Abstract
In “Contents just are in the head” (Erkenntnis 54, pp. 321–4.) I have presented two arguments against the thesis of semantic externalism. In “Contents just aren’t in the head” Anthony Brueckner has argued that my arguments are unsuccessful, since they rest upon some misconceptions regarding the nature of this thesis. (Erkenntnis 58, pp. 1–6.) In the present paper I will attempt to clarify and strengthen the case against semantic externalism, and show that Brueckner misses the point of my arguments.
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A. Horowitz (2001) ArticleTitle‘Contents just are in the head’ Erkenntis 54 321–44 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1010747032196
A. Brueckner (2003) ArticleTitle‘Contents just aren’t in the head’ Erkenntis 58 1–6 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1021889421860
A. Horowitz (1996) ArticleTitle‘Putnam, Searle and Externalism’ Philosophical Studies 81 27–69 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00354478
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Horowitz, A. Externalism, the environment, and thought-tokens. Erkenntnis 63, 133–138 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-1038-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-1038-4