Abstract
R. C. Jeffrey has proposed probabilism as a solution to Hume's problem of justifying induction. This paper shows that the assumptions of his Estimation Theorem, used to justify induction, can be weakened to provide a more satisfactory interpretation. It is also questioned whether the use of probabilism adds significantly to our understanding (or even Hume's understanding) of the problem of induction.
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References
Finetti, Bruno de: 1938, ‘Sur la condition d'équivalence partielle’, Actualitiés Scient. et Inductr., No. 739, Hermann & Cie, Paris. (English translation in Jeffrey (1980), p. 194)
Hume, David: 1888, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby Bigge (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 89.
Jeffrey, Richard C. (éd.): 1980, Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Vol. 2, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley.
Jeffrey, Richard C.: 1986, ‘Probabilism and Induction’, Topoi 5, 51–58.
Rosenkrantz, R. D.: 1982, ‘Does the Philosophy of Induction Rest on a Mistake?’, The Journal of Philosophy 79, 78–97.
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Hosack, J. On probabilism and induction. Topoi 10, 227–229 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141342
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141342