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Introduction

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Abstract

Neo-Fregean logicism seeks to base mathematics on abstraction principles. But the acceptable abstraction principles are surrounded by unacceptable (indeed often paradoxical) ones. This is the “bad company problem.” In this introduction I first provide a brief historical overview of the problem. Then I outline the main responses that are currently being debated. In the course of doing so I provide summaries of the contributions to this special issue.

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Correspondence to Øystein Linnebo.

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Linnebo, Ø. Introduction. Synthese 170, 321–329 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9267-5

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