Abstract
The phenomenological tradition has had a long interest in embodiment, and bodily experience beyond the confines of the “skinbag” body. Here I respond to Helena De Preester’s analysis of different types of protheses: limb, perceptual, cognitive. In her paper “Technology and the body: the (im)possibilities of re-embodiment”, she wants to make finer distinctions between extensions and incorporations. Today’s hi-tech developments make this refinement necessary and possible. I respond to the three levels or types of prostheses taking note of the increasing difficulty at each level and express certain worries about cognitively framed notions of bodily experience.
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Reference
De Preester H. (2011) Technology and the body: The (im)possibilities of re-embodiment. Foundations of science 16(2–3): 119–137
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Ihde, D. Postphenomenological Re-embodiment. Found Sci 17, 373–377 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-011-9244-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-011-9244-9