Notes
See Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” “Identification and Externality,” and “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988); see also Frankfurt, “The Faintest Passion,” in Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Harry Frankfurt, “Reply to T.M. Scanlon,” in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, eds., (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 2002), pp. 184–185; see also Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, pp. 13–14.
See Frankfurt, “Reply to T.M. Scanlon,” in Buss and Overton, eds., op. cit., pp. 184–185.
See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 166–171.
Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, p. 163.
Ibid.
See Richard Moran, “Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life,” in Buss and Overton, op. cit.
Harry Frankfurt, “Identification and Externality,” in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, pp. 66–68.
Harry Frankfurt, “The Faintest Passion,” in Frankfurt, Necessity, Volition, and Love, p. 99.
Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, p. 170.
Ibid, p. 176.
Ibid, p. 175.
Ibid, pp. 167–169.
See Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” in Agency and Answerability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 29.
See Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About.
See Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
See, Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, p. 172.
See Frankfurt, “Identification and Externality,” in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, pp. 66–68.
Ibid.
Harry Frankfurt, “Reply to Michael E. Bratman,” in Buss and Overton, eds., op. cit., p. 87.
See Michael Bratman, Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 62–64.
Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, p. 170.
Harry Frankfurt, “Reply to Gary Watson,” in Buss and Overton, eds., op. cit., p. 160.
See Richard Holton, “Rational Resolve,” Philosophical Review 113 (2004).
Frankfurt, “Identification and Externality,” in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, p. 65.
Ibid.
For comments on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank T.M. Scanlon, Richard Moran, Christine Korsgaard, and the members of the Moral and Political Workshop at Harvard University. I would also like to thank an anonymous referee and Thomas Magnell, the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Value Inquiry, for their comments and help.
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Hussain, W. Autonomy, Frankfurt, and the Nature of Reflective Endorsement. J Value Inquiry 44, 61–79 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-009-9177-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-009-9177-5