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Does Communicative Retributivism Necessarily Negate Capital Punishment?

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Abstract

Does communicative retributivism necessarily negate capital punishment? My answer is no. I argue that there is a place, though a very limited and unsettled one, for capital punishment within the theoretical vision of communicative retributivism. The death penalty, when reserved for extravagantly evil murderers for the most heinous crimes, is justifiable by communicative retributive ideals. I argue that punishment as censure is a response to the preceding message sent by the offender through his criminal act. The gravity of punishment should be commensurate to the preceding criminal message, so that the offender can face up to the nature and significance of his crime. All murders are not the same. To measure up to the most evil and humanity-degrading murderous message, capital punishment should be the counter-message. Next, I argue that capital punishment does not necessarily violate human dignity. The death penalty and torture may both disrupt human dignity, yet in distinct ways. The death penalty terminates life, the vessel that holds together autonomy, while torture directly assaults autonomy. Torture is never permissible as a form of punishment. But death penalty, when used only on the extravagant evildoers, is justifiable, as life is thoroughly degraded by his own evil act. Further, I argue that mercy is integral to communicative retributivists’ theory of capital punishment.

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Notes

  1. See von Hirsch (1998).

  2. See Duff (2001, pp. 107–112).

  3. See Duff (2001, pp. 152–155) and Markel (2005, pp. 457–476).

  4. See Duff (2001, pp. 106–115).

  5. “Confrontational conception of retributivism” is how he dubbed his version of the communicative approach to retributive justice. See Markel (2011, p. 49).

  6. See Markel (2005, pp. 464–467).

  7. See Pojman and Reiman (1998, pp. 60–63).

  8. See Berns (1991, pp. 162–163).

  9. See van den Haag (1986, p. 1669).

  10. See Markel (2011, pp. 62–64).

  11. See Duff (2001, p. 142).

  12. See Kramer (2011, p. 74–77). There are conceptual alternatives. For example, Duff uses “relative proportionality” and “absolute proportionality”. See Duff (2001, p. 133).

  13. See Duff (2001, p. 143).

  14. As Duff puts it, the punishment is meant to “bring offenders to face up to the character and the significance of what they have done, and serve as apologetic reparation for the crime.” See Duff (2001, p. 142).

  15. As Jeffrey Reiman points out, it would “trivialize the harms those crimes caused and be no longer compatible with sincerely believing that the offender deserves to have done to him what he has done to his victim and no longer capable of impressing upon the criminal his equality with his victim.” See Reiman (1985, p. 128).

  16. See Nozick (1981, pp. 74–79).

  17. See Kramer (2011, pp. 104–110).

  18. See Markel (2009, pp. 1196–1197).

  19. See Kramer (2011, p. 107).

  20. See Markel (2009, p. 1211–1212).

  21. See Kramer (2011, p. 109).

  22. See Asuka (2011). For doubts about such cultural explanations, see Lane (2005).

  23. See Arendt (1994, p. 279).

  24. See Arendt (1994, p. 277).

  25. See Arendt (1994, p. 277).

  26. See Murphy and Hampton (1988, p. 25).

  27. See Murphy and Hampton (1988, p. 44).

  28. See Primoratz (1989, pp. 158–167), Pojman and Reiman (1998, pp. 27–33) and Berns (1991, pp. 162–163).

  29. Hugo Bedau uses this point in his arguments for abolition, when he criticizes Kant’s retributive idea on death penalty for being too abstract to explain murderers whose state of mind does not necessarily warrant execution. See Bedau (1987, pp. 16–18).

  30. See Zimbardo (2008).

  31. For a description of Bundy’s crimes, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Bundy (last visited May 14, 2013).

  32. See Stone (2009, pp. 217–221).

  33. Mailer (1981, p. 6). Also quoted in Weisberg (2011, p. 42).

  34. Boswell (1887, p.470).

  35. This case is discussed by Jeffrie G. Murphy. See Murphy (2012, pp. 137–138).

  36. See Kant (1996(1785), p. 85).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, 128 Academia Road, Sec. 2, Nankang, Taipei, 11529, Taiwan

    Jimmy Chia-Shin Hsu

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Correspondence to Jimmy Chia-Shin Hsu.

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J.S.D., 2009, The University of Chicago Law School

An early draft of this paper was presented at "The 2012 Conference on Legal Thought and Social Change: Life and Justice" at Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan. I thank Matthew Kramer and Matt Matravers for their very helpful remarks at the conference. I also thank the anonymous referee for critical comments. My special thanks go to Douglas Husak for his meticulous editorial effort to improve this article.

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Hsu, J.CS. Does Communicative Retributivism Necessarily Negate Capital Punishment?. Criminal Law, Philosophy 9, 603–617 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-013-9261-6

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