Abstract
In a world of change, we see species go from common to rare and yet are unable to point to any moment at which they ceased to be common. We see people grow old and yet cannot nominate any moment at which they ceased to be young. Nonetheless, transitions like these surely must occur at some point, if at all. There must be a change somewhere but no particular point can be singled out as the point of change. Where then are we to draw the line? This puzzling question lies at the heart of the ancient sorites paradox and the more general class of paradoxical arguments that now go by that name. In what follows we look at the various forms the paradox can take and some of the responses that have been pursued.
In a world of change, we see species go from common to rare and yet are unable to point to any moment at which they ceased to be common. We see people grow old and yet cannot nominate any moment at which they ceased to be young, and we see societies become unjust and yet cannot nominate any moment at which they ceased to be just. Nonetheless, transitions like these surely must occur at some point, if at all. There must be a change somewhere but no particular point can be singled out as the point of change. Where then are we to draw the line?
This chapter reproduces part of my “The Sorites Paradox” in E. Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005). URL: http://plato.stanford.edu.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
This chapter reproduces part of my “The Sorites Paradox” in E. Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005). URL: http://plato.stanford.edu.
- 2.
For more on this see Barnes (1982).
- 3.
Of course, if one supposes that all and only vague terms are soritical then Sorensen’s argument can be invoked without hesitation. The additional argument invoked here makes no such supposition. It is supposed that only vague terms are soritical but not that all vague terms are. For more see § 3.
- 4.
See, for example, Keefe (2000: 7).
References
Barnes, J. (1982), “Medicine, Experience and Logic” in Barnes, J., Brunschwig, J., Burnyeat, M., and Schofield, M. (eds.), Science and Speculation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 24–68.
Burnyeat, M.F. (1982), “Gods and Heaps” in Schofield, M. and Nussbaum, M.C. (eds.), Language and Logos, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 315–338.
Cargile, J. (1969), “The Sorites Paradox”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20: 193–202.
Copi, I. (1972), Introduction to Logic, New York, NY: Macmillan.
Diogenes Laërtius (1925), Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans./ed. by R.D. Hicks, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dummett, M. (1975), “Wang’s Paradox”, Synthese 30: 301–324.
Fine, K. (1975), “Vagueness, Truth and Logic”, Synthese 30: 265–300.
Frege, G. (1903), Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol. II, in Geach, P. and Black, M. (trans./eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 3rd edn, Oxford: Blackwell (1980).
Goguen, J. (1969), “The Logic of Inexact Concepts”, Synthese 19: 325–378.
Graff, D. (2000), “Shifting Sands: An Interest-Relative Theory of Vagueness”, Philosophical Topics 28: 45–81.
Graff, D. (2001), “Phenomenal Continua and the Sorites”, Mind 110: 905–935.
Greenough, P. (2003), “Vagueness: A Minimal Theory”, Mind 112: 235–281.
Haack, S. (1974), Deviant Logics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Halldén, S. (1949), The Logic of Nonsense, Uppsala: Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift.
Horgan, T. (1994), “Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites”, Philosophical Perspectives 8: 159–188.
Jaśkowski, S. (1969) [1948], “Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems”, Studia Logica 24: 143–157. Originally published in 1948 in Polish in Studia Scientarium Torunensis, Sec. A II: 55–77.
Keefe, R. (2000), Theories of Vagueness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Körner, S. (1960), The Philosophy of Mathematics, London: Hutchinson.
Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (1987), The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Luce, A.A. (1958), Logic, London: English Universities Press.
Machina, K. (1976), “Truth, Belief and Vagueness”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 5: 47–78.
Mignucci, M. (1993), “The Stoic Analysis of the Sorites”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 231–245.
Priest, G. (1991), “Sorites and Identity”, Logique et Analyse 135–136: 293–296.
Priest, G. (2003), “A Site for Sorites” in Beall, J.C. (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 9–23.
Quine, W.V.O. (1981), “What Price Bivalence?”, Journal of Philosophy 78: 90–95.
Raffman, D. (1996), “Vagueness and Context-Sensitivity”, Philosophical Studies 81: 175–192.
Rolf, B. (1981), Topics on Vagueness, PhD thesis, Lund.
Rolf, B. (1984), “Sorites”, Synthese 58: 219–250.
Russell, B. (1923), “Vagueness”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology 1: 84–92.
Shapiro, S. (2006), Vagueness in Context, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soames, S. (1999), Understanding Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sorensen, R. (1985), “An Argument for the Vagueness of ‘Vague’”, Analysis 45: 134–137.
Sorensen, R. (1988), Blindspots, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sorensen, R. (2001), Vagueness and Contradiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tye, M. (1994), “Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness”, in Tomberlin, J. (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language, Northridge, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co., pp. 189–206.
Unger, P. (1979), “There are no Ordinary Things”, Synthese 41: 117–154.
Wheeler, S.C. (1979), “On that Which is Not”, Synthese 41: 155–173.
Williamson, T. (1994), Vagueness, London: Routledge.
Williamson, T. (2000), Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, C. (1975), “On the Coherence of Vague Predicates”, Synthese 30: 325–365.
Zadeh, L. (1965), “Fuzzy Sets”, Information and Control 8: 338–353.
Zadeh, L. (1975), “Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning”, Synthese 30: 407–428.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hyde, D. (2011). The Sorites Paradox. In: Ronzitti, G. (eds) Vagueness: A Guide. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 19. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0375-9_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0375-9_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-0374-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-0375-9
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)