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The contemporary state of philosophy of science in Britain

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Summary

Some of the problem areas in which British philosophers of science have recently been engaged are described and some of the major contributions noted. Two sets of problems are given special attention: one concerned with the analysis of probability statements and one concerned with the appraisal of scientific theories. Three traditions in the approach to this second set of problems are distinguished. These might be called the Carnapian, the Popperian and the Wittgensteinian traditions.

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Literatur-Verzeichnis

  1. D. A. Gillies,An Objective Theory of Probability, 1973.

  2. J. R. Lucas,The Concept of Probability, 1970.

  3. D. H. Mellor, “Connectivity, Chance and Ignorance” (I),British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 16, 1965; “Connectivity, Chance and Ignorance (II)”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18, 1967; “Chance”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 43, 1969; “God and Probability”,Religious Studies, 5, 1969;The Matter of Chance, 1971.

  4. K. R. Popper, “The Propensity Interpretation of Probability”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 10, 1957; “The Propensity Interpretation of the Calculus of Probability and the Quantum Theory”, in S. Korner (ed.):Observation and Interpretation, Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium of the Colston Research Society, 1966; “Quantum Machanics without ‘The Observer’”, in M. Bunge (ed.):Quantum Theory and Reality, 1964.

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  6. J. R. Lucasop. cit.

  7. I. J. Good,Probability and Weighing of Evidence, 1948.

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  10. I. Hacking, “Jacques Bernoulli'sArt of Conjecturing”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 22, 1971; Equipossibility Theories of Probability”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 22, 1971.

  11. I. Hacking, “The Leibniz-Carnap Programme of Inductive Logic”,Journal of Philosophy, 68, 1971.

  12. H. B. Hesse, “A Self-Correcting Observation Language”, in B. van Rootselaar and J. F. Staal (eds.):Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 1968; “Confirmation of Laws”, in Morgenbesser, Suppes, White (eds.):Philosophy, Science and Method: Essays in Honour of Ernest Nagel, 1969; “Probability as the Logic of Science”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1972; andThe Structure of Scientific Inference, 1974.

  13. D. V. Lindley,Inference, 1965.

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  16. I. Lakatos, “Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic”, in I. Lakatos (ed.):The Problem of Inductive Logic, 1968.

  17. C. Howson, “Must the Logical Probability of Laws be Zero?”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 24, 1973.

  18. D. Miller, “The Truth-Likeness of Truthlikeness”, Analysis33, 1972; “Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 1974; “On the Comparison of False Theories by their Bases”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 1974.

  19. L. J. Cohen, “What has Confirmation to do with Probabilities?”,Mind, 75, 1966;The Implications of Induction, 1970.

  20. K. R. PopperConjectures and Refutations, 1963, p. 217.

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  23. I. Lakatos “Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic” inThe Problem of Inductive Logic, 1968.

  24. A. E. Musgrave “Logical versus Historical Theories of Confirmation”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 1974.

  25. See I. Lakatosop. cit. and “Popper zum Abgrenzungs- und Induktionsproblem” in H. Lenk (ed.)Neue Aspekte der Wissenschaftstheorie, 1971.

  26. In various parts of hisThe Open Society and its Enemies, 1945 and hisThe Poverty of Historicism, 1957.

  27. See especially his “Ideal Types and Historical Explanation” in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds.)Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 1953; his “Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 8, 1957; and his “Imperfect Rationality” in Borger and Cioffi (eds.)Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences, 1970.

  28. W. W. BartleyRetreat to Commitment, 1972.

  29. See,e.g. J. W. N. Watkins “Comprehensively Critical Rationalism”,Philosophy, 64, 1969.

  30. J. W. N. Watkins “Between Analytic and Empirical”,Philosophy, 32, 1957; and “Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics”,Mind, 67, 1958.

  31. J. Agassi “Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics” in M. Bunge (ed.)The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, 1964.

  32. G. BuchdahlMetaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, 1969.

  33. For the first attempted solution see PopperConjectures and Refutations, 1963, Ch. 10 and appendix, for the second seeObjective Knowledge, 1973, Ch. 2.

  34. David Miller “Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude” and “On the Comparison of False Theories by their Bases” inBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 1974.

  35. See, for example, PolanyiPersonal Knowledge, 1958, KuhnThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962 and Feyerabend “Problems of Empiricism II” in Colodny (ed.)The Nature and Function of Scientific Theory, 1969.

  36. See, for example, J. Giedymin “Consolations for the Irrationalist?”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23, 1972.

  37. Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.)Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 1970.

  38. Notably his “Proofs and Refutations”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 14, 1963–4.

  39. E. G. Zahar “Why did Einstein's Programme supersede Lorentz's?”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 24, 1973.

  40. See, for example, Lakatos and Zahar “Why did Copernicus' Programme supersede Lorentz's?” in R. Westerman (ed.)The Copernican Achievement, 1974; and J. Worrall “Thomas Young and the ‘Refutation’ of Newtonian Optics”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 1974.

  41. S. Latsis “Situational Determinism in Economics”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23, 1972 and P. Urbach “Progress and Degeneration in the IQ-debate”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 1974.

  42. I. Lakatos “History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions” in Buck and Cohen (eds.)Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 8, 1971.

  43. K. R. PopperObjective Knowledge, 1973.

  44. See for example Toulmin,The Uses of Argument, 1954 and R. HarréThe Principles of Scientific Thinking, 1970.

  45. ToulminHuman Understanding, 1973.

  46. Toulmin's phrase is ‘conceptual population’ but by a ‘concept’ he means a skill. (The accuracy of Toulmin's Darwinian metaphors is, by the way, challenged in L. J. Cohen's review inBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 24, 1973).

  47. See S. Körner,Experience and Theory, London, 1966; ‘Kant's Conception of Freedom’, Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy,Proceedings of the British Academy, 1967; andCategorial Frameworks, 1970.

  48. W. C. Kneale “Russell's Paradox and Some Others”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 22, 1971 and “Numbers and Numerals”,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23, 1972.

  49. J. L. MackieTruth, Probability and the Paradoxes, 1973.

  50. J. L. MackieThe Cement of the Universe, 1974.

  51. See especially his “The Origins of the Copernican Revolution”,Scientific American, 215, 1966.

  52. J. R. RavetzScientific Knowledge and its Social Problems, 1971.

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  1. Dept. of Philosophy, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, Aldwych, WC2A 2AE, 6B-London, Great - Britain

    Colin Howson & John Worrall

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  2. John Worrall
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Howson, C., Worrall, J. The contemporary state of philosophy of science in Britain. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5, 363–374 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801748

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