Abstract
Mathematical cognition is widely regarded as the epitome of the kind of cognition that systematically eludes enactivist treatment. It is the parade example of abstract, disembodied cognition if ever there was one. As it is such an important test case, this paper focuses squarely on what Gallagher has to say about mathematical cognition in Enactivist Interventions. Gallagher explores a number of possible theories that he holds could provide useful fodder for developing an adequate enactivist account of mathematical cognition. Yet if the analyses of this paper prove sound, then some of the central approaches he considers are simply not fit for such service. That said, in the final analysis, if crucial additions and subtractions are made, there is a real chance of fashioning a promising enactivist account of mathematical cognition.
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Notes
That cognition is a kind of doing is a central, oft-repeated claim in Enactivist Interventions. We are told that: “active inference is not ‘inference’ at all, it’ s a doing, an enactive adjustment, a worldly engagement” (Gallagher p. 19); “intentionality is determined by what the agent is doing and what the agent is ready to do” (Gallagher 2017, p. 79); “an enactivist account of … cognitive activities should focus on the fact that … these activities are just that — activities, or doings…. When I am remembering or imagining something, I am doing something. I am engaged in some kind of action …” (Gallagher 2017, p. 191).
A reason Lakoff and Núñez’s (2000) account is construed as a theory about neurally-based cognitive mechanisms is because they hold “we human beings have no direct access to our deepest forms of understanding. The analytic techniques of cognitive science are necessary if we are to understand how we understand” (Lakoff and Núñez 2000, p. xiii, emphasis added).
Menary explains his commitments on this score in a footnote, “the appearance of the word representation here need not raise concerns; these are not representations with propositional contents and truth conditions” (Menary 2015, p. 12). More recently, he repeats that as he intends to use the notion a “cognitive vehicle need not be contentful” (Menary 2018, p. 209).
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Hutto, D.D. Re-doing the math: making enactivism add up. Philos Stud 176, 827–837 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-01233-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-01233-5