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What is “cognitive accessibility” accessibility to?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Pierre Jacob
Pierre Jacob
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, UMR 8129, EHESS/ENS/CNRS, DEC, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Pavillon Jardin, 75005 Paris, France. Pierre.Jacob@ehess.frhttp://www.institutnicod.org
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Abstract

I first argue that some of Block's formulations may misleadingly suggest that the function of mechanisms of so-called cognitive accessibility is to make one aware, not of visible features of the visible world, but of one's own psychological life. I then ask whether Block's view of phenomenology in the present target article is consistent with his endorsement of non-representationalism elsewhere.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 508
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

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