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Science and the Phenomenal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jenann Ismael
Jenann Ismael*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona
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Abstract

The Hard Problem of the mind is addressed and it is argued that physical-phenomenal property identities have the same status as the identification of an ostended bit of physical space and the coordinates assigned the spot on a map of the terrain. It is argued, that is to say, that such identities are, or follow from, stipulations which interpret the map.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue 3 , September 1999 , pp. 351 - 369
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, P.O. Box 210027, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721–9559.

‡

I would like to thank David Chalmers, David Reeve, David Perry, and an audience at Reed College, where this paper was given, for very helpful discussion.

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