Volume 7, 1981
Craig K. Ihara
Pages 582-598
Towards a Rule-Utilitarian Theory of Supererogation
This article seeks to make a contribution toward the eventual construction of an adequate formulation of rule-utilitarianism by explaining same of the difficulties the notion of supererogation poses for such an enterprise, and by describing a rule-utilitarian theory of supererogation which would resolve those difficulties. The first difficulty that the notion of supererogation raises for rule-utilitarianism is that beliefs concerning acts "beyond the call of duty" are not an insignificant part of many persons' considered moral opinions and any theory, rule-utilitarian or not, which does not provide a place for them will be found lacking on that account. Secondly, I shall argue that without an adequate theory of supererogation it is extremely unlikely that the rule-utilitarian will succeed in arriving at a moral code which will maximize utility. Thirdly, without an adequate theory of supererogation, rule-utilitarian accounts of basic moral concepts such as "right", "obligatory", and "wrong" will be unsatisfactory, even frcm a utilitarian point of view. I begin in section I by considering how best to define 'supererogation." I propose a reforming definition at the end of that section. In section II I claim that rule-utilitarians must recognize a distinction between two types of rules if they hope to avoid the difficulties mentioned above. In section III I attempt to explain and to resolve the difficulties supererogation poses for rule-utilitarianism.