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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
The things I wish to say here are relatively few and simple. Reflection on certain moral phenomena suggests, by way of a rather loose dialectical argument, a certain traditional theory of the nature of virtue. This is the notion that virtue consists, partly, of acting on the basis of some principle. If we do not assume in advance some narrow conception of what principles are like, this theory can provide us with a plausible account of the virtue of courage. If we take it seriously and follow its implications where they lead us we can learn something, not only about virtue, but about the nature of principle as well.
1 In “Character and Thought,” American Philosophical Quarterly, (July 1978). I give a more ample argument for a broader theory which in fact entails this one: that traits of character in general (including both virtues and vices) are related to principles in this way.
2 This is similar to a view tentatively ascribed to Aristotle by Elizabeth Anscombe at the beginning of “Thought and Action in Aristotle.” Aristotle's Ethics, ed. By Walsh, J. and Shapiro, L. (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1967), pp. 56 and 57.Google Scholar
3 This method can be used here in spite of the fact that a courageous person need not see his situation as a problem (i.e., he may not see any need to deliberate about it): the same fact holds in the case of the engineer and the strategist.
4 Richards, D. A. J. A Theory of Reasons for Action (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 28,Google Scholar 29, and 43. Cf. Rawls, John A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407–424.Google Scholar
5 An interesting discussion of conflicts between such ends is to be found in Ronald de Sousa's “The Good and the True,” Mind, (October 1974).
6 I am assuming throughout this discussion that it is not the case that all things are pursued only because they secure some single end, such as pleasure or happiness; if that were so there would be no such thing as incommensurable ends.
7 Some conflicts which involve moral issues seem to provide counterexamples to this. Justice and wealth are generally incommensurable, but it is hardly absurd to think that, whenever a person can acquire a certain piece of property only by doing something unjust, he should choose Justice over wealth. This is only a counterexample if we suppose that Justice in such contexts is an end. It seems more plausible to regard it as a limit on both the ends and the means which an agent should permit himself.
8 “The Good and the True,” p. 551.
9 I have described it as a belief about one's own safety, and my safety does not seem to be a particular, as my dog and my typewriter are. At any rate, this belief about one's own safety is a belief about indefinitely many actual and possible situations, Just as beliefs about typewriters in general and dogs in general are about indefinitely many actual and possible objects.
10 For an account of generosity which supports the suggestion that it does not require self-mastery, see my “Generosity,” American Philosophical Quarterly (July 1975).
11 This paper was improved by comments made by Marc Kummel, Philippa Foot, Kurt Baier, and Deborah Katz Hunt on earlier drafts.
