Abstract
Propositions play a central role in contemporary semantics. On the Russellian account, propositions are structured entities containing particulars, properties and relations. This contrasts sharply with the sets-of-possible-worlds view of propositions. I’ll discuss how to extend the sets-of-worlds view to accommodate fine-grained hyperintensional contents. When this is done in a satisfactory way, I’ll argue, it makes heavy use of entities very much like Russellian tuples. The two notions of proposition become inter-definable and inter-substitutable: they are not genuinely distinct accounts of how propositions represent what they represent. Semantic theorists may move freely between the two conceptions of what propositions are. Nevertheless, the two approaches give different accounts of the metaphysical nature of propositions. I argue that the sets-of-worlds view provides an adequate account of the nature of propositions, whereas the Russellian view cannot.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Berto, F. (2010). Impossible worlds and propositions: Against the parity thesis. The Philosophical Quarterly, 60(240), 471–486.
Carnap, R. (1947). Meaning and Necessity. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Chalmers, D. (2010). The nature of epistemic space. In A. Egan & B. Weatherson (Eds.), Epistemic modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, K. (1994). Essence and modality: The second philosophical perspectives lecture. Philosophical perspectives, 8, 1–16.
Jago, M. (2009). Logical Information and Epistemic Space. Synthese, 167(2), 327–341.
Jago, M. (2013a). Against Yagisawa’s Modal Realism. Analysis, 73(1), 10–17.
Jago, M. (2013b). The Content of Deduction. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 42(2), 317–34.
King, J. (1995). Structured propositions and complex predicates. Noûs, 29(4), 516–535.
King, J. (1996). Structured propostions and sentence structure. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25(5), 495–521.
Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4), 549–567.
Nolan, D. (1997). Impossible worlds: A modest approach. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38(4), 535–572.
Ripley, D. (2012). Structures and circumstances: Two ways to fine-grain propositions. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0100-4.
Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s puzzle. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Salmon, N. (2005). Metaphysics, mathematics, and meaning. New York: Oxford University Press.
Soames, S. (1985). Lost innocence. Linguistics And Philosophy, 18, 59–72.
Soames, S. (1987). Direct reference, propositional attitudes and semantic content. Philosophical Topics, 15, 47–87.
Soames, S. (2008). Why propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 37(3), 267–276.
Stalnaker, R. (1976a). Possible worlds. Noûs, 10(1), 65–75.
Stalnaker, R. (1976b). Propositions. In A. MacKay & D. Merrill (Eds.), Issues in the philosophy of language (pp. 79–91). New Haven: Yale University Press.
Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Yagisawa, T. (2010). Worlds and individuals possible and otherwise. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Jago, M. Hyperintensional propositions. Synthese 192, 585–601 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0461-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0461-y