Abstract
In this paper, I raise some questions about Pritchard’s (2005) internalist argument for scepticism. I argue that his internalism begs the question in support of scepticism. Correlatively I advance what I take to be a better internalist argument for scepticism, one that leaves open the possibility of empirically adjudicating sceptical hypotheses. I close by discussing what it means to be an internalist.
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Hudson, R.G. Pritchard’s angst. Acta Anal 21, 85–92 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1011-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1011-0