Abstract
This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are popularly called ‘hinge propositions’.
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Notes
Throughout, OC denotes Wittgenstein (1969) On Certainty.
See esp. Misak (2004), who argues that Peirce also endorses the reverse claim—i.e. If (if inquiry into a hypothesis H were pursued long enough and well enough, then H would be believed) then H is true. I do not defend this claim here. Note I have also changed Misak’s wording by substituting ‘long enough and well enough’ for ‘as far as it could fruitfully go’.
Like Peirce I prefer to think that of propositions as the bearers of truth and falsity. I’ve used ‘hypothesis’ here just to emphasise that this is a claim about propositions into whose truth we might inquire. The relevance of this emphasis should become clear as we proceed.
Small caps denote the concept as distinct from the thing itself.
Many critics overlook this vital point, e.g. Wright (1992).
Peirce argues that our seeking the permanent fixation of belief will rule out things like wishful thinking (the ‘method of tenacity’) and belief that is forced or coerced (the ‘method of authority’).
It’s worth noting now (as I do again later), that Peirce’s view does not commit us to the view that one must be able to recognise when one has inquired long enough and well enough, that is, to be in something like epistemically ideal circumstances in order for us to know the truth of a proposition. This neutralises a popular objection to Peirce’s conception of truth, see e.g. Wright (1992).
An anonymous referee helpfully recommends Misak (forthcoming) as a source of further clarity. Regrettably the author was unable to acquire a copy prior to the completion of this paper.
Peirce saw his own philosophical project as an attempt to ‘correct and develop Kant’s philosophical vision’. Hookway (1998, p. 270). The relevant passages in Kant’s Critique are B221-2, B536-37, B672 and B675.
B672.
Bennett (1974, p. 271).
Ibid. p. 278.
CP 3.215 ‘Kant’s distinction of regulative and constitutive principles is unsound.’
Both quotations CP 2.113, emphasis added.
One answer I do not consider here is Peirce’s suggestion that ‘all that logic warrants is a hope not a belief’. Hookway (2002), for example, prefers to construe regulative assumptions as justified hopes. This approach has clear exegetical advantages. It also accommodates various claims prevalent in Peirce’s later work: that belief has no role to play in scientific investigation; that at best we may hope that our hypotheses are true, because we lack the reflective justification required for belief; that belief is only appropriate in vital matters (see e.g. CP 1.635). Despite its exegetical strength, I have doubts about the likely success of this strategy and propose to criticize it in future work. My main concerns are (a) if we understand belief as a disposition to act (as Peirce does), then there is no pragmatically legitimate way to draw the distinction Peirce needs here between a rational/justified hope and a belief, and (b) I am sceptical about the prospects of identifying a distinctive set of norms governing hopes versus beliefs to which we can appeal in saying a hope is ‘justified’ or ‘rational’.
It may be best to think of regulative assumptions as a special sub-class of hinge propositions, distinguished from others by their role in regulating a practice or activity.
Please excuse the deliberate pun—both meanings of ‘certain’ are fitting in this case.
This is Pritchard’s (2011) way of putting it.
OC §6 and §11.
It may be less confusing simply to drop the term ‘regulative assumption’ altogether in favour of hinge proposition, since the former has unhelpful Kantian overtones.
See Pritchard (2011, p. 7) for more on this point.
See OC §71–72 and Pritchard (2011, p. 11).
Pritchard (2011, p. 6). I have one reservation about this, inspired by Peirce (via Bernstein 2010, p. 43), which seems to represent an objection to the above proposal. The objection is this: grounds that are individually less certain than the conclusion they support can provide grounds if they are more certain when taken collectively. For example, imagine you receive 20 distinct eye-witness reports about a shooting that took place on a busy shopping street. Each individual report may be hazy, shaky and vague in lots of ways. Yet if every single report agrees on the identity of the shooter, then when taken collectively, those individually uncertain reports are quite sufficient, I take it, to justify a belief about the identity of the shooter. Now Moore’s anti-sceptical move is clearly not analogous to the eye-witness case. His claim to know he has hands is based solely on immediate perceptual awareness. Taken this way, Wittgenstein’s objection stands. The objection does however raise an interesting possibility: that one might claim (legitimately, by Wittgenstein’s own standards) to know some hinge proposition, on the basis of many individually weak, but collectively strong pieces of evidence. The hinge strategist would presumably have to make some sort of concession (how significant, I don’t know), if, when taken together, those many weak claims are genuinely more certain than the conclusion. As far as I can tell, this is a bare possibility, and not something we need worry about unless or until someone can make a case for what is uncontroversially a hinge proposition being open to support from a large number of collectively more certain, individually weak pieces of evidence.
p. 172.
For those who feel it does not, the subsequent discussion of objections to the proposal will, I hope, supply greater illumination.
CP 2.113.
I suggest later that one cannot even raise legitimate or genuine doubts about the truth of (T).
Another relevant observation on the No Grounds feature: the burden of proof—to come up with grounds for (T) stronger than (T) itself—would again seem to be firmly on the critic here, and the critic is unlikely even to want to meet this burden, since they think (T) is false anyway.
See e.g. Nesher (2001).
More on this in Sect. 3.3.
See e.g. CP 5.498, CP 5.505 or Johanson (1994, p. 175).
I’m inclined to agree with Hookway’s argument that ‘when Peirce attempted to work out the details of his philosophical picture for his logic text in the early 1870s, he was forced to confront some problems which he could not answer.’ Hookway (2002), p. 18. Unlike Hookway—as noted in footnote 17—I believe Peirce’s hope-based solution was not the right approach to solving the problem.
This is strikingly similar to Pritchard’s (2011) point about the structure of reasons.
I’m grateful to Steve Burwood for pressing this point.
See Johanson (1994, p. 174), CP 5.451, and CP 5.509-10.
It is odd, but not contradictory I take it, to speak of being uncertain about whether or not one is certain. Consider its plainly well-formed opposite—I’m certain that I am uncertain about p.
Bernstein (2010, p. 34).
Note that this feature of Peirce’s account is also overlooked by some of his critics. See in particular Wright (1992).
Hookway (2007, p. 10).
Putnam (1995, pp. 151–181).
Hookway (2007, p. 11).
Op. Cit. p. 12.
I’m heavily indebted to Joe Morrison for this example & response.
See in particular, Russell (1946).
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Prof. Chris Hookway, Dr. Joe Morrison, and two anonymous referees for invaluable commentary and conversation about this paper. I am also grateful to audiences at the University of Hull and the University of Sheffield for lively and useful discussion of the ideas contained herein.
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Howat, A.W. Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth. Erkenn 78, 451–468 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9351-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9351-6