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The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions

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Abstract

The paper provides an argument for the thesis that an agent’s degrees of disbelief should obey the ranking calculus. This Consistency Argument is based on the Consistency Theorem. The latter says that an agent’s belief set is and will always be consistent and deductively closed iff her degrees of entrenchment satisfy the ranking axioms and are updated according to the ranktheoretic update rules.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 91125, USA

    Franz Huber

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  1. Franz Huber
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Correspondence to Franz Huber.

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Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by Branden Fitelson

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Huber, F. The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions. Stud Logica 86, 299–329 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9062-9

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