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What Do You Think of Philosophical Bioethics?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 February 2015

MATTI HÄYRY
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Abstract:

This article provides an overview of approaches to bioethics—practical and theoretical, philosophical and nonphilosophical. It is argued that those who yearn for pragmatism and real-life relevance would do well to concentrate on politics, legislation, social policy, and lobbying. Those, on the other hand, who seek knowledge about our moral thought might be interested in philosophical bioethics—in the explication of concepts, arguments, views, and normative statements.

Keywords

approachesbioethicsdescriptionevaluationinterpretationphilosophypracticepresuppositionstheory
Type
Special Section: Philosophical Bioethics—Its State and Future
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , April 2015 , pp. 139 - 148
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

Notes

1. E.g., Häyry, M. Rationality and the Genetic Challenge: Making People Better? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2010CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Häyry, M. Rationality and the genetic challenge revisited. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2011;20:468–83.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

2. I should mention that this article is inspired by two previous contributions to discussions on the nature of bioethics, namely: Takala, T. What is wrong with global bioethics? On the limitations of the four principles approach. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2001;10:72–77CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; and Takala, T. Demagogues, firefighters, and window dressers: Who are we and what should we do? Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2005;14:385–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. I hasten to add that, of course, generalizations like these have to be taken with a pinch of salt. Many people in the English-speaking regions do take cultural variation seriously, and many people in others assume “English,” “American,” or generally universalistic stances.Cf. Häyry, M, Takala, T.American principles, European values, and the mezzanine rules of ethical genetic data banking. In: Häyry, M, Chadwick, R, Árnason, V, Árnason, G, eds. The Ethics and Governance of Human Genetic Databases: European Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2007:14–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. See note 1, Häyry 2010, esp. chap. 2 and 10.

5. This rational reconstruction was suggested, quite presciently, by Ruth Chadwick in the context of cloning fifteen years prior to Dolly: Chadwick R., Cloning. Philosophy 1982;57:201–9.Google Scholar

6. If there is an internal doctrinal dispute concerning this point, I leave it in the capable hands of Thomist ethicists.

7. Dworkin, R. The original position. In: Daniels, N, ed. Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice.” Stanford: Stanford University Press; 1975:16–53, at 29.Google Scholar

8. An exercise of this particular balancing act is provided in Häyry, M. Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics. London: Routledge; 1994.Google Scholar

9. This does not necessarily imply objectivism or universalism—subjectivism or intersubjectivism and well-defined relativism are equally possible. See Häyry, M. A defense of ethical relativism. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2005;14:7–12.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

10. See note 1, Häyry 2010, at 223.