-
Views
-
Cite
Cite
Robert Howell, The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 65, Issue 258, January 2015, Pages 22–39, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu058
- Share Icon Share
Abstract
Russellian Monism, the view that phenomenal or protophenomenal properties serve as the categorical grounds of physical dispositions, has increasingly been thought to enjoy an advantage over traditional property dualism in that it avoids epiphenomenalism. This paper argues otherwise. Russellian Monism faces problems with mental causation that parallel those of traditional dualism. The best it can hope for is that phenomenal properties are causally relevant, but not in virtue of their phenomenality.
© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the Universityof St Andrews. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
Issue Section:
Article
You do not currently have access to this article.