Abstract
In his bookMinimal Rationality (1986), Christopher Cherniak draws deep and widespread conclusions from our finitude, and not only for philosophy but also for a wide range of science as well. Cherniak's basic idea is that traditional philosophical theories of rationality represent idealisations that are inaccessible to finite rational agents. It is the purpose of this paper to apply a theory of idealisation in science to Cherniak's arguments. The heart of the theory is a distinction between idealisations that represent reversible, solely quantitative simplifications and those that represent irreversible, degenerate idealisations which collapse out essential theoretical structure. I argue that Cherniak's position is best understood as assigning the latter status to traditional rationality theories and that, so understood, his arguments may be illuminated, expanded, and certain common criticisms of them rebutted. The result, however, is a departure from traditional, formalist theories of rationality of a more radical kind than Cherniak contemplates, with widespread ramifications for philosophical theory, especially philosophy of science itself.
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I would like to thank Professor R. E. Butts and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario, Canada, for generous support and stimulating discussion during the research leave at which time this paper was prepared, and the University of Newcastle and its vice-chancellor, Professor K. Morgan, for support. I am greatly indebted to extended discussion with Professor H. I. Brown, to thoughtful comments from two anonymousSynthese referees, and to discussion with Professor W. Harper; between them they have sharpened and corrected the presentation at several places, especially Sections 3 (referees), 4passim (Brown), 4.1 (referee), 4.3 (Harper). More specific acknowledgement is given as appropriate.
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Hooker, C.A. Idealisation, naturalism, and rationality: Some lessons from Minimal Rationality. Synthese 99, 181–231 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064429
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064429