


श्रमण ŚRAMAṆA

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Vol. LXX

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चित्रं किमत्र यदि ते त्रिदशांगनाभिर्नीतं मनागपि मनो न विकार-मार्गम् ।
कल्पान्तकालमरुता चलिताचलेन किं मन्दराद्रिशिखरं चलितं कदाचित् ॥

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The Vindication of Tarka as a Pramāṇa in Jaina Philosophy

-Arvind Jaiswal

Introduction:

Tarka in Indian Philosophy is denigrated, following Nyāya School and other orthodox schools as well, as either not being a distinct valid instrument of knowledge, or not being an instrument of valid knowledge at all. It is either pushed in the domain of some other valid instrument of knowledge or regarded as an invalid or invalid instrument of knowledge. To be clear, it is not that everywhere, in Indian Philosophy, the sources of knowledge and the knowledge obtained through those sources are distinct. Buddhist Logicians, namely Dharmakīrti etc., are reluctant to separate the means of knowledge from the knowledge itself, whereas Naiyāyikas preferably proclaim this separation in talking about *anumāna* (inference) as the means to attain *anumiti* (that is the name for inferential cognition, it is privileged to be a type of 'knowledge'), also when distinguish *upamāna* from *upamiti*. Likewise, it cannot be said as a rule that when *tarka* is regarded invalid, it is done so always as invalid knowledge, or always as invalid instrument of knowledge. Dharmakīrti in his *Nibandhāvalī* and *Pramāṇavārttika* (1.35 & 1.40) asks 'Jainas what is the need to accept another separate means to obtain knowledge of that what can be obtained by inference'.¹ We see that Buddhists are ruling out *tarka* to be a separate valid instrument of knowledge and they are not doing the same with what we come to know through that instrument. Together with that, Buddhists do not separate the instrument of knowledge from that what we know through that instrument. The discrepancy is worth noting here, as we shall see later on in this paper more explicitly, at this point in Buddhist logician's view when they profess that 1) that what is believed by others to be known through *tarka* is something valid as knowledge, but not *tarka* as valid instrument of knowledge, and 2) knowledge

and the instrument of knowledge are not different from each other. Buddhists resolution, we can dare to say, to such an observation might go like this: although the valid knowledge is not distinct from the valid means of knowledge but *tarka* is an invalid means of knowledge for it has no object of its own to know, given that all the objects, only two in Buddhist logicians view: *svalakṣaṇa*, i.e. unique particulars, and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, i.e. conceptual universals, are already exhausted by perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) respectively. Buddhists would be ready to accept *tarka* as a separate instrument of knowledge only if it has an object of its own. This commitment of Buddhists is widely known as their *pramāṇa-vyavasthāvāda*, that each *pramāṇa* has to have their own distinct *prameya*, i.e. the object of knowledge. Besides, Buddhists condemnation of *tarka* as an invalid instrument of knowledge, *Naiyāyikās* take it to be invalid cognition (*apramā*). Howsoever one discards the validity of *Tarka*, as a valid instrument of valid cognition, i.e. knowledge, or as valid cognition itself, Jaina thinkers have endeavoured to re-establish its validity, as we shall see in this paper how their arguments advance. In order to do that, Jaina thinkers have come up, first, with what they think to be the nature of *tarka*, thereafter they call on the conceptions of *tarka* put forward by the thinkers of other main schools of classical Indian philosophy and criticise those conceptions of *tarka*, and thereby showed that *tarka* is vindicated in being a *pramāṇa*. This paper takes the same course as well.

Nature of Tarka according to Jaina Thinkers

Primarily, Jainas define that *Tarka* is *vyāpti-jñāna*.² *Vyāpti* is such a special kind of relation between *sādhya* and *sādhana* which does not tolerate any promiscuity, in Sanskrit, *vyabhicāra*, in the relation and which instates a sense of *gamyā*, i.e., where one can reach to, and *gamaka*, i.e., what can lead one to somewhere, in and between them.³ Simply put, the fact that two things, say, @ and #, are related to each other in a fashion which enables one thing, let it be @, to be reached through the other, #, and that their relativity in the aforesaid

fashion nowhere, as well as at no point of time, fails is *vyāpti*. For instance, a relation of smoke and fire: here, smoke is *gamaka* and fire is *gamyā* -in the sense that wherever smoke is present, fire is present as well, and wherever fire is not present, smoke also is absent there- but not *vice versa*. There is no irregularity in the relation when fire, i.e., the *gamyā* in this case, is regarded as something that can be reached through smoke, i.e., the *gamaka*; whereas if smoke is taken to be *gamyā* through fire taken as *gamaka* will also do, but not always. Here comes the role of *tarka*, it seizes the universal *gamyā* and *gamaka* relation.

By the employment of *tarka*, *vyāpti*'s virtue of failing nowhere and at no point of time is captured; by no other means, it is emphasised by Jainas, one can capture this feature of the relation between two things whatsoever. For instance, understanding of (a) Smoke, at any time and at any place, is produced by fire, or, (b) Smoke, at any time and at any place, is not produced by non-fire,⁴ can arise only through reasoning. The reason to disregard perception here is that through perception only few instances of some phenomenon are known, not all. It is practically impossible for one person, and theoretically implausible for all persons as well, to perceive all smoke-fire instances of even the present, let alone instances of past and of future. Thus, there is no question of universality of *gamyā-gamaka* relationship being known through perception. If memory and recollections are added to perception, even then it is not possible for memory and recollection are restricted to some or other time and space, as is the case with perception. All memories, all recollections and all perceptions of all the persons living or dead on the earth taken together will not suffice to make universality claim that is being made through *tarka*, for it is plain and simple that it cannot include the instances that will come into being in the future. Likewise, if *anumāna* is said to be the means through which we capture the universality of this relation then it will be but commission of *anyonyāśraya doṣa*,⁵ for

anumāna itself depends on *vyāpti*. Hence, it is to be said that *tarka* is a separate *pramāṇa* for the knowledge of *vyāpti*.⁶

Obviously, if realism granted to be fine, a relation and the knowledge of that relation are distinct. Thereby, *vyāpti* and *vyāpti-jñāna* are required to be taken as different from each other in the sense that the first is ontological and the latter is epistemological. Noteworthy is that *vyāpti-jñāna*, not *vyāpti*, is being called *tarka*, in the definition above. *Tarka*, in this manner, is knowledge concerning universal relations. It is altogether a different issue, and so this is left undiscussed here, whether those universal relations hold between ideas or things. For our purpose, it will do if we grant both that it holds between things and that between the distinct knowledge tokens of those things as well. If that sort of universal relation holds and its *characteristica universalis* is to be captured *qua univarsalis*, then one has to rely on *tarka* as a *pramāṇa*, as Jainas contend.

To make the concept of *tarka* more comprehensive, it is expanded by defining it as *ūhastarkaḥ*. To be more precise, *sakaladeśakālādyavacchedena sādhyasādhanabhāvādivicaya ūhastarkaḥ*.⁷ It translates, an assertion delimited by all spaces and times of some things being in a state of “provable-by” and “proof-of” etc is *tarka*. Thus, apart from the above example of smoke-fire relation, the assertions such as “the word ‘pot’ signifies a pot”, “A pot is signified by the word ‘pot’, and so on and so forth exemplify *tarka*.⁸ This signifier-of and signified-by relation is included, with the introduction of “etc” in the definition of *tarka*, in the set of those objects which are known through *tarka*. Akin to *vyāpti*’s case, such thinking also that a specific word is a signifier-of all the instances of a specific thing at all places and times is impossible to be ascertained unless reasoning is done to reach at that thinking. Same is to be said of some specific thing being signified-by some specific word at all places and times.

For Jainas, it is not that *vyāpti*, which comprises of co-located-ness of one thing with another that pervades the first, is by its own nature graspable from the repeated observations in agreement and no

different observation than that of agreement. Also, it is not possible, according to Jaina's view, that *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti* can seize all the instances of that which is in the state of provable-by and proof-of etc with something. Because, "I am reasoning out," it is proved in our experience, to seize all the instances of that which is in the state of provable-by and proof-of with something.⁹ Thus, it implies that *tarka*, i.e., suppositional reasoning,¹⁰ only and nothing else helps us grasp *vyāpti*. Further, envisaging *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti* lacks *pramāṇa* as well,¹¹ for without assertion, even by known universals all particulars are not seized. Along with that, signified-by and signifier-of state as well is conceived by *tarka*, for it is the state that pertains to all instances, not merely universality in relation, of a word and its meaning.¹² Here, in rejecting that *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti* can provide us with the knowledge required to establish universality acclaimed in the *vyāpti* etc relations, it is evident that Jainas are reluctant to take this knowledge to be a knowledge of universal relations of ideas only, in that case *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti* could have done the job and *tarka* was not needed.

Buddhists understanding of Tarka criticised

Buddhists opine that because *vyāpti* is of the nature of concepts and it takes place after the completion of perception, *tarka* is not *pramāṇa* in that. Jainas defy this saying that although it takes place that way and is of that nature, it is not graspable, in the manner of seizing all the instances of it, in the percepts accumulated in perception. Hence, as they consider a concept universal an object of knowledge known through *anumāna pramāṇa*, this type of conceptual knowledge also must have a *pramāṇa* to be known through. Buddhists traditionally accept *prāmāṇya*, for the practical purposes, of that *pramāṇa* which, as in the case of *anumāna*, presents to us even *avastu*, so they should not have any difficulty in positing a conceptual *vyāpti* relation as the object of *tarka pramāṇa*.

Furthermore, talking about the grasp of *vyāpti* through *pratyakṣa-anupalambha-pañcaka* is spurious.¹³ The mechanism of *pratyakṣa-*

anupalambha-pañcaka goes like this: firstly, one perception of absence of smoke where smoke and fire both are absent; thereafter, two positive perception of smoke where fire is being posited; and later on, two perceptions of the absence of smoke where fire is not posited. These fivefold perceptions are supposed to be the process through which *vyāpti* is grasped. Jainas discard it for perception does, as perception functions *sannihitamātravicayatayā* (by making object only to that which is connected immediately to it at the moment) and *avicāraikatayā* (without consideration in thought), not include the characteristic of conceiving place etc mediated all instances of a thing.¹⁴

Naiyāyika's underestimation of tarka criticised

Apart from the aforementioned *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti* criticism, *Nyāya* thinking about *tarka* is more directly criticised in what follows. *Naiyāyikas* define *tarka* as *vyāpyasyāhāryāropeṇa vyāpakasyāhārya-prasañjanam tarkaḥ*. It means, by opted imposition of that which is to be pervaded, opted introduction of that which pervades the previously said thing is called *tarka*. It is believed to be auxiliary to some other *pramāṇa*, it plays its role when arises any doubt antithetic to the content that is known through other *pramāṇa*, and by virtue of eliminating of that doubt, *tarka* thus is in conformity with that *pramāṇa* only. In *Naiyāyikas* view, "Paradigmatically, *tarka* is called for in order to establish a presumption of truth in favour of one thesis that has putative source support against a rival thesis that also has putative source support, a thesis and a counter-thesis both backed up by, for example, apparently genuine inferences (the most common situation) or by competing perceptual or testimonial evidence."¹⁵ For them, it is not a *pramāṇa* in its own right. Jainas reject this saying that *tarka* which grasps *vyāpti* is a *pramāṇa* in its own right for it has *sva-para-vyavasāyitva*, *tarka*-s accepted by others are employed somehow in one's own discourse as well, it is useful in dissolving opted doubt which culminates into *viparyaya*, or it can independently be used to dissolve doubt itself.¹⁶ Thus, serving these purposes and that too independently sometimes, it is not only auxiliary to some *pramāṇa*, rather it is a *pramāṇa* in its own right.

Discussion

Scholars have tried to show circularity in the *tarka* articulated by Jaina thinkers.¹⁷ But any such accusation can be dismissed pointing out that it is either confined to some specific notion of *tarka* of a particular Jaina thinker or it is generated out of misapprehension of the notion of *tarka*.¹⁸ Another discussion can be started over the issue: whether or not *tarka* is a sentence driven reasoning; or, if it is, how far can we go in formulating a theory of *tarka* sentences,¹⁹ not only as per the Nyāya understanding of it but also of others as well, including Jains. Jaina notion of *tarka* can also be utilized to show that it is not just a cognitive validator,²⁰ as Naiyāyikas think it to be, but it is verily a valid, or at least a valid instrument of cognition.

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ऋद्धि-ऊँ ह्रीँ अर्हँ णमो दसपुळीणं।

मंत्र - ऊँ नमो भगवती गुणवती सुसीमा पृथ्वी बज्रशृङ्खला मानसी महामानसी स्वाहा।

प्रभाव - प्रतिष्ठा और सौभाग्य में वृद्धि होती है, निर्मल ब्रह्मचर्य पालन की शक्ति मिलती है।

Strengthening chastity and increasing prestige and prosperity.