Abstract
It is customary to think that Objective List (“OL), Desire-Satisfaction (“D-S”) and Hedonistic (“HED”) theories of prudential value pretty much cover the waterfront, and that those of the three that are “subjective” are naturalistic (in the sense attacked by Moore, Ross and Ewing), while those that are “objective” must be Platonic, Aristotelian or commit the naturalist fallacy. I here argue for a theory that is both naturalistic (because voluntaristic) and objective but neither Platonic, Aristotelian, nor (I hope) fallacious. In addition, this proposal, called “CHOICE,” is an example of neither an OL, D-S, nor HED theory. It is a theory according to which uncoerced choosings create objective values that we (even everyone) may be wrong about, because valuations are conative rather than epistemic activities. On this view, intrinsic prudential goods necessarily involve likely (pursuant to lawlike regularities) net increases in successful free choosings.
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Notes
I discuss this in Horn (2018).
I should stress at the outset that I intend my terminology and taxonomy to be traditional here, consistent, e.g., with the classifications of Hobbes as a voluntarist and of Stevenson as a subjectivist. I cannot, therefore, endorse anything like the heterodoxical parsing recently suggested by Ferkany (2012), according to which (what he calls) “Voluntarism” is a matter of whether a person would agree (perhaps after reflection) that some state of affairs is something toward which she has a pro-attitude. Ferkany contrasts such theories with something he calls “Intellectualism,” which is taken to mean what pretty much everyone else calls “objectivism”—i.e., views according to which items may be good for us regardless of what attitudes people may have toward them. Ferkany also defines “Psychologism” as something that makes well-being exclusively a function of experiential states, and then, somewhat confusingly, goes on to make what he calls “Subjectivism” true just in case either Voluntarism or Psychologism is true. Finally, he makes well-being Objective “insofar as either [Voluntarism or Psychologism] is false.” Thus, on his view, such hedonistic items as “A life full of simple pleasures” could neither be nor be a constituent of any Objective-List” of intrinsic prudential goods. Furthermore, under Ferkany’s scheme, a theory of prudential value can be both objectivist and subjectivist. To be fair, it may be equally difficult for some readers to swallow my McDowellesque contention that a value judgement may be objective (have “objective purport”) and yet be false. See my definitions of “objective theories” and “subjective judgments” below.
I will not here discuss aesthetic value, but I have touched a toe in those waters in Horn (2015).
These three basic positions are set forth very nicely in the opening pages of Keller (2009), although HED is there called “the mental state theory.”
This is stated a bit too categorically, since nothing prevents an OL from containing elements, like happiness, that seem to require positive attitudes.
As will be discussed below, OLs may also be classified as Enumerative or Explanatory, and as Variable or Invariable.
A good discussion of the proper placement of various styles of hedonic theories may be found in Dorsey (2011).
Sharp (1941), see pp. 253–254.
Hare (1963); see p. 196.
Sumner (1995), see p. 768.
Heathwood (2014); see p. 205). Similarly, Keller, ‘Welfare as Success,’ makes the objectivity/subjectivity characterization a function of whether the item being considered is deemed valuable because of, or independently of the valuation.
Or, I suppose, unconsciousness—so long as they must be the acts of a person. See, e.g., Perry (1926), particularly chh. 8–9.
Sobel (1997), makes the same point when he notes that Sumner leaves “room to worry that he did not notice that on the necessary condition interpretation the objectivist can allow that the agent’s attitudes play a (perhaps crucial) role in shaping her good. The more the objectivist allows this, the more they can capture the subject-relativity of well- being in just the way that Sumner approves.” (pp. 506–507).
I discuss this sort of epistemic “power” in Horn (2018).
Voluntarism is thus unsympathetic to G.E. Moore’s disgust with uninhabited, never-seen ugly worlds and his paeon to the intrinsic value of never-to-be-experienced beautiful ones.
See, however, note 52 below.
Thus, divine command theories are voluntaristic, as are some versions of theories according to which there is nothing to value judgements but autobiographical commentary or expressions of emotion. But neither divine command theories nor anything like emotivism is necessary to voluntarism; all that is required is, roughly, that for all states of affairs P, without some act of valuation regarding P, P could be neither valuable nor “disvaluable.” A more precise definition is offered below.
These elaborations of D-S are discussed in Section 3.
The “only if, because of, and during only such times as” may be precisely what Sobel (2009) would take to constitute what he calls “grounding.” That would make all voluntaristic “conferrings” of value subjective. If so, I don’t share his intuitions on this matter. I believe I take the orthodox position in holding that what it is easy for any of us to be wrong about (and that others may sometimes have a better perspective on) cannot be a subjective judgment. See also, Sobel (1997).
Additional argument would be required to show that all naturalist positions are voluntarist. Perfectionists may claim that human flourishing is both naturally value-enhancing and non-voluntaristic.
Lewis, ‘Dispositional Theories of Value,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63: 113–137. Dorsey (2012) also suggests that “The argument from the metaphysics of ‘good’ has an important place in arguments for D-S. D-S is often defended on grounds of naturalism, i.e., that it is most consonant with our naturalist, scientistic worldview.” Dorsey credits Connie Rosati for reminding him of this virtue. See p. 435.
This criticism is made also by Bradley (2007). OL defenders have seemed largely untroubled by charges of non-illumination, however. Rice (2013) seems to attempt to handle the objection that OL theories are merely enumerative mostly by saying the word “because” loudly in such sentences as “Friendships are constituents of a person’s well being because they involve friendship, an intrinsic prudential good.” One may doubt, however, whether throwing in even an italicized “because” can make such a claim explanatory. Firkany (‘The Objectivity of Well-Being’) puts his similar defense this way: “[S]ome things just do make our lives go well for us, and we think they do so because of that fact.” See p. 486. Perhaps to his credit, Fletcher (2016) attempts no such argument to the effect that OL is anything but enumerative. Instead, he is perfectly content to take an approach that that may remind some observers of Oxford casualism of the 1960s. On Fletcher’s view, we must only ensure that we have hold of a good list of items, and we can do that simply by noting what ordinary people put on such lists when discussing their lives. Indeed, he suggests (Fletcher 2009) that we go even further in the direction of Austin by dividing up theories of prudential value according to whether they are “variabilist” or “invariabilist,” i.e., whether a HED theory makes all pleasures valuable at all times; a D-S theory makes all desires (or satisfactions) in every instance value-generating; or an OL theory makes such things as friendships valuable whatever a person may think about friendships at any time. And he takes a theory of well-being to be defective to the extent that it is unable to adjust for issues or concerns of the moment. All three philosophers suggest that those who disdain OL for being unilluminating support theories that can actually do no better themselves.
Sumner, ‘The Subjectivity of Welfare’; see p. 769.
For extensive bibliographies of political and welfare economists working in this area in the twentieth Century, see Mishan (1960); and Brock (1973); See also Feldman (2004); Korobkin (2009); and Ellerman (2015). Of course, much of the work of such well-known observers as Arrow, Barry, Baumol, Beitz, Bergson, Braybrooke, Buchanan, Dahl, Downs, Dworkin, Fishburn, Hansson, Harsanyi, Hayek, Hausman, Hicks, Little, May, Nozick, Posner, Rawls, Riker, Samuelson, Sen, and Waldron is devoted to—and in some cases quite critical of—claimed connections between choice (individual or social) and individual or general welfare. I will briefly discuss a couple of the principal criticisms in Section 4.
For defense of a contrary claim, one according to which objective interpersonal weightings of preferences are indeed impossible, but nevertheless remain essential to any just electoral process, see Hayden (2003).
For expression of the view that naturalism actually has nothing whatever to offer except positions that are (falsely) alleged to be immune from criticisms leveled at OL, see Fletcher (2013); and Rice, ‘Defending the Objective List Theory of Well-Being.’ Much more even-handed defenses of OL can be found in Arneson, “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction” and Kraut (1994). It is my hope that the value standard proposed here makes significant progress toward meeting the challenges specified for voluntaristic theories in those two eloquent defenses of Perfectionism.
See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 511.
To handle pointlessness, the idealization might also involve the requirement that the desired state of affairs is essentially connected to a particular person’s life. See Dorsey, ‘Subjectivism Without Desire,’ pp. 420–421.
For two examples, see Heathwood, ‘Desire Satisfaction and Hedonism’ Philosophical Studies 128: 539–563; and Bronsteen et al. (2010).
These include Sidgwick, Brandt, Lewis, Railton, Griffin, Kagan, Sobel and many others.
Dorsey, ‘Subjectivism Without Desire.’
Keller, ‘Welfare as Success’ makes a similar point. Enoch (2005) provides a thorough-going critique of claims of the consistency of idealization techniques and value-subjectivity. Sobel’s response, ‘Subjectivism and Idealization’ includes the statement that to say “it is one’s desires that determine one’s well-being is to hold that it is whether one wants X that determines whether one benefits in getting X”; see p. 346. However, Sobel does not tell us enough about what he means by “determine” to enable us to distinguish between what may be taken as a rationale for voluntarism and what must be taken as a defense of full-blown subjectivism.
For good examples, see, again, Heathwood, ‘Desire Satisfaction and Hedonism’; and Bronsteen, Buccafusco et al., ‘Welfare as Happiness,’
See Butler (1827).
See Horn (2013).
This tack is taken by Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life, who also allows for adjustments based on desert.
Sumner (1998) also takes Feldman to task on this matter. He questions the consistency of consequentialism with a position that takes value enhancements to be based on desert or veridicality, because such enhancements appear to “violate the traditional assumption that the good is prior to the right”; see p. 178. On Sumner’s view, Feldman’s approach “abandons the traditional utilitarian project by rejecting the idea that principles about desert (and fairness, justice, etc.) are to be derived from the maximization of the good, [since] they are somehow or other (how?) determined independently and then used to partially define the good to be maximized.” Keller, ‘Welfare as Success’ makes a similar criticism; see p. 679.
See Dorsey ‘Subjectivism Without Desire,’ pp. 420–421 for coverage of a couple of innings.
‘Subjectivism Without Desire’ p. 423.
‘The “Proof” of Utility in Bentham and Mill,’ p. 10.
It may seem that this problem can be handled by putting a prima facie or pro tanto qualifier before the “good” in the first sentence, but this would require us to have some more fundamental axiom to rely on for determining what is intrinsically good.
For the original versions, see Hall, ‘A Categorial Analysis of Value,’ pp. 342–343 and What is Value, pp. 185–187.
Note that there is no danger of any standard of this sort being deemed subjective, if only because none is intended as a contingent proposition.
The voluntarism endorsed here refers exclusively to what is valuable for persons. Of course, Aristotelians often make much of the fact that it is reasonable to claim that things can be made better or worse for non-sentient entities: see Kraut (2007). I don’t deny that sunlight is in some sense “good for” clover (as is oxygen for cancer cells and erosion for canyons) and that this would be so even if there had never been sentient entities. But while it seems absurd to claim that what is good for clover, cancer or canyons is, all else equal, intrinsically good simpliciter (i.e. good for the world as a whole), it seems to me at least plausible that a net increase in what is good for sentient entities over the long term makes the universe a better place whatever may happen elsewhere. In any case, I consider it basic that for something to be intrinsically good its occurrence or instantiation must, if all else is unchanged, make the world a better place.
For an excellent discussion of the error in claiming that the existence of a successful choice or satisfied want is sufficient to produce a social or political good, see Barry (1973).
Of course, an intrinsically (prudentially) good act may also be immoral: I make no attempt here to explicate moral values.
See Arneson on “cheap thrills” in ‘Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction,’ p. 120.
See Samuelson (1938),
Broome, ‘Choice and Value in Economics.’
Sen (1970).
See, e.g., Hausman (2000). For what I take to be a decisive critique of the view that preferences are reduceable to behaviors, see any of the works on “bounded rationality” by Herbert A. Simon or James W. March.
This, too, would require an axiom; it is no more strictly derivable from CHOICE than “with each counting as one and none counting as more than one” is derivable from Benthamic HED. But it seems to me a highly intuitive addendum.
Or, perhaps more precisely, “pluritarianism.” The point is that the hunt for cardinal utility values can be abandoned in favor of counting final choices, whether or not one endorses simple majoritarianism.
See Wootton (1945).
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Larry Tapper, John De Mouy, and several anonymous contributors to The Skeptical Zone website.
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Horn, W. CHOICE: an Objective, Voluntaristic Theory of Prudential Value. Philosophia 48, 191–215 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00117-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00117-0