Abstract
Michael Dummett’s interpretation of Frege’s theory of sentence meaning is supposed to open the door to slingshot argument objections, reducing truth-conditional semantics to the absurdity of implying that every true sentence has the same truth-maker. Dummett’s account has further been alleged to conflict with Frege’s criticism of synonymous meaning, according to which any two sentences with the same truth value express the same thought in the sense of designating the same objectified truth value, the True or the False. I defend Dummett’s interpretation of Frege, emphasizing the unique semantic analysis of sentence meaning it provides by interposing the fixing of truth-conditions as mediating between a sentence’s sense and its reference to respective reified truth values. The distinction blunts the force of slingshot arguments in a characterization of truth conditions generally, and of truth-making states of affairs in particular for the Fregean truth value reference of true sentences. The solution thereby vindicates Dummett’s clarification of Frege’s theory of sentence meaning and the individuation of propositions or Fregean Gedanken. My conclusion is that Dummett interprets Frege correctly, and that Frege’s analysis of sentence meaning avoids the counterintuitive consequences of slingshot argument reasoning for any kindred correspondence theory of truth.
