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Externalism revisited: Is there such a thing as narrow content?

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  1. CREA, Ecole Polytechnique-CNRS, 1, rue Descartes, 75005, Paris, France

    Pierre Jacob

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  1. Pierre Jacob
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Jacob, P. Externalism revisited: Is there such a thing as narrow content?. Philosophical Studies 60, 143–176 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00367468

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