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The false dichotomy of domain-specific versus domain-general cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 August 2017

Ivo Jacobs  and
Peter Gärdenfors
Ivo Jacobs
Affiliation:
Cognitive Science, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, 221 00, Lund, Swedenivo.jacobs@lucs.lu.sepeter.gardenfors@lucs.lu.sehttp://www.fil.lu.se/person/IvoJacobshttp://www.fil.lu.se/person/PeterGardenfors
Peter Gärdenfors
Affiliation:
Cognitive Science, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, 221 00, Lund, Swedenivo.jacobs@lucs.lu.sepeter.gardenfors@lucs.lu.sehttp://www.fil.lu.se/person/IvoJacobshttp://www.fil.lu.se/person/PeterGardenfors
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Abstract

The qualitative division between domain-general and domain-specific cognition is unsubstantiated. The distinction is instead better viewed as opposites on a gradual scale, which has more explanatory power and fits current empirical evidence better. We also argue that causal cognition may be more general than social learning, which it often involves.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 40 , 2017 , e207
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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