are single events or the existence of single substances. This, however, would go against the spirit of Rundle's work, which is deeply grounded in ordinary language—witness his argument against causation at a distance. For we do call out for explanation of diachronic sets of occurrences: "Why did Pruss get up earlier on both this Monday and last Monday? Because he teaches Plato in the mornings on Mondays." Just as synchronous coincidences call out for explanations (and the explanation may simply cite some stochastic process that happened to produce both events) so do asynchronous ones.

Rundle could give another argument here, however. He expressly says that the PSR applies only to states of affairs which it is logically possible to explain. Now, a PSR restricted to explainable states of affairs is still a nontrivial PSR, since it implies that there is an explanation of why the house is on fire, because the state of affairs of the house being on fire clearly has an explanation in some possible worlds, say those that contain an arsonist. And the restriction is arguably not *ad hoc*. If Rundle's argument that theism is incoherent were sound, then he could contend that the whole sequence of events in history could only be explained by a nonspatiotemporal being's causality, whereas such causality is nonsense, so that it follows that the sequence cannot be explained, and hence is not subject to the PSR. However, Rundle's argument against theism is not sound.

Nonetheless, Rundle's book is one that should be read. Rundle proceeds in a particularly original anthropocentric "ordinary language" way, a way that is culturally alien to much atheistic writing in the philosophy of religion, which tends to err on the side of scientism. Yet, interestingly, the two sides meet: both Rundle and some scientistic critics of theism such as Adolf Grünbaum hold that divine causation is incoherent.

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The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Edited by Robert Kane. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 638 pages. $80.00.

The last forty years has seen a real renaissance in the philosophical exploration of free will and related subjects. The volume under review focuses on this period; it is not directly concerned with major thinkers from the past. Its twenty-four topical chapters, written by some of the leading figures in the field, cover the gamut of recent work on free will.

A crucial and perhaps ineliminable feature of our sense of self is that it is, at least sometimes, up to us what we do. Free agency, so understood, is important for a number of reasons. One is that we cannot but think of our-

selves as agents rather than patients; the practical business of living neces- sarily involves us in an "intentional stance" toward our own futures. Another is that the concept of moral responsibility and the "reactive atti- tudes" of gratitude, resentment, indignation, and the like, make little sense apart from the assumption that we are free agents. A conception of "free" that delivers these goods will need to satisfy two requirements. One is that the question of what we will do is not always already settled; our futures contain genuine alternatives. The other is that the question of what we will do, when it gets settled, is settled by us; ultimately, it is we who are the sources of our own actions. Call these the "Alternatives Condition" and the "Source Condition" respectively.

The philosophical "problem of free will" is driven principally by the question whether these conditions can be satisfied. Recent work on this question falls into one or more of the following eight subareas.

(1) *The compatibility question.* Is the existence of free will compatible with universal causal determinism? It would appear, on the face of it, that such determinism would threaten both the Alternative and the Source Condition. There are considerations on the other side, to be sure, based on the relationship between agency and character, proposed analyses of power- attributions, the role of reasons in the explanation of action, and the sense that our self-image as free agents runs so deep that it would be impervious to any empirical discovery. But Peter van Inwagen's careful and magisteri- al formulation of the so-called Consequence Argument, published just over twenty years ago, provided powerful support for an overall presumption in favor of the incompatibilist answer to the question. The significance of the Consequence Argument, and the implications of apparent counterexamples to the "Rule b" on which it relies, continue to attract considerable attention.

(2) *The truth of determinism.* The realization that determinism lapses at the subnuclear level antedates the period focused on in the book, but the rel- evance of this lapse is still matter for active debate. The important question is whether determinism, *of the sort that is arguably incompatible with free will*, is true. If determinism continues to reign at the molecular and cellular levels, where the neural events associated with the exercise of agency are presumably located, then determinism of the relevant sort is true, however much indeterminism may characterize events at the subnuclear level. Not surprisingly, discoveries in the neurosciences tend to confirm rather than disconfirm the causally determined workings of the brain and central ner- vous system. But they hardly establish neural determinism. Indeed, the conclusive establishment of macrodeterminism would seem to presuppose that quantum indeterminacy cannot be amplified to the macrolevel, a pre- supposition that appears to be refuted by the existence of, for example, Geiger counters.

(3) *The existence of free will*. Our initial presumption that we are free agents is threatened by the possibility that determinism is both true and incompatible with free will. It is also threatened by introspective reflection on the causes of our own actions ("there but for the grace of God go I"). Defenders of free will must therefore do more than cite its centrality to our ordinary conceptual scheme. Perhaps there are simply two perspectives we can take on the matter—an internal, subjective, and practical perspective that makes us the deciding factor in our own actions, and an external, objective, and theoretical perspective that places us within a larger nexus of causes—and it is a mistake to suppose that the former gets things right in a way that the latter, with equal or greater justification, cannot also claim to do. Deliberation, for example, requires a *belief* in an open future, but may not require that the future *be* open. Moral responsibility is surely harder to subjectivize. Still, opponents of free will may distinguish between a full-blooded moral responsibility that does require free will, and neighboring notions of "responsibility" that do not require free will. Defenders of free will need to say why the latter just are not good enough.

(4) *Logical and theological versions of the problem*. Determinism is not the only thesis that generates such problems for free will. The existence of true future-contingent propositions has also been thought to threaten human freedom, on the grounds that propositions describing future actions will already be true and the agent will therefore be unable to do otherwise, since no one can falsify what is already true. The position that such propositions exist and that their existence is incompatible with free agency is often called "logical" or "prior-truth" fatalism. An additional, though related, problem is generated by the thesis that an omniscient deity exists. It is this being's beliefs about future actions, and not just the truth of propositions about those actions, that are arguably incompatible with human freedom; here, to act otherwise is to falsify the belief of an essentially omniscient being, and that is surely impossible. The position that such a being exists and that human freedom is therefore impossible is often called "theological" fatalism. Both forms of fatalism, but especially theological fatalism (thanks to Nelson Pike's influential reformulation of the problem in 1965), have been subjects of renewed and lively debate during the period covered by this volume. Many of the issues driving this debate are also at the heart of the current controversy over "open theism."

(5) *Recent developments in compatibilism*. The idea that free will is somehow compatible with determinism was the majority position among philosophers throughout the twentieth century. While it probably continues to attract more support than incompatibilism, it no longer dominates the agenda the way it once did. This has been a healthy development, for compatibilism as well as for its rivals. A prominent feature of the "classical compatibilism" that reigned forty years ago was the analysis of power—or

ability—claims in terms of conditionals declaring that the person *would* do what they had the power or ability to do *if* they did something else (for example, chose to do it, tried to do it, and so on). Incompatibilists countered that such analyses failed to reconcile determinism with free *will*, since they had nothing to say about the all-important power to *choose or try* otherwise. The "new compatibilism" is more likely than the old to recognize the justice of this charge. One sign of this recognition is the proliferation of "mesh theories" which highlight the relation (or "mesh") between a person's will and the rest of their motivational and valuational structure. A prominent example is Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical view of the self, in which the will is free when one's first-order volitions are in conformity with one's second-order volitions.

(6) *Recent developments in libertarianism.* Incompatibilists have to choose between free agency and determinism, and libertarians choose free agency. Based on the number of prominent analytic philosophers who have endorsed libertarianism, this option would appear to be more respectable today than it was forty years ago. Perhaps the most pressing question facing libertarians is how indeterminism can be harnessed so that it makes a positive contribution toward a free will worth wanting, rather than undermining it from another direction. The problem is that, if determinism seems incompatible with free will, indeterminism can seem equally incompatible. If there are causes that do not necessitate, it may be possible to pass between the horns of this dilemma. It has also been claimed that the dilemma presupposes a single species of causal determination, called "event causation," and that the dilemma can therefore be avoided by positing a further type of causation, called "agent causation." Here indeterminism makes its contribution by providing space within the event-causal nexus for agent causation to operate. Libertarians who go this route, like Roderick Chisholm, William Rowe, Timothy O'Connor, and Randolph Clarke, must defend the metaphysical propriety of this alternative to event causation. Other libertarians—for example, Carl Ginet, Storrs McCall, and Robert Kane himself—are dubious of this project and disinclined to posit a new species of causation. Their task is to sketch a purely event-causal process, certain nodes of which are causally undetermined, such that a choice issuing from this process can plausibly be regarded as "teleologically intelligible."

(7) *Recent developments in hard determinism.* Incompatibilists who opt for determinism over free agency are called "hard determinists." The news here concerns not so much hard determinism *per se* as what Kane calls "successor views to hard determinism." What distinguishes these "successors" from the old hard determinism is that their denial of free will rests more on its alleged unintelligibility than on a commitment to the empirical thesis that determinism (of the appropriate sort) is true. Since what we want, when we want free will (full-blooded moral responsibility,

deliberation among genuinely open alternatives, and so forth), is not in fact available, the situation must be faced squarely. Perhaps something in the neighborhood of free agency can be salvaged; perhaps we can even come to think of what was lost as "good riddance to bad rubbish." Alternatively, it may be, as Saul Smilansky has argued, that the only thing left is the necessary "illusion" of free will. A related approach, which further distances itself from the old hard determinism, is Richard Double's "free will subjectivism": free agency is important because of its normative implications (for example, its legitimation of praise and blame), but if these implications are themselves construed subjectively, as they would be under a subjectivist metaethics, there is no need for free will itself to be anything more than subjective.

(8) *Questioning the Alternatives Condition.* Another essay that transformed the current discussion was Harry Frankfurt's 1969 attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, or PAP, which he formulated this way: a person is morally responsible for what he did only if he could have done otherwise. To deny PAP, as Frankfurt urged, is in effect to deny the Alternatives Condition for free agency. At the heart of Frankfurt's argument was a counterexample in which a special mechanism—a "counterfactual intervener"— appeared to strip the agent of alternatives while leaving intact the intuition that the agent was morally responsible for his action. Counterexamples of this sort, which have come to be called "Frankfurt-style" or "Frankfurt-type" counterexamples, have proliferated over the years as defenders of the Alternatives Condition have pointed to alleged flaws in earlier such counterexamples. The viability of Frankfurt-style counterexamples remains the central issue in the larger debate, but philosophers persuaded by Frankfurt's argument have also begun to develop accounts of what free will and moral responsibility would look like in the absence of an Alternatives Condition. Frankfurt-type reasons for disavowing the Alternatives Condition cut across all three of the standard positions on free will. John Fischer, for example, who has probably explored the post-PAP terrain more thoroughly than any other philosopher, follows Frankfurt's own lead in embracing a compatibilism no longer compelled to accommodate the Alternatives Condition, a position he calls "semi-compatibilism;" Derk Pereboom is a member of Kane's "hard determinism successor" camp who characterizes himself as a "causal-history incompatibilist" on the grounds that his conception of the free agency with which determinism is incompatible is one that satisfies the Source Condition but not the Alternatives Condition; and I am an example of a libertarian who sees the Source Condition as fundamental and incompatible with determinism but rejects the Alternatives Condition for Frankfurt-type reasons.

The territory just described is covered in the book in the following way. Robert Kane, the volume's editor, starts things off with an excellent introductory survey of the current landscape. In Part 1, "Theology and

Fatalism," Mark Bernstein discusses fatalism in general, both logical and theological, while Linda Zagzebski focuses on the latter, canvassing all the principal solutions offered since the appearance of Pike's landmark article. This is followed by Part 2, "Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism," containing contributions by David Hodgson and Robert Bishop, and Part 3, "The Modal or Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism," in which Tomis Kapitan critically evaluates the Consequence Argument and Peter van Inwagen pursues the rehabilitation of Rule b while allowing that "free will remains a mystery." Part 4, "Compatibilist Perspectives on Freedom and Responsibility," contains chapters by Bernard Berofsky, Ishtiyaque Haji, Paul Russell, and one coauthored by Christopher Taylor and Daniel Dennett, providing a good sense of what is old and what is new in contemporary compatibilist opinion. The Frankfurt-inspired attack on the Alternatives Condition and the implications of rejecting this condition are the subject of Part 5, "Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt-Style Examples," with contributions by John Fischer, Laura Ekstrom, and David Widerker. The authors of the four chapters in Part 6, "Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will," are Timothy O'Connor, Randolph Clarke, Carl Ginet, and Robert Kane, who represent the two main forms of agent-causal libertarianism and the two main forms of non–agent-causal libertarianism. Part 7, "Nonstandard Views: Successor Views to Hard Determinism and Others," contains chapters by Galen Strawson, Ted Honderich, Derk Pereboom, Saul Smilansky (these are the "successor views"), Richard Double (whose position is not technically a successor to hard determinism, but could play that role), and Alfred Mele (whose "agnostic autonomism" qualifies as "nonstandard" inasmuch as it avoids commitment on the compatibility question. Finally, Part 8, "Neuroscience and Free Will," contains contributions from scientists Benjamin Libet and Henrik Walter.

Some of these authors pursue a relatively nonpartisan survey of the most important recent work in their assigned areas, while others use their chapters principally to summarize or defend their own views. But since most of the book's contributors, and all of those who take the second of the two approaches just described, are major figures whose contributions merit the attention in any case, the result never comes across as self-indulgent. There are inevitable differences in quality from chapter to chapter, but the overall standard is quite high.

This is simply a terrific book. Anyone with an interest in what (analytic) philosophy has done with the perennial question of free will during the last forty years will find it invaluable. If the other books in the new Oxford Handbook series are remotely as good as this one, Oxford has really outdone itself.

While graduate students and faculty are the obvious audience, advanced undergraduates should also find most of the chapters readily accessible. The thoroughness of its coverage, combined with the fact that the leading figures in the field are providing the coverage, makes it a good candidate for a required text in appropriate courses, not just an optional reference work to be consulted on the side. In fact, now that it has come out in paperback, I plan to use it, along with van Inwagen's classic *An Essay on Free Will*, as the principal text in my graduate free will seminar.

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Thinking How to Live. By Allan Gibbard. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 302 pages. $45.00.

In *Thinking How to Live*, Allan Gibbard attempts to present how an expressivist account of ethics can imitate cognitive truth-values for moral claims. In some way, his project can be seen as a response to the classic criticism of expressivism known as the "Frege-Geach problem," which argues against the expressivists' doctrine that moral beliefs do not possess truth-values. Since expressivists have traditionally denied that morality has a cognitive truth component, Gibbard is venturing into new territory that could vindicate expressivism against one of its oft-cited flaws.

The central thesis that drives *Thinking How to Live* is that deciding what to do is equivalent to deciding what one ought to do. This equivalency, if successful, would demonstrate that nonnatural moral properties are reducible (and deducible) from natural nonmoral properties. This project strives to show that a naturalist and expressivist account of morality can, at the very least, mimic the known benefits of a realist account of morality. If Gibbard is correct, then the metaphysical richness of moral realism becomes unnecessary, and perhaps even superfluous, to account for moral properties. Moreover, he would show that expressivism can at least mimic all the desired advantages that realists claim to possess.

In order to derive what one ought to do from what one decides to do, Gibbard invokes an elaborate theory of planning and decision making. According to Gibbard, it is possible to deduce "the thing to do" from a process of planning and decision making. Once one understands the "thing to do," one can mimic realists' nonnatural language about "the thing one *ought* to do." Gibbard frequently uses examples of decision-makers like Hera, an egoistic hedonist, to illustrate how this works. Hera, as an egoistic hedonist, chooses what she believes will bring about the most pleasure when she decides the "thing to do." Consequently, if Hera decides that eating ice