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The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on Factualism

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Abstract

Davidson has famously argued that conceptual relativism, which, for him, is based on the content-scheme dualism, or the “third dogma” of empiricism, is either unintelligible or philosophically uninteresting and has accused Quine of holding onto such a dogma. For Davidson, there can be found no intelligible ground for the claim that there may exist untranslatable languages: all languages, if they are languages, are in principle inter-translatable and uttered sentences, if identifiable as utterances, are interpretable. Davidson has also endorsed the Quinean indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction. The early Quine, as well as the later Quine, believe that the indeterminacy of translation casts serious doubt on the existence of facts of the matter about correct translation between languages. In this paper, I will argue that Quine cannot be the target of Davidson’s argument against conceptual relativism, and that Davidson’s argument is in conflict, among others, with his endorsement of the Quinean indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction. I will show how this conflict results in a radical departure from Quine with respect to the matter of factualism about fine-grained meanings.

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Notes

  1. Consequently, there has been a huge literature on this argument. See, e.g., Baghramian and Coliva (2020: Chapter 4), Baghramian (1998; 2004: Chapter 7), Forrai (2001: Chaper 5), Bar-On (1994), Child (1994), Lynch (1998), and Hacker (1996).

  2. Different versions of CR have been supported by different philosophers including, for instance, James (1975; 1979), Lewis (1929), Kuhn (1962), Goodman (1978; 1996), Putnam (1987; 1988), and even Wittgenstein’s Investigations (1953). My concentration, however, will be on Davidson’s characterization of CR and his argument against it.

  3. See especially Davidson (1982; 1992; 1999c). For a discussion of this argument, see, e.g., Hossein Khani (2017; 2018b; 2019; 2020), Bernecker (2013), Glüer (2006), Goldberg (2008), Talmage (1997), Verheggen and Myers (2016), and Ludwig and Lepore (2005: 404–413).

  4. On such differences, see, e.g., Davidson (1983: 148, 151; 1990b: 319).

  5. See, e.g., Baghramian (2004: 199–201) and Henderson (1994: 172–173).

  6. See also Davidson (1974a: 17).

  7. See Davidson (1974a: 14).

  8. For more on his “Closet Metaphor”, see Davidson (1974a: 14).

  9. Davidson’s later discussion of triangulation and content externalism supports this claim. See, e.g., Davidson (1990a: 54–55).

  10. See, e.g., Davidson (1974a: 14).

  11. See also Quine (1951: 38; 1969b: 80–81).

  12. I believe Quine’s metaphor of the “Myth of a Museum” clarifies such a difference. See Quine (1969b: 27–30; 1981: 41).

  13. For more on this, see Miller (2006).

  14. Quine has changed his view on this matter. In 1981, he seems to be in agreement with Davidson (1981: 29). He considers different options and rationales behind it, especially in Quine (1990a: 99–101; 1990d). See also Bergström (1984), Newton-Smith (1978), and Severo (2007).

  15. See Davidson (1974a: 15–16).

  16. See, e.g., Davidson (1991: 162).

  17. See Davidson (1974a: 19).

  18. See Davidson (1988a: 40).

  19. I will say more about what Quine means by “untranslatable” here.

  20. See Quine (1970) and in general, his pre-1970 works on the topic, such Quine (1960; 1968; 1969b; 1970).

  21. This period starts with Quine (1975), and then Quine (1987; 1981) and continues to his later works such as Quine (1990a; 1990d; 1993; 1995).

  22. See, e.g., Quine (1970: 183).

  23. Quine puts the difference in terms of a metaphor that he calls the “Myth of a Museum”. See Quine (1969b: 27–30; 1981: 41).

  24. Two expressions have different fine-grained meanings if they have the same stimulus meaning but differ in the sort of unique meaning we (traditionally) expect them to possessas. On this, see Hossein Khani (2017; 2019; 2018a).

  25. Davidson has made his adherence to the Quinean indeterminacy thesis clear in several of his writings. For instance, he says, in 1999, that “I accept the indeterminacy of Word and Object” (1999a: 80); again that “there remain two important kinds of indeterminacy on which we [Davidson and Quine] agree: indeterminacy due to what Quine calls the inscrutability of reference, and indeterminacy that results from the blurring of the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic” (1997: 78). Some aspects of Davidson’s puzzling reading of Quine’s indeterminacy thesis have been discussed in the literature, recently by Kemp (2012: 127) and Hossein Khani (2017; 2019; 2018a).

  26. See, e.g., Davidson (1974a: 15–16).

  27. See Davidson (1974a: 20).

  28. See also Quine (1969b, 25; 1981: 28).

  29. The cornerstone of Davidson’s discussion of triangulation is the essentiality of our being caused by certain things to respond in a certain way to those things, together with others’ being caused by our responses to those things to respond to us. See, e.g., Davidson (1982; 1991; 1992; 1999b; 1999c; 2001c).

  30. See Quine (1990d: 1).

  31. See Quine (1993; 1995). Hylton describes Quine’s position as follows: For Quine, “[t]he relation of the whole theory, or some sizeable chunk, to experience is not all that there is, even on a Quinean account. The structure of the theory, the links among its component sentences, must also be taken into account. Will taking account of these matters suffice in every case to determine translation? Quine conjectures that it may not” (2007: 221).

  32. See Quine (1995: 78).

  33. On this distinction see Hossein Khani (2018a; 2021b).

  34. As Quine clearly puts it, “the indeterminacy of translation … clearly has nothing to do with inaccessible facts and human limitations. Dispositions to observable behavior are all there is for semantics to be right or wrong about … In the case of systems of the world, on the other hand, one is prepared to believe that reality exceeds the scope of the human apparatus in unspecifiable ways” (1990a: 101).

  35. And this mistake is very similar to the kind of mistake Chomsky made about Quine’s Argument from Above. See Chomsky (1968); see Quine (1968) for his reply to Chomsky: “Chomsky did not dismiss … He missed” the indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction (1968: 276). See  Hossein Khani (2017; 2018a) and George (1986) for a discussion of this.

  36. Obviously, these are not counted as a case of indeterminacy of translation for Quine. On a discussion of this issue see Hossein Khani (2018a).

  37. I believe the same can be shown to be the case in the case of Davidson’s later remarks on intention. See Hossein Khani (2021a).

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Gary Kemp for valuable comments on this article. I would like to thank audiences at IRIP and IPM, and an anonymous referee for this journal for constructive comments and suggestions.

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  1. School of Analytic Philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran

    Ali Hossein Khani

  2. Science Studies Group, Iranian Institute of Philosophy (IRIP), Tehran, Iran

    Ali Hossein Khani

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Hossein Khani, A. The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on Factualism. Acta Anal 38, 161–183 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00509-0

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