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POLITINIAI GINČAI, INTERESAI IR VIDAUS POLITIKA ISLAMIŠKŲJŲ INTERNATINIŲ MOKYKLŲ TEISĖJE

The Political Contestation, Interests, and Domestic Politics
in Islamic Boarding Schools Law

SUMMARY

Islamic boarding schools did not receive juridical recognition from the state for a long time, so their graduates were often not recognized. During the time of President Jokowi, radical changes occurred. Islamic boarding schools were recognized and designated as educational institutions like public education institutions. The state recognized the existence of these schools with the declaration of Law Number 18 of 2019 concerning Islamic boarding schools. However, the law was met with positive and negative reactions, especially among Islamic groups. The research delves into the questions why the law was met by pros and cons, what caused them, how the contestation was expressed in the ratification of the Islamic boarding school law. The research has employed the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu to analyze the contestation model. The findings of the present research indicate that the contestation on the formulation of the Islamic boarding school law had occurred before the law was declared. The pro and contra groups split into two big poles, consisting of the pro groups driven by the Islamic organization *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and the contra groups by the Islamic organization Muhammadiyah. The article focuses on their contestation and the consequences that led to the current situation in the country.

SANTRAUKA

Valstybė ilgą laiką teisiškai nepripažino islamo internatinių mokyklų, todėl jų absolventų kvalifikacija dažnai būdavo neįvertinta. Prezidento Džokovi (Jokowi) valdymo laikotarpiu įvyko radikalių pokyčių. Islamo internatinės mokyklos buvo pripažintos ir įvardytos švietimo įstaigomis, tokiomis kaip ir valstybinės švietimo įstaigos. Valstybė pripažino šias mokyklas, paskelbdama 2019 m. Įstatymą Nr. 18 dėl islamo in-

RAKTAŽODŽIAI: ginčas, islamo internatinės mokyklos, susidomėjimas.

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ternatinių mokyklų. Vis dėlto šis įstatymas sulaukė ir teigiamų, ir neigiamų reakcijų. Neigiamus atsiliepimus išsakė islamo grupės. Tyrime gilinamasi į klausimus, kodėl priimtas įstatymas buvo sutiktas, viena vertus, palankiai, kita vertus, nepalankiai, kas lėmė šias reakcijas, kaip pasireiškė ginčai, ratifikuojant islamo internatinių mokyklų įstatymą. Atliekant tyrimą ir analizuojant ginčų modelį, buvo pasitelkta Pierre'o Bourdieu socialinė teorija. Šio tyrimo rezultatai rodo, kad ginčai dėl islamo internatinių mokyklų įstatymo formulavimosi vyko, dar prieš paskelbiant įstatymą. „Už“ ir „prieš“ grupės pasidalijo į du didelius polius: grupės „už“ vadovavo islamo organizacija Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), o grupės „prieš“ – islamo organizacija Muhammadiyah. Straipsnyje pateikiama informacijos apie šių priešingų stovyklų nesutarimus ir analizuojamos kilusių ginčų sukeltos pasekmės, lėmusios dabartinę padėtį šalyje.

INTRODUCTION

The existence of Islamic boarding schools has brought dominant changes to the nation and state of the Republic of Indonesia (Usman, 2013; Muazza et al., 2018; Muazza et al., 2019; Mukminin, 2022). The knowledge of religion taught in Islamic boarding schools brings benefits to daily life (Chasanah, 2021). Since long ago, Islamic boarding schools have been tested as non-formal educational institutions that have given birth to many national figures (Ulum, 2018). The movement to defend independence was created through Islamic boarding schools driven by the founder of Nahdlatul Ulama, a group of students with jihad resolutions who sacrificed their lives to confront the Dutch military aggression, which attempted to return to colonize Indonesia on the 22nd of October of 1945. The resistance movement grew in the environment of Islamic boarding schools (Husnan, 2017). After Indonesia's independence, when the regime changed from the old order to the new order, then continued to reform the order, no one could ignore the paramount role of the Islamic boarding school. Islamic boarding schools are the motor of guarding diversity, the diversity of life of the Indo-

nesian nation and state (Ghofarrozin & Janah, 2021). However, Islamic boarding schools did not have juridical recognition from the state, so their graduates were often not recognized (Suhendra, 2020).

Responding to these conditions, Islamic boarding schools then began to try to include general subjects into their curriculum (Sidiq, 2013; Mukminin et al., 2019). In addition, besides broadening the horizons of students' thinking, they also pursued the status of state recognition through participation in the National Examination (UN) organized by the government (Khoiriyah et al., 2020). This concept started when the Minister of Religion was first held by a young man, Wahid Hasyim. At that time, the son of Kyai Hasyim Asyari initiated education reform. He issued Permenag Number 3 of 1950, which contained the policy of providing general subjects in madrasas, and conversely, all public schools were required to provide religious subjects. Therefore, the idea emerged that Islamic boarding schools gave birth to public schools in the form of junior high or senior high schools, such as Tebuireng Jombang (Hayati, 2011).

This policy implies that Islamic boarding schools can issue graduation

certificates (shahadah) for education at a certain level. Since then, Islamic boarding school graduates have also been recognized and considered equivalent to formal schools. However, Islamic boarding school alumni are required to take exams in formal education, and they are declared to have passed to be able to continue formal education to a higher level (Setyawan, 2019).

The enactment of the National Education System Law Number 20 of 2003 did not bring fresh air to the Islamic boarding school environment. The law did not specify the position of schools within Islamic boarding schools. The efforts of Islamic boarding school to obtain legality and state recognition continued until the Minister of Religion Regulation Number 18 of 2014 was issued, in which the crucial point is the state's recognition of Islamic boarding schools that meet the requirements to carry out learning activities like formal schools. The state recognizes their diplomas without having to take extra exams to conform to public education. At this point, the struggle of Islamic boarding school was one step forward (Ghofarozin & Janah, 2021). However, this condition was not considered as in favor of education run by Islamic boarding schools, since they were still not considered equal to other public education. Therefore, a new law was formulated that equated Islamic boarding schools with public education. The law was called the Islamic Boarding School Law Number 18 of 2019. This law was officially ratified by the government to coincide with the commemoration of Santri Day on the 22nd of October 2019 (Bazari Syam, 2022).

Unlike before, Islamic boarding schools now can carry out education like public education, ranging from undergraduate to doctoral degrees. The graduates can also hold a doctoral degree without having to go to school or study at a public educational institution (Mukminin et al., 2017; Mukminin et al., 2017). This level is passed through *Ma'had Aly* or the study of the yellow book curriculum (Ramadayani, 2021). As stated in Article 1 paragraph (7), an education that takes place in an Islamic boarding school environment, studies Islam based on the yellow book. The study of the yellow book is carried out in stages and adjusted to the academic degrees of bachelor, master, and doctoral degrees (Sholeh, 2022). Afterward, academic degrees can be issued by Islamic boarding schools through *Ma'had Aly*, as emphasized in article 22 (Putri & Rivauzi, 2022). Like other public education, Islamic boarding schools in Law 18 of 2019 receive an allocation of funds from the government as an endowment fund. This budget allocation shows that the state has provided full equality to Islamic boarding schools. Besides, endowment funds can be used to continue, improve, and advance Islamic boarding schools with various facilities and infrastructure (Rambe, 2022).

This struggle was hard because the ratification of Law number 18 of 2019 had reaped internal pros and cons among muslims (Wiranata, 2019). Divisions also occurred within the DPR RI. The pro group thought Islamic boarding school law could be a stronghold to maintain the progress of Islamic boarding schools (Setyawan, 2019). Before the existence of the Islamic boarding school law, the po-

sition of education in Islamic boarding schools was disadvantaged. The state tended to ignore and was discriminatory towards the position of Islamic boarding schools (Ghofarrozin & Janah, 2021), while the contra groups viewed that the Islamic boarding school law provided a broad space for the state to intervene. This counter-group believed that Islamic boarding schools had to be independent and maintained by not tying themselves to government regulatory mechanisms (Ghofarrozin & Janah, 2021). In addition, the contra groups viewed that the Islamic Boarding School Law only accommodated the interests of certain Islamic boarding schools. This contestation was related to the formulation of the Islamic boarding school law that is the focus of this research.

Research on Islamic boarding schools and law number 18 of 2019 has been widely discussed. Like the research conducted by Setyawan (2019) on the Islamic boarding school law: Local genius and state intervention on Islamic boarding schools. In this research, Setyawan (2019) photographed the contribution of Islamic boarding schools to the world of education in Indonesia. One of the ways for Islamic boarding schools to survive with

their independence is to relate to residents. He was concerned that the government would use the Islamic boarding school law to eliminate its independence. As a result, the Islamic boarding school had lost its uniqueness. In the end, this research concluded that Islamic boarding school law had both positive and negative impacts on the nation and state of Indonesia (Setyawan, 2019). Afterward, Ghofarrozin and Janah (2021) highlighted the issue of the state's alignment with Islamic boarding schools through law number 18 of 2019. They termed the Islamic boarding school law as a form of state recognition. Erfandi (2020) also claimed that the state used to be ignorant and not present in helping the continuity of education within the Islamic boarding school environment. It was only in the Jokowi era that Islamic Boarding Schools were equal to public education. This condition shows that the country is progressing in viewing the Islamic boarding school environment (Erfandi, 2020).

The present research is a case study (Creswell, 2002) about the pros and cons of the Islamic Boarding School Law Number 18 of 2019. The research bases itself on the exploratory and descriptive analysis.

PROS AND CONS OF ISLAMIC BOARDING SCHOOL LAW NUMBER 18 OF 2019 REGARDING NU VERSUS MUHAMMADIYAH

The ratification of Law Number 18 of 2019 has had many consequences, ranging from equality with public-based education to the obligation of the State to allocate endowment funds for all Islamic boarding schools through the state

budget scheme (Siraj et al., 2022). Regarding the equality issue there was a strong agreement among all sides. However, contradictions began to emerge when it came to the allocation of endowment funds by the government. It is because

these consequences resulted in Islamic boarding schools which could receive endowment funds from the government. And endowment funds could only be allocated to those Islamic schools that met definite requirements, including implementation of the yellow book curriculum (Ilham et al., 2022). In Indonesia, just few Islamic boarding schools, and mostly those with a modern style, do not teach the yellow book (Asyari, 2021). Thus, the Islamic Boarding School Law raised pros and cons, even from the start of the discussion to its ratification in the DPR RI.

The pros and cons have involved Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, which are known as the biggest Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Apart from NU, in the ranks of pro-law groups, there are several mass organizations such as the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), Mathlaul Anwar, Tarbiah Association, Al Ittihadiyah, and Al Wasliyah. Meanwhile, in the ranks of groups opposing the Islamic boarding school law (cons), there are Islamic organizations such as Aisiyah (Muhammadiyah women's organization), Islamic Association (PERSIS), Mathla'ul Anwar, Islamic Da'wah Council (DDI), Al Wasliyah, Nahdlatul Wathan (NW), Darunnajah Islamic Boarding School, Islamic Tarbiyah Association (PERTI) and the Indonesian Islamic Boarding School Cooperation Agency (BKSPPI).

An effort to reject the existence of the Islamic boarding school law was carried out by Muhammadiyah and other Islamic organizations by sending an official letter on the 17th of September 2019 to the chairperson of the Indone-

sian Parliament, Puan Maharani. A similar letter was also sent to the Chairman of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly, Bambang Soesatyo, the Chairman of Commission VIII of the Indonesian Parliament, and all faction leaders in the Indonesian Parliament. Muhammadiyah's rejection was carried out officially on behalf of the institution in which the letter sent was signed directly by Busyro Muqoddas, who served as Chair of the Central Executive, and signed by Abdul Mu'ti, General Secretary of PP Muhammadiyah (Ghofarrozin & Janah, 2021).

The reason for the rejection of Muhammadiyah and several other Islamic mass organizations, as stated in the letter sent to the leadership of the DPR RI, was that the Islamic boarding school law was considered not to accommodate the aspirations of all Islamic mass organizations. Muhammadiyah then alluded to the Islamic boarding school terminology, which it considered too narrow. Muhammadiyah assessed that the Islamic boarding school law seemed to accommodate traditional Islamic boarding schools, which indeed made more of the yellow book as a reference curriculum. Thus, in Muhammadiyah's view, the Islamic boarding school law would only benefit few Islamic boarding schools. On the other hand, it eliminated Muhammadiyah's Islamic boarding schools, which were more modern in style and did not teach the yellow book. Strictly speaking, Muhammadiyah stated that the Islamic boarding school law which requires the yellow book curriculum benefits NU's Islamic boarding school.

Muhammadiyah's rejection is because Islamic boarding schools or schools managed by Muhammadiyah are not included in the definition contained in the law. An explanation by Abdul Mu'ti, General Secretary of PP Muhammadiyah emphasized the reason for Muhammadiyah's rejection which explained that the terminology of Islamic boarding school and Ma'had Aly in the Islamic boarding school law does not accommodate Islamic boarding schools managed by Muhammadiyah. Furthermore, NU took the opposite attitude, urging the DPR to speed up the process of ratifying the Islamic boarding school law. KH Ma'ruf Amin, Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia who also represented NU, believed that the Islamic Boarding School Law was necessary so that Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia would have equality with public education.

Voices of support also came from the NU committee, Dr. Zayadi, M.Pd, the head of the East Java Province Ministry of Religion office. He argued that the

consequence of the Islamic Boarding School Law was the state's recognition of the educational model run by Islamic boarding schools. Therefore, the government was obliged to meet the learning needs of Islamic boarding schools, such as the provision of facilities, educational facilities, and infrastructure, as is the case with public education. Hence, Islamic boarding schools would grow and develop like public education and produce quality graduates. Legalization by the government was necessary because, according to Zayadi, Islamic boarding schools were the original legacy of education in Indonesia, not public education.

The pros and cons of the Islamic boarding school law can be seen in the use of the term Islamic boarding school, where the definition of Islamic boarding school provides that it will bring consequences related to economic interests, which is the allocation of endowment funds. The definition of an Islamic boarding school in the law emphasizes

Table 1. The Core points of the debated Islamic Boarding School Law

The Core Points of the Islamic Boarding School Law	Controversial
It is mandatory to use the yellow book curriculum	Not all Islamic boarding schools have a yellow book curriculum
Kyai must have an Islamic boarding school education	There are many Islamic boarding schools whose Kyai do not have an Islamic boarding school education
Islamic boarding schools can give undergraduate to doctoral degrees	Conducted through the Ma'had Aly curriculum system (based on the tiered Yellow Book)
Islamic boarding schools receive endowment funds from the government	Claimed to be divisive between Islamic boarding schools, become a field of corruption. Islamic boarding schools are known for their independent character which does not rely on government assistance.

that it is called an Islamic boarding school if it teaches the yellow book as an educational curriculum. Another point is having Kyai, students, dormitories, and mosques. These conditions form the basis for an institution to have the status of an Islamic boarding school and the right to receive an endowment fund allocation from the government (Harahap, 2022).

The contradiction also came from the former Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), an Islamic mass organization that had been disbanded by the government. Through

its spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto, HTI opposes Articles 3 a and b, which relate to the term moderate. HTI assumes that the word 'moderate' in the Islamic boarding school law seems discriminatory against certain groups and has the potential to create divisions. The following is Ismail Yusanto's explanation, as quoted from VOA Indonesia.

HTI's rejection is quite reasonable because HTI also has several Islamic boarding schools in the region, which do not meet the requirements of Islamic boarding schools as referred to in the law.

THE CONTESTATION ON THE ISLAMIC BOARDING SCHOOL LAW NUMBER 18 OF 2019

The contestation of the Islamic boarding school law formulation among members of the DPR RI also took place fiercely. This law was proposed by two Islamic parties, PKB and PPP. As it is known, PKB and PPP are Islamic parties whose voter base and core cadres are mostly from Islamic boarding schools (Rahman & Khalyubi, 2022). Contestation began when the draft law entered the DPR RI legislative body (Baleg). There was no rejection from the council. It is just that a debate arose regarding the naming of the law, so Balog then decided to change the name of this law to the Islamic Boarding Schools and Religious Education Bill. Through a plenary meeting on the 16th of October of 2018, the DPR decided that the Islamic Boarding Schools and Religious Education were a proposal for the DPR's initiative.

Substantially, the content of the bill does not only regulate education in Is-

lamic boarding schools. Furthermore, the bill also regulates the education of six religions in Indonesia, including Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism (Usman, 2021). It is where the conflict begins. The Communion of Churches and the Council of Bishops in Indonesia feel they were not involved in drafting the bill. Therefore, they are busy expressing their rejection of the DPR. The rejection of the church communion was also voiced through a petition. The reason for the rejection is quite clear because the Islamic Boarding School and Religious Education Bill are seen as discriminatory against Christian groups. One of the points being criticized is article 69 paragraph 3, which requires that non-formal religious education carried out by Christians must have at least 15 participants. These conditions are considered onerous. In addition, they are worried about

sweeping action against Christian Sunday schools that do not have a permit. The Indonesian Bishops' Conference, which is a collection of Indonesian Catholic church institutions, also rejected the bill (Hutabarat, 2018).

The voices of rejection sent to the DPR continued to grow and be massive, in which the Islamic Boarding School and Religious Education Bill were considered to accommodate the interests of the elite. In addition, the bill's contents are deemed not to fulfill the principle of justice, especially for minority religious groups in Indonesia. The Jakarta Catholic Scholars Association (ISKA) sent its rejection to the DPR and requested that the draft relating to Catholic religious education be removed from the bill. Afterward, they asked that the governance of Catholic religious education be fully handed over to the regulations of the Indonesian Catholic church, according to the tradition that has been going on.

PBNU had also voiced its opposition to the Islamic Boarding Schools and Religious Education Bill. PBNU's rejection is related to articles 20, 32-34, which are considered to open the possible space for the government to intervene in Islamic boarding schools. Even though it did not reject its entirety, through its Secretary General, Helmy Faishal Zaini, PBNU asked that discussions on the Islamic Boarding School and Religious Education Bill be stopped until revisions were made. Meanwhile, the pros and cons of the DPR were also fierce. The NasDem Party also voiced and raised rejections to the contents of the articles in the bill, as was protested by the church

association. NasDem wants a clear separation of the problems of religious education and theology.

The Golkar Party also officially declared its position. Through members of its faction in the DPR, Golkar sent a letter requesting that the two articles that were protested by the church communion be repealed or abolished. Through his spokesman, Jerry Sambuaga, a member of Commission I of the Indonesian Parliament, Golkar said that this article makes the state intervene in the procedures for Christian worship.

After a year of polemics and dynamics, the DPR then agreed to remove the element of religious education from the draft bill. Thus, the contents of the draft changed to the Islamic Boarding Schools Bill, which focused on discussion specifically regarding Islamic boarding schools. However, the pros and cons also did not end immediately. After changing the name, the pros and cons continued within the Islamic group, as explained above. Even though there was no rejection, there were pros and cons to the Islamic boarding school bill within the DPR. The PPP faction, as the proposing party, stressed that Islamic boarding schools should be restored to their function as educational institutions and should not be reduced due to political policies. Meanwhile, the PKS faction highlighted the allocation of endowment funds for Islamic boarding schools, as stated in the draft bill. PKS is concerned that the allocation of funds specifically to Islamic boarding schools will disrupt the independence of pesantren. PKS proposes that articles on funding for Islam-

ic boarding schools are sufficiently regulated in government regulations, not in-laws. The PKS argument is intended so that Islamic boarding schools do not receive intervention from the government. The attitude of the PKS remained consistent when the law was passed, where the PKS tended to open space for revisions or changes to the Islamic boarding school law, particularly regarding funding (Atmari, 2022).

Initially, the government also objected to the article on the allocation of en-

dowment funds for Islamic boarding schools. Based on the confession of the Head of Commission VIII Ace Hasan, the government had asked for the provisions governing the allocation of Islamic boarding schools' endowment funds (article 49) to be abolished, because it will be burdensome for the state. In the end, after going through quite a long struggle, all factions in the DPR agreed. The Islamic boarding school law was then passed through the plenary session of the DPR RI on September 24, 2019.

CONTESTATION ANALYSIS WITH THE REFERENCE TO HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

The pros and cons behind the formulation of the Islamic Boarding School Law, which involves Islamic groups (Muhammadiyah versus NU) and Christian groups tend to lead to reductions after the 2019 Presidential Election, where NU and Muhammadiyah split into supporters of Jokowi and Prabowo (Jabbar, 2022). Meanwhile, NU and Muhammadiyah are sources of great voice in the political context in Indonesia, especially in Central Java and East Java. The magnitude of the votes of NU and Muhammadiyah is because they are rooted in Islamic boarding schools managed by the two organizations (Ukhwaluddin & Subekti, 2022).

Jokowi and Prabowo's winning teams acknowledged that Islamic boarding schools were the main target managed in the 2019 presidential election. In their view, the Islamic boarding school has a strong influence, especially among the Santri. This illustrates that Islamic board-

ing schools have a very wide network. Records from the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia in 2015 showed that 4 million students were serving in 28,961 Islamic boarding schools. This figure continues to grow considering the number of Islamic boarding schools which continues to grow.

This interest in voting has prompted, both Prabowo and Jokowi to seriously work on Islamic boarding schools as vote granaries. The Islamic boarding school bill became a political tool, campaign material to win over the students' votes. Apart from that, members of the DPR also used the Islamic Boarding School Bill as a political tool to attract the votes of the Santri. The votes of the Santri are to be used for the benefit of the General Election, Pilkada, the 2024 Presidential Election, and other political agendas.

From this perspective, the Islamic Boarding School Law is an instrument to strengthen the political base of Islamic

boarding schools through an endowment grant scheme and other facilities from the state. Thus, the pros and cons related to the Islamic Boarding School Bill have formed power institutions that are asymmetrically distributed in parliament, where the initiator group for the law is PKB and PPP, which are two NU-based parties. Meanwhile, the opposing group is a political party that does not have a sound base in Islamic boarding schools.

Referring to the theory of historical institutionalism, where institutionalization can be created due to asymmetric power relations, institutions carry out their functions by maintaining the status quo or creating a power balance. It is because institutions have distributed power to community groups. At that point, humans form coalitions and compete (Marsh, 2004). Using this paradigm, in this context, the Islamic Boarding School Law is used as an instrument to maximize utility or fulfill interests (Parsons, 2005).

Parliamentary powers are to ensure that a group obtains opportunities to maximize the fulfillment of interests in a safe and conducive manner. There is no goal of domination over other groups,

but superior institutions over other groups are considered important as an effort to maximize the fulfillment of interests. In addition, the taken political actions are based on profit and loss calculations for each group. It is what sparked the reaction of Christian groups so that they made efforts to resist and protest hard against the formulation of the Islamic Boarding School Law. The reason is that the state, through the Islamic boarding school law, has intervened too far by regulating the procedures for Christian worship, so the reaction of opposition arose because Christian groups felt their interests were disturbed and harmed. Hence, Christian groups demand a revision of the institutions of power, in this case, the DPR. The same condition occurs in the Muhammadiyah group and other Islamic organizations. They view that the Islamic Boarding Schools Law has closed access to Islamic boarding schools owned by Muhammadiyah or those who do not meet the requirements in the Law. Disruption of the equilibrium makes Muhammadiyah feel it is experiencing a loss while other groups are enjoying the benefits, so they moved to protest efforts.

CONTESTATION ANALYSIS WITH REFERENCE TO PIERRE BOURDIEU APPROACH ARENA

The concept of the arena in Bourdieu's theory is a place for actors to fight (Emirbayer & Jhonson, 2008). These actors compete in the arena by using their capital (Lubis, 2014). An arena concept is a powerful approach to analyzing a contesting organization. The arena is a

battlefield between actors to secure their interests. Therefore, the contestation in this research involving organizational groups involved in the pros and cons of the Islamic Boarding School Law is a form of power relations. In the context of this research, the contestation that oc-

curs is related to the capital owned. The actors involved in contestation in the arena use the owned capital, at the same time they fight over the existing capital (Walther, 2014).

The availability of capital can influence an actor's success over other actors in the arena, so to facilitate the analysis of how actors compete, one can examine the capital distributed within it. There are stages to analyze the arena, like abstracting a particular environment from a political environment. From there, objective relations between actors in the arena can be obtained. Afterward, explore the habits carried out by each actor. To win contestation and dominate, actors need capital. With the power of this capital, the actors can create legitimacy. In the context of this research, economic and cultural capital plays a crucial and dominant role. The role of cultural capital in Islamic Boarding School Law is essential. It is because cultural capital is a product of scientific space. Hearings, research, and seminars are the basis for deciding policies and actions regarding the formulation of the Islamic boarding school law. Even so, economic capital is still a determining part of contestation in an arena. It is because economic capital is the dominant basis relating to the benefits derived from the formulation of the Islamic Boarding School Law.

Capital in Bourdieu's view is different from Karl Mark's concept of capital. Bourdieu's capital dimension is even broader from an economic perspective. Bourdieu divides capital dimensions into several aspects, such as economic capital, cultural capital, social capital,

and symbolic capital. Economic capital refers to the ownership of assets that can be converted into money. Cultural capital refers to ownership of knowledge or education. Meanwhile, social capital refers to ownership in position, rank, or network form (Desan, 2013). These three capitals then merge to make the actor a single entity with a definite symbol which Bourdieu calls Symbolic Capital.

This capital is to fight in an arena to gain a victory in form of ownership of resources or legitimacy of power. In the context of this research, those who contested the formulation of the Islamic Boarding Schools Law were divided into two poles, namely pro groups driven by NU and contra groups driven by Muhammadiyah. From the data described above, the dominant and strongest position group in the arena is NU. It is because NU is supported by two major Islamic parties, PKB and PPP, and has support from the government.

In addition, NU also has several cadres spread across nationalist parties, such as Golkar, PDIP, Gerindra, and Demokrat. Therefore, these political parties also have an interest in passing the Islamic Boarding School Law to attract sympathy and political support from the Santri spread in Islamic boarding schools. These parties have used Islamic boarding schools as a basis for voting in every election. In addition, the strength of the NU group has the support of government groups, which have economic capital. The government's economic capital strength is the availability of the budget. In addition, the government also has social capital in the form of a huge political network and infrastruc-

ture. In the context of the formulation of the Islamic Boarding School Law, the coalition of parties supporting the government in parliament has the majority. Only PKS and *Demokrat* are not part of the government coalition party. This power base strengthens the role of NU and the state in this contest. This condition can be seen from the ratification of the Islamic Boarding School Law without rejection from political parties.

Based on Bourdieu's concept, the actor with the most capital will potentially win the contest in an area because, with the power of existing capital, actors have high power to force or make definite policies. The Islamic Boarding School

Law has manifested into a manifested value in the form of perception. Perception is also related to how the actors think (Brubaker, 1985). Additionally, perception is related to the attitude of each actor involved in the contest (Lach, 1996). Hence, referring to Bourdieu's concept, the perception of each actor will form a differentiator. In the end, this differentiator is also manifested in decisions or positions in the arena by existing capital (Haryatmoko, 2016). Each actor is then positioned in an arena according to the distinction made. At that point, as a form of extraction, the ratification of the Islamic Boarding School Law number 18 of 2019 was realized.

CONCLUSION

Intense competition between the pros and cons of the Islamic Boarding Schools Law from the start of the discussion led to sharp polarization. The drafting of the Islamic Boarding School Bill became an arena for fierce contestation involving both pro and contra groups. In this context, the pro group won the contest because the Islamic Boarding School Bill was passed by the DPR to become a law with the support of all factions in the DPR RI. However, groups against the law, specifically Christian groups, are no longer involved in the contest because of their rejection that the articles governing religious education have been removed or repealed. The contestation then shifted between internal Islamic groups, which were represented by two major mass organizations, namely NU and Muhammadiyah.

Muhammadiyah, which felt that its interests were not accommodated in the Islamic Boarding School Law, made massive efforts to reject it. On the other hand, NU fully supported this Law on Islamic Boarding Schools to be ratified by the DPR. The trigger for the pros and cons was the existence of restrictions regarding the definition of Islamic boarding school, in which the law required the status Islamic boarding school to have a yellow book curriculum. Afterward, it was mandatory to have a Kyai at an Islamic boarding school that taught the yellow book. Thus, the modern-style Islamic boarding school developed by Muhammadiyah could not be categorized under the status of Islamic boarding school as stated in the Law. Additionally, non-formal educational institutions that did not have the status of Is-

Islamic boarding schools were not entitled to receive an endowment fund allocation from the government. Meanwhile, the NU group felt that the term Islamic boarding school with these various requirements was appropriate. It was understandable because all NU-based Islamic boarding schools had implemented the yellow book curriculum and had Kyai studied for a long time at Islamic boarding schools.

This intense competition between pros and cons groups prevents transactional costs from occurring because each group has shown the irrelevance of rational choices. Policies are decided

through the projection of power (power interplay) without any political transactions indicating that the ongoing contestation can be seen as historical and sociological institutionalism, namely an approach that considers the factors of ideas or the influence of structure on political relations by involving institutions. On the other hand, the theory developed by Bourdieu is still relevant to explain the contestation in the Islamic Boarding School Law. Each actor has their capital, so it is the strongest actor who wins the contest. In our case, it has been the group affiliated with the NU mass organization.

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