Abstract
If Husserl is correct, phenomenological inquiry produces knowledge with an extremely high level of epistemic warrant or justification. However, there are several good reasons to think that we are highly fallible at carrying out phenomenological inquiries. It is extremely difficult to engage in phenomenological investigations, and there are very few substantive phenomenological claims that command a widespread consensus. In what follows, I introduce a distinction between method-fallibility and agent-fallibility, and use it to argue that the fact that we are fallible phenomenologists does not undermine Husserl’s claims concerning the epistemic value of phenomenological inquiry. I will also defend my account against both internalist and externalist objections.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See, for instance, Hua XVI, p. 117; 1997, p. 98.
Thanks to David Jennings for suggesting the phrase “agent-fallibility.” David Roochnik has pointed out that this is somewhat misleading, since to be fallible at something at least implies the possibility of success, whereas the limiting case of agent-fallibility, as I am construing it, is sheer incompetence. Provided we bear this in mind, however, I think the term will not mislead.
“[S]eeing consciousness… is just acts of thought formed in certain ways, and things, which are not acts of thought, are nonetheless constituted in them, come to givenness in them…” (Hua II, p. 72; 1999, p. 52). As this passage suggests, to constitute an object in consciousness is to carry out those acts in which it is brought to givenness, which need not be a process of making or constructing it.
See Hua III, p. 340; 1982, p. 333: “To every region and category of alleged objects there corresponds phenomenologically not only a fundamental sort of sense… but also a fundamental type of originarily presentive consciousness of such senses and, belonging to it, a fundamental type of originary evidence which is essentially motivated by originary givenness of such a character.” David Woodruff Smith holds that everything in the world has, in addition to a form and a substrate, an “appearance,” which “is how it is known or apprehended” (Smith 2004, p. 17). An appearance, then, is part of a formal ontological structure “that applies to any entity in our kind of world,” and is, therefore, what the Scholastics would call a “transcendental” (p. 28).
For an excellent discussion of Husserl’s realism, see Willard (2002).
See, for instance, Alston (1989).
This is meant to resemble Lawrence Bonjour’s (former) insistence that in order for any empirical belief B to be justified, one must justifiably believe that (a) B has feature ϕ and (b) beliefs having feature ϕ are highly likely to be true (see Bonjour 1985, p. 31). Bonjour has, of course, since abandoned his coherentist, but not his internalist, ways (see Bonjour 1999).
There is another understanding of agent-reliabilism according to which it poses no threat to the position here. Suppose that I am unreliable when it comes to performing acts of phenomenological reflection, but I habitually base beliefs on acts of phenomenological reflection on those occasions when I carry it out properly. Then, when I come to believe that p on the basis of properly carrying out an act of phenomenological reflection, we can either say (a) I am not justified in believing that p, because performing acts of phenomenological reflection is not part of my cognitive character, or (b) I am justified, because basing beliefs on phenomenological reflections is part of my character. If we opt for (b), then agent-reliabilism poses no problem for this position. However, it can also be construed along the lines of (a), in which case it does pose a threat. The problem here is that the definition of agent-reliabilism—in addition to entailing that we believe beliefs—is ambiguous between having a disposition to carry out acts of a certain type and having a disposition to believe on the basis of those acts when they are carried out.
References
Alston, W. (1989). What’s wrong with immediate knowledge? In W. Alston (Ed.), Epistemic justification: Essays in the theory of knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the word. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bonjour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bonjour, L. (1992). Externalism/Internalism. In J. Dancy & E. Sosa (Eds.), A companion to epistemology (pp. 132–136). Oxford: Blackwell.
Bonjour, L. (1999). Foundationalism and the external world. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 229–249.
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Drummond, J. (2007). Phenomenology: Neither auto- nor hetero- be. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6, 57–74.
Føllesdal, D. (1988). Husserl on evidence and justification. In R. Sokolowski (Ed.), Edmund Husserl and the phenomenological tradition (pp. 107–129). Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.
Goldman, A. (1979). What is justified belief? In G. S. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge (pp. 1–23). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Greco, J. (1999). Agent reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 273–296.
Hopp, W. (2008). Husserl, phenomenology, and foundationalism. Inquiry, 51, 194–216.
Husserl, E. (1963). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. Husserliana S. Strasser (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Cartesian meditations (D. Cairns, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
Husserl, E. (1966). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926. Husserliana XI. M. Fleisher (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis (A. J. Steinbock, Trans.). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
Husserl, E. (1973a). Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Husserliana II. W. Biemel (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. The idea of phenomenology (L. Hardy, Trans.). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
Husserl, E. (1973b). Ding und Raum. Husserliana XVI. U. Claesges (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Thing and space (R. Rojcewicz, Trans.). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
Husserl, E. (1974). Formale und transzendentale Logik. Husserliana XVII. P. Janssen (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Formal and transcendental logic (D. Cairns, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phänomenologie. Husserliana III. K. Schuhman (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology (F. Kersten, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
Husserl, E. (1984). Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Husserliana XIX U. Panzer (Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Logical investigations (J. N. Findlay, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
Smith, D. W. (2004). Mind world. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Thomasson, A. L. (2005). First-personal knowledge in phenomenology. In D. W. Smith & A. L. Thomasson (Eds.), Phenomenology and the philosophy of mind (pp. 115–139). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Van Cleve, J. (1979). Foundationalism, epistemic principles, and the Cartesian circle. The Philosophical Review, 88, 55–91.
Willard, D. (2002). The world well won: Husserl’s epistemic realism one hundred years later. In D. Zahavi & F. Stjernfelt (Eds.), One hundred years of phenomenology (pp. 69–78). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Zahavi, D. (2007). Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6, 21–43.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to David Jennings, Lynn Niizawa, and Irina Meketa for their extensive and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. And thanks most of all to George Heffernan, whose meticulous and insightful comments have greatly enhanced my understanding of Husserl’s account of evidence.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hopp, W. Phenomenology and Fallibility. Husserl Stud 25, 1–14 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-008-9053-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-008-9053-3