Abstract
Martin Peterson argues for two interesting and appealing claims: multi-dimensionalism and degrees of rightness. Multi-dimensionalism is the view that more than one factor determines whether an act is right. According to Peterson’s multi-dimensionalism, these factors are not simply ways of achieving some greater aggregate good. Degrees of rightness is the view that some actions are more wrong or less right than others without being entirely wrong. It is of course, compatible with this, that some actions are right or wrong to a maximal degree, or entirely right or wrong. Multi-dimensionalism and degrees are taken to be intertwined. On Peterson’s view, if there were only one dimension, we wouldn’t need degrees; where only one dimension applies, an act is entirely right or entirely wrong. Peterson claims that degrees of rightness or wrongness arise only because there are multi-dimensions, and that an act cannot be entirely right if it is wrong on some dimension. I shall argue against both of these claims.
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Notes
Verdictive reasons are roughly the same as Ross’s prima facie obligations.
The argument for degrees described here is supposed to be entirely independent of Peterson’s. The point is to show that one can find alternative motivations for that view; and that these motivations are consistent with a denial of multi-dimensionalism. See (Norcross and Howard-Snyder 1993 and Norcross 1997).
As an anonymous referee pointed out, there is also the fact that a wide range of actions may call for neither reward nor punishment. If we think of “right” as meaning something stronger than simply permissible, then the idea that there are actions that are neither right nor wrong would make sense. This need not complicate the very abstract point I am making here, I hope.
This example is modified from one that appears in (Ross 1930). His own example would probably work as well. But I want my example to avoid the worry that saving the child’s life is not morally required but supererogatory. Obviously, if you hit a child with your car, even if this was not your fault, you have a responsibility to see to it that he makes it to hospital.
In case the principle that “ought” implies “can” requires defense, see (Howard-Snyder 2006).
References
Howard-Snyder, F (2006) ‘Cannot’ implies ‘not ought‘, Philos Stud 130 (2) 233–246.
Norcross A (1997) Good and bad actions. Philos Rev 106:1–36
Norcross A, Howard-Snyder F (1993) A consequentialist case for rejecting the right. J Philos Res 18:109–125
Peterson M (2013) The dimensions of consequentialism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Ross WD (1930) The right and the good. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Martin Peterson and others at the conference on Peterson’s book at Constance University in November of 2013. Thanks also to my colleagues, Hud Hudson, Dan Howard-Snyder, Dennis Whitcomb, Ryan Wasserman, and to an anonymous referee, for helpful comments.
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Howard-Snyder, F. Degrees and Dimensions of Rightness: Reflections on Martin Peterson’s Dimensions of Consequentialism. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 31–38 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9661-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9661-x