conflicts based on different perceptions of the common good, which promote liberty, from those based on competing self-interest, which are understood as corrupt deviations from the common good.

But perhaps the most important part of the book lies in the chapters defending this account from critics who argue that insofar as republicanism has anything valid to offer, it is indistinguishable from liberalism. Maynor squarely addresses this issue by detailing the ways in which his account differs from both neutralist liberalism and political liberalism, here represented by Kymlicka and Rawls respectively. In distinction from the first, republican politics promotes the 'quasi-perfectionist' good of non-domination, entails a deliberative public political sphere in which citizens publicly account for their views and listen to others, and allows more active state intervention to limit domination by individuals or groups in society. Against Rawls's belief that the instrumental version of republicanism is compatible with political liberalism, Maynor argues that the aim of promoting non-domination will be more demanding than Rawls's scheme; it cannot be limited to the basic structure of society, but promotes political virtues with positive spillover effects on the ends and character of non-dominated individuals. Secondly, political activity here has intrinsic as well as instrumental value, without being held to realise the highest end or true nature of human beings. Finally, the public realm does not require the bracketing of comprehensive doctrines, but allows the expression of all views that do not seek to dominate others. Thus, it will accommodate groups not insofar as they are liberal but insofar as they are non-dominating.

Maynor thus draws out the implications of non-domination more fully than Pettit has done. But he also diverges from Pettit, who, he argues, fails to follow through from his initial insights to see the connection between non-domination and autonomy, and does not adequately differentiate his theory from liberalism (p. 52). In contrast, Maynor favours the development of more reciprocal powers, as well as constitutional structures to minimize domination.

His contestatory democracy involves more popular engagement than Pettit's account. Also, he is prepared to be more explicit about the need for civic virtue (which Pettit prefers to call civility) and the central role of education in constraining the development of dominating ends (where Pettit gives a greater role to incentives). Whereas Pettit advocates a 'shared-value neutralism', Maynor describes his approach, while still instrumental, as a 'quasi-perfectionism'.

This book demonstrates convincingly that non-domination is a useful concept to apply to contemporary politics, though in places the discussion is somewhat hampered by the way in which the language of non-domination (for example, the tracking of interests) is spelled out rather abstractly, rather than being given more concrete meaning. The real strength and originality of this book is the way in which it brings non-domination republicanism to engage with the prevailing accounts of liberalism, and shows that the arguments for instrumental and participatory republicanism are less clearly separable than is sometimes assumed.

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Metaphysics, Method and Politics: The Political Philosophy of RG Collingwood
James Connelly
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RG Collingwood was once considered to be a neglected philosopher. No one could sensibly make such a judgement today. In part, this reflects changes in philosophical climate. In part, too, it indicates the willingness of contemporary philosophers to apply Collingwood's ways of thought to problems of their own — here Collingwood's writings on art are especially responsive to reconstruction and renewal, witness the recent revival of interest in Collingwood's expressivism. It also shows just how determined commentators on Collingwood are to plot the development of his thought. In this respect, the availability of Collingwood's manuscripts, together with their selective publication, is a powerful antidote to neglect.

Telling the story of Collingwood's thinking is James Connelly's aim in *Metaphysics, Method and Politics: The Political Philosophy of RG Collingwood.* It is a work that began life as a PhD dissertation and that has been thoroughly revised and brought up to date to take into account the more recent and