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Practical Necessity and the Fulfilment of the Plan of Nature in Kant's *Idea for a Universal History*

I

In his essay *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (*Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*), Kant distinguishes the aim of a philosophical account of history from the aim of the historian. While history is concerned with actions performed by historical agents and with events that result from these actions, a philosophical account of history is concerned with the laws that underlie all such actions and events. This concern with the underlying laws of history is reflected in Kant's attempt to explain the emergence of legal and political arrangements that are conditions of the full development of human capacities in terms of an aim of nature (*Naturabsicht*) and a plan of nature (*Naturplan*). The legal and political arrangements in question are 'a society in which *freedom under external laws* can be encountered combined in the greatest possible degree with irresistible power' (IUH, 8, 22) and a federation of nations in which the power of each state is subject to the federation's 'united will' (IUH, 8, 24). In Kant's essay, the proximate cause of the emergence of these legal and political arrangements appears to be a type of practical necessity. This practical necessity consists in being compelled by a situation in which one finds oneself to agree to something, regardless of what one might otherwise prefer to do and might in fact have done if other options had been available. This type of practical necessity is different from the type of practical necessity (*praktische Nothwendigkeit*) of which Kant speaks in relation to moral duty, where an agent is *obliged*, as the member of a kingdom of ends, to act in accordance with the principle of legislating universally valid law and the idea of the dignity of a rational being, but cannot be *forced* to do so by some inclination if he or she is to retain his or her moral autonomy (GMM, 4, 434).

In connection with the establishment of a 'civil society', Kant claims that human beings 'who are otherwise so taken with unconstrained freedom, are compelled [*zwingt*] by need [*Noth*] to enter into this condition of coercion [*Zustand des Zwanges*]; and indeed by the greatest necessity of all, namely that which human beings inflict on one another, given that their own inclinations make it so that they can not long subsist next to one another in wild freedom' (IUH, 8, 22). Thus, although self-imposed, the legal restrictions to which human beings subject themselves are necessary conditions of their own security and therefore something that they are strongly inclined to accept, however reluctantly, rather than being for

them moral principles that they ought to obey regardless of whether or not it suits them to do so. It is necessity, then, in the form of need, that compels human beings to enter a condition in which their natural freedom is restricted with the aim of avoiding the harms that they might otherwise wish to do to each other and could do to each other in the absence of legal restrictions and the coercive means of enforcing them. Here human unsociability (*Ungeselligkeit*) is through itself necessitated (*durch sich selbst genöthigt*) to discipline itself (IUH, 8, 22).

In the case of the establishment of a global legal and political order, nature employs a particular means of getting individual states to take the initial steps towards establishing a federation of nations, namely, each state's need to renounce its complete independence which it experiences as a result of evils that it itself suffers and that are analogous to the evils suffered by human beings in a condition of absolute natural freedom. Individual states may well take the final step, however, only 'after many devastations, reversals and even thoroughgoing inward exhaustion of their powers', even though this step is one that 'reason could have told them even without so much sad experience' to take (IUH, 8, 24; translation modified). This represents a fundamental idea at work in Kant's essay: human beings have to be compelled, by the undesirable nature of situations in which they come to find themselves, to establish a legal or political order, even though reason tells them to establish such an order independently of the bad experiences that eventually lead them to do so. In other words, even if we assume that human beings possess the capacity to gain insight into the rationality of such a step, it cannot be presupposed that this insight will be sufficient to motivate them actually to take this step independently of such experiences. Therefore, on purely methodological grounds, there is needed an account of how they will come to take this step which must avoid presupposing either rational insight or the motivation to act in accordance with such insight. This requirement introduces what is, or so I intend to argue, a distinctive feature of Kant's essay, namely, the way in which it seeks to describe the existence of a mechanism which is sufficient to explain how individuals or states that cannot be expected to do immediately what reason requires of them would agree to arrangements that are necessary to bring about the transition to a legal and political order. This mechanism is the type of practical necessity already described together with certain basic interests that the agents who establish such an order are assumed to share.

This practical necessity has both a subjective aspect and an objective one. The objective aspect consists in the existence of events, forces or states of affairs that are beyond the immediate control of individual human beings or individual states, and thereby constrain an agent's will by limiting the options available to him, her or it. The subjective aspect consists in feeling oneself to be constrained to do something that one does not necessarily desire to do and

would, in all likelihood, avoid doing if another option happened to be available or was perceived to be available. It is fitting to speak of such a subjective aspect because Kant himself implies that individuals would, in fact, prefer to enjoy unlimited freedom, if the costs of enjoying this freedom were not so high, and we may assume that the same holds for independent states. It is the desire to preserve themselves and not to suffer harm at the hands of others that leads (or will lead) human beings or independent states to renounce their natural freedom or complete political independence in the face of a lack of other, more attractive options. This subjective aspect allows Kant to adopt an innovative approach in the *Idea for a Universal History*, for he is thereby able to attempt to explain the emergence of both a law-governed state and a global legal and political order purely in terms of a first-person perspective. This brings me to a second distinctive feature of Kant's essay that I wish to stress.

This first-person perspective is that of agents that are subject to practical necessity and feel themselves compelled to establish a law-governed state and a global legal and political order. In seeking to adopt the perspective of such agents, whose actions are explained by introducing minimal assumptions, namely, that they would be motivated by a concern for their own lives and welfare, the essay guards itself against becoming question-begging. In particular, it does not assume that individuals or states are motivated by anything other than a concern for themselves, and in this way it does not presuppose that they are motivated by any sense of moral duty. The wish to avoid such a presupposition is also to be found in the essay *Towards Perpetual Peace*. Here Kant seeks to address the question of how human beings might be *made* to do what they 'ought to do in accordance with laws of freedom' without compromising their freedom (PP, 8, 365). He addresses this question with a description of how nature 'comes to the aid of the general will grounded in reason, revered but impotent in practice', by compelling human beings both at a national level and at a global one to agree to enter a law-governed condition; and he expressly claims that this transition does not concern 'the moral improvement of human beings but only the mechanism of nature' (PP, 8, 366).

The approach adopted by Kant in the *Idea for a Universal History* is, in short, one that seeks to explain certain developments in terms of the attitudes and experiences of the agents who must themselves bring about these developments, while introducing minimal assumptions. This is not to say, however, that these agents' attitudes and what motivates them cannot be transformed in the course of the experiences that they undergo and what results from these experiences. The types of experiences that individuals undergo may, in fact, shape their attitudes and what motivates them, which is not to say that these attitudes and how individuals respond to these experiences are purely mechanical matters. Indeed, as we shall see, Kant

appears to want to claim that there is a transformation. Nevertheless, when explaining this transformation Kant must avoid introducing factors that must be thought to be external to the agents in question, in the sense that they cannot be assumed to count among their attitudes and motivations or be viewed as arising automatically from them. What is more, the narrative, as opposed to expository or analytic, character that Kant's approach gives to parts of the essay, allows us, as readers, to adopt the standpoint of the agents whose actions and the reasons behind them are being described. In this way, a third-person perspective would merge with a first-person perspective. Our reading and interpretation of Kant's *Idea for a Universal History* ought, therefore, to be an immanent one, in that it does not appeal to factors that are external to the first-person perspective that is being described. I shall argue that this requirement generates difficulties in relation to another central aim of Kant's essay, namely, the way in which it is meant to indicate how history should be written from a philosophical standpoint.

As previously mentioned, Kant attempts in this essay to explain the emergence of legal and political arrangements that are necessary conditions of the full development of human capacities in terms of an aim and a plan of nature. This concerns his teleological understanding of history. The approach that Kant adopts in the *Idea for a Universal History* requires, however, that he does not introduce a standpoint that is external to the one adopted by the agents whose views and actions are being described. Rather, any changes in these agents' attitudes and views would have to be explained in a way that remains internal to their own standpoint. Consequently, Kant's teleological understanding of history is one that we, his readers, must also be led to accept by adopting the standpoint of the agents whose attitudes and views, together with that which results from them, are described in his *Idea for a Universal History*. If Kant is able to show us how both the legal and political changes that he describes and a transformation in the standpoint of these agents who are initially determined to introduce these changes by practical necessity are possible without the introduction of any external factors, we would have good grounds for accepting not only his teleological understanding of history, but also his recommendations concerning how a philosophical account of history ought to be written in accordance with this teleological understanding of history.

For the purposes of this essay, it is not strictly necessary to determine the precise status of the hidden plan of nature that Kant mentions in the *Idea for a Universal History*. On the one hand, this plan can be said to possess only the regulative status of an idea that we must employ in order to comprehend history as a whole, but whose objective validity cannot be demonstrated, in accordance with the theory that Kant later developed in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* concerning how living things cannot be adequately comprehended in purely

mechanical terms. Rather, we must instead conceive of living things and history as well in terms of the idea of a unified whole that exhibits a form of internal purposiveness.¹ On the other hand, it has been argued that in the *Idea for a Universal History* nature as such is held to exhibit a hidden plan which provides the key to explaining history and predicting its future course, making Kant guilty of what he himself must class as a dogmatic error.² The second interpretation presents a problem that is less obvious in the case of a merely regulative teleological understanding of history. The idea of a plan of nature that possesses a constitutive status implies that this plan will, if necessary, be realized by purely natural means independently of the wills of human beings. Yet in the third proposition of his essay, Kant insists that the state of perfection to be achieved by humanity should, for the sake of humanity's self-esteem, be humanity's own work. This demand might be thought to conflict with the central role played by practical necessity in Kant's account of how the final aim of nature is progressively realized in the course of history, for this role suggests that humanity unconsciously works towards a given end without human beings having freely chosen it as the immediate end of their actions. Nevertheless, these actions would be the agents' own actions, despite being determined by practical necessity, in so far as these agents consent to enter a law-governed national or global political order, whereas the idea of a plan of nature that possesses a constitutive status does allow even this element of freedom, because it implies that the agent is nature itself which employs human beings as mere means. I shall therefore assume that the regulative reading of Kant's plan of nature is the correct one. This still leaves us with the question of how the agents whose views and actions are being described would themselves come to adopt such a regulative teleological understanding of history.

¹ See Henry E. Allison, 'Teleology and history in Kant: the critical foundations of Kant's philosophy of history', in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and James Schmidt (eds.), *Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 24-45. In *Towards Perpetual Peace*, which was first published in 1795, Kant certainly does accord the approach adopted in the *Idea for a Universal History* only a regulative status. Although he speaks of 'the great artist nature (*natura daedala rerum*) from whose mechanical course purposiveness shines forth visibly, letting concord arise by means of the discord between human beings even against their will', he states that the notion of providence that the 'artifices of nature' thereby suggest to us, is something that we 'only can and must *add ... in thought ...* by analogy with actions of human art' (PP, 8, 360-362).

² See Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 154-156.

In relation to this question, the possibility of a transformation of the standpoint that individuals adopt is essential. This is because, as we shall see, Kant implies that a moral transformation is facilitated by the establishment of a legal and political order. This invites the claim that there is some kind of fundamental moral change in what motivates individuals, with the result that their actions can no longer be explained purely in terms of practical necessity in conjunction with an instrumental form of rationality whose end is self-interest. Rather, once a law-governed state or ‘civil society’ is in place, reason becomes the subject or agent of change. This leads rational subjects, as moral agents, to act with the intention of fulfilling nature’s final end, which for Kant means realizing the aims of reason itself.³ This would help explain how individuals or states that were compelled to limit their freedom of action as a matter of practical necessity might then be sufficiently motivated to maintain a law-governed condition once the experiences that first motivated them to establish it are no longer present. Such an explanation of how legal and political conditions would be maintained over time, if not forever, is clearly required, because the realization of the aim of nature in the course of time entails the idea of a developmental historical process.

Although this type of argument provides a formal means of addressing the issue in question, I shall argue that in the *Idea for a Universal History* Kant ultimately fails to identify a specific mechanism that would explain this change in what motivates individuals. This failure to explain a transformation in what motivates individuals in a way that avoids assuming the validity of a standpoint that is external to the standpoint of the individuals or states that are the agents of historical change, invites the following question: what would motivate individuals to remain in and to maintain a law-governed condition in the absence of this moral transformation and the experiences that first motivated them to establish such a condition? In the final part of the essay, I relate this particular issue to Kant’s idea of a philosophical approach to history. Kant wants not only to justify a certain way of viewing history, but also to show that this way of viewing history has implications with regard to a philosophical account of history that has ‘a cosmopolitan aim’ in its approach to the material provided by the academic discipline known as ‘history’. I argue for a particular way of understanding the connection between this way of viewing history and the writing of history from a philosophical standpoint before going on to show how the absence of a satisfactory explanation of any fundamental moral change in what motivates individuals, even once the transition to a global legal and political order has been

³ See Barbara Herman, ‘A habitat for humanity’, in Oksenberg Rorty and Schmidt, *Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim*, 150-170.

made, generates a tension between the cosmopolitan aim of Kant's essay and the requirement to maintain in existence a global legal and political order generated by this same aim. Since such a legal and political order is one of the fundamental conditions of the realization of the aim of nature in the course of human history,⁴ this tension amounts, in effect, to a tension between universal history, as Kant conceives of it, and the cosmopolitan aim of a philosophical approach to the material provided by historical studies.

II

For Kant, the social antagonism that results from each individual seeking to further his or her self-interested ends in society provides the motor of human history. This antagonism is the first aspect of what he calls 'unsociable sociability' (*ungesellige Geselligkeit*). The unsociability of human beings consists in their desire to be independent and to order everything in accordance with their own ends and views. This results in conflict whenever individuals who are driven by the desire for independence pursue ends that are incompatible, unless at least some of these individuals renounce their ends, or, as is more relevant in the present case, they agree to limit their pursuit of them by subjecting themselves to a legal and institutional framework that determines which ends are or are not permissible and how far permissible ends ought to be pursued. Even within this framework, however, there will be competition, because the pursuit of permissible ends will not always allow all individuals who desire to pursue the same end to enjoy the means to this end or to enjoy these means to the same degree as others do. Human sociability, in contrast, consists in the desire to associate with other members of the human species, because each individual can come to feel him- or herself to be truly human by developing his or her distinctively human powers only if he or she interacts with other human beings. While human sociability makes social relations necessary, the unsociable aspects of human nature make these relations antagonistic. In the absence of social antagonism, however, human powers would remain undeveloped contrary to the aim of nature. Competition is, in fact, one of the main means by which these powers are developed, and in this regard even moral

⁴ This is not to say that the establishment of a global legal and political order is itself the end of history for Kant. This end has, in fact, been identified with the idea of the highest good, of which Kant had already spoken in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. See Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 162 and Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, Chapter 1. Although dealing with this particular interpretive issue lies beyond the scope of this essay, I shall identify a problem that applies to the transition to a moral world if this world is taken to form the final end of history in the case of the *Idea for a Universal History*.

vices can prove useful. Thus, Kant states that nature should be thanked ‘for the incompatibility, for the spiteful competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess or even to dominate’ (IUH, 8, 21). In this way, something good results from something that might otherwise be regarded as evil in the sense of morally deficient. Consequently, although human beings, if their nature had been different, might have enjoyed ‘an arcadian, pastoral life of perfect concord, contentment and mutual love’, their existence would then have been of hardly more value than the one enjoyed by the animals that they keep, whereas nature intended something different for human beings, namely, that although they will ‘to live comfortably and contentedly’, they should nevertheless abandon their idleness and inactive contentment to be plunged instead into a condition of labour and toil (IUH, 8, 21).

Here we encounter a partial answer to the question of why practical necessity is required to explain how human beings are motivated, independently of what they may themselves originally desire to do and would otherwise do, to establish the legal and political conditions of the further development of their distinctively human capacities and powers as nature intends. In the absence of practical necessity and the social antagonism which is its source, human beings would have lacked the motivation to leave their idyllic natural existence, and they could not, therefore, have even begun to develop capacities and powers that extend beyond the ones required by a rudimentary form of individual and social development. Rather, or so Kant assumes, they would have preferred to remain living in a state of comfortable idleness that prevented the fuller development of their capacities and powers, since they would then have experienced no need to develop them further. Social antagonism, which is itself a product of original human nature, in this way proves essential to explaining not only how human beings were led to develop their powers in competition with others in a civil society, but also how prior to this they learnt, through painful experience, to renounce their lawless natural freedom at an individual level. The course that history is taking, or is likely to take, turns out, then, to be based on a theory of human nature in a twofold sense: first of all, in the sense of what human nature already is, and, secondly, in the sense that the potentialities contained in human nature must first be developed and realized in the course of history itself.

Kant, however, draws a distinction between a merely civilized condition, which presupposes the development of certain human capacities that are conditions of culture, as well as the establishment of a legal and political order, and a truly moral condition. Moreover, he opposes a genuinely moral condition to one that merely seems to be moral, in that it consists in such purely external moral phenomena as proprietary and love of honour. Kant concedes, in fact, that in this respect ‘*Rousseau* was not so wrong when he preferred ... the condition of

savages’, though this is true only if we neglect the final step that humanity must take, before which ‘human nature endures the hardest ills under the deceptive appearance of external welfare’ (IUH, 8, 26). Kant identifies this last step with ‘the combination of states’ (*die Staatenverbindung*). He must, therefore, be thought to have in mind the transition to a global legal and political order, whereas we may assume that a national legal and political order has already been established by human beings who had experienced the need for such an order as the result of the evils associated with a condition of natural freedom, given that a civil society ‘in which there is a thoroughgoing antagonism of its members’ (IUH, 8, 22) is for Kant a condition of civilization in the non-moral sense. Human beings are then compelled to establish a federative global legal and political order by their experiences of the horrors and inconveniences of a condition of interstate hostility, in which ‘states apply all their powers to their vain and violent aims of expansion and thus ceaselessly constrain the slow endeavor of the inner formation [*Bildung*] of their citizens’ mode of thought’; and it is experiences of precisely this kind that ‘necessitate [*nöthigen*] our species to devise ... a law of equilibrium and to introduce ... a cosmopolitan condition of public state security’ (IUH, 8, 26). The antagonism or hostility that is the ultimate source of the practical necessity which leads human beings to establish a law-governed international order can be classed as ‘healthy’ in virtue of its role in bringing about this transition, which then further facilitates the development of human capacities.

Given the way in which a legal and political order at the national level is compatible with the existence of a legal and political order characterized by social and interstate antagonisms, it is far from self-evident that people’s attitudes and what motivates them will undergo a fundamental change with the establishment of such an order. Rather, there is little reason to think that people’s attitudes and that which motivates individuals would not instead remain essentially the same as the attitudes and sources of motivation of those members of the human species who (if only hypothetically) first established and entered such an order as a matter of practical necessity. The law-governed condition that Kant has in mind does not, therefore, appear to be one that is necessarily willed and maintained by *moral* agents motivated by the demands of reason alone. Hence his own distinction between a non-moral form of civilization and a moral form of civilization. This is not to say, however, that the maintenance of a legal and political order over time would not require that individuals in some sense identify themselves with it. Yet the grounds of their identification with this order need not be specifically moral ones. Rather, these grounds could be purely instrumental ones, such as the desire for self-preservation, peace and stability. Thus the following question arises: is Kant

able to explain in the *Idea for a Universal History* the existence of a mechanism that would explain the relevant transformation of an agent's attitudes and what motivates him or her without introducing an external standpoint? Kant's account of the transition to a moral standpoint in the essay itself is sufficiently vague to warrant the claim that he fails to identify such a mechanism:

Thus happen the first true steps from crudity toward culture, which really consists in the social worth of the human being; thus all talents come bit by bit to be developed, taste is formed, and even, through progress in enlightenment, a beginning is made toward the foundation of a mode of thought which can with time transform the rude natural predisposition to make moral distinctions into determinate practical principles and hence transform a *pathologically* compelled agreement to form a society finally into a *moral* whole. (IUH, 8, 21)

Here it seems that the capacity to make a type of moral distinction, though what type of distinction remains unclear, will in turn enable human beings to establish certain principles that may govern them and unite them as members of a single moral community, whose precise nature is again left unspecified, but which could be identified with the global legal and political order that forms the end of history, at least in so far as this end is concerned with law and politics. This global legal and political order might be viewed as only a negative condition of morality, however, in that war is a condition in which even those people who are disposed to act morally, and would otherwise do so, find themselves in a situation in which necessity forces them to act immorally.⁵ Yet there is no explanation of how individuals who are subject to a practical necessity that has its basis in social antagonisms will undergo a fundamental transformation in their attitudes and in that which motivates them that would explain the transition from the willing of a type of association founded on human need ('a *pathologically* compelled agreement') to the willing of a distinctively 'moral' form of association.

⁵ In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant appeals to the way in which culture lessens the dominion of sensuous inclinations, thereby preparing human beings 'for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power', and how certain experiences foster self-discipline and thus 'an aptitude for higher ends, which lies hidden in us' (CJ, 5, 433-434). These are necessary but not also sufficient conditions of morality, however, because there is no guarantee that the capacities that are developed in this way will in fact be employed in the pursuit of moral ends.

One response to what I have stated here would be to argue that for Kant the attitudes and dispositions of human beings do indeed fundamentally change once a law-governed state and, more especially, a global legal and political order have been established. With respect to the latter it has been argued that Kant identifies certain features of fundamental human psychology that are compatible with, and may even promote, a cosmopolitan standpoint, including feelings of beneficence. Moreover, once human beings have begun to act morally, they may learn to love to do so, with the result that moral feelings are produced and reinforced in them.⁶ I have shown, however, that in the *Idea for a Universal History* Kant relies on the notions of practical necessity and social antagonism to explain the realization of the aim of nature with the intention of avoiding any presuppositions concerning such moral features of fundamental human psychology. Any appeal to natural moral feelings therefore introduces factors that, from the perspective of this essay, amount to an external standpoint.⁷ The idea that a love of acting morally develops in individuals as an unintended consequence of their acting morally presupposes, moreover, that people have *already* begun to act morally. Although the response here might be to claim that acting morally in the first instance requires only external conformity with duty,⁸ whereas a love of acting morally involves the disposition to act primarily from a sense of duty, the problem of how to explain the transition from external morality to a genuine moral disposition then reappears. Solving this problem within the context of the *Idea for a Universal History* would require specifying the mechanism whereby the transition from ‘a *pathologically* compelled agreement to form a society’ to ‘a *moral* whole’

⁶ Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism*, 165-169.

⁷ In this respect, it would also rely on claims that Kant may make elsewhere while ignoring other claims that sit less comfortably with the idea of a transition to a moral way of thinking and acting, such as those connected with Kant’s own theory of the radical evil in human nature. For an account of how Kant’s theory of radical evil creates difficulties for his idea of a transition to a moral whole, see David James, *Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependency and Necessity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 57-85. See also note 19 below.

⁸ This can in fact be regarded as the stage which Kant thinks we have so far reached, given what he says in the following passage: ‘We are *cultivated* in a high degree by art and science. We are *civilized*, perhaps to the point of being overburdened, by all sorts of social decorum and propriety. But very much is still lacking before we can be held to be already *moralized*. For the idea of morality still belongs to culture; but the use of this idea which comes down only to a resemblance of morals in love of honor and in external propriety constitutes only being civilized ... But everything good that is not grafted onto a morally good disposition, is nothing but mere semblance and glittering misery. In this condition humankind will remain until, in the way I have said, it will labor its way out of the chaotic condition of the present relations between states’. (IUH, 8, 26)

could by itself effect a fundamental change in people's attitudes and in what motivates them. Yet, it is precisely this type of mechanism that appears to be lacking in Kant's essay. What is more, the claim that a love of acting morally develops in individuals as an unintended consequence of their acting morally, whether it be in a merely external fashion or in the form of occasional acts performed with a genuine moral disposition, assumes that acting morally does indeed produce and reinforce moral feeling. The absence of any mechanism that explains how individuals have even begun to act in a truly moral sense means, however, that we do not even need to consider the question of whether acting morally does indeed result in a love of acting morally.

We may conclude, then, that when it comes to the question of people's willingness to remain part of, and to help maintain, a national or global legal and political order which has already been established, it cannot be assumed that individuals will be motivated by considerations that are essentially different from the ones that motivated them to establish this order in the first place.⁹ To claim otherwise would require introducing an external standpoint that is incompatible with one of Kant's main intentions in the *Idea for a Universal History*. This raises the following question: since the considerations that motivate individuals to establish a national or global legal and political order are connected with certain experiences and the wish to avoid them in the future, what would motivate future generations to remain part of, and to help maintain, such an order if, in accordance with the original intention behind its establishment, this legal and political order had been effective in preventing them from suffering similar experiences? Here it is important to bear in mind the following points. First of all, Kant distinguishes between that which reason tells individuals to do and that which they are motivated to do. He does not presuppose a happy coincidence of these two things. Indeed, in the *Idea for a Universal History*, he attempts to explain how practical necessity can bring

⁹ In response to what I have here said an appeal might be made to Kant's writings on related topics, such as his *Rechtslehre* of 1796, along the lines that Kant constructs an argument that demonstrates that human beings have a duty to promote the state as one of their ends, irrespective of any empirical considerations, simply because a state with coercive power is conceptually necessary, in the sense of being a requirement of the fundamental right of freedom that each person originally enjoys. Clearly, however, this type of response will lack validity in the case of the *Idea for a Universal History*, given that in this essay Kant is interested in offering a form of explanation that appeals to empirical considerations, including certain human psychological propensities that must in some sense be observable, while the description of these propensities forms part of a narrative that itself describes dynamic social processes and how they result in legal and political transformations.

about their alignment. Secondly, the maintenance of both a national and a global legal and political order are conditions of the full development of distinctively human capacities in the species as a whole. From this emerges the need to explain how future generations, if not *all* future generations, will be motivated to remain part of and to maintain an order of this kind, for otherwise there would, at best, be only a partial development of these capacities, or at worst a gradual relapse into barbarism. In either case, the plan of nature that the *Idea of a Universal History* aims to identify, and which, as we shall see, ensures that the course of history is not a source of despair instead of hope, would be frustrated, and one might then even ask whether history can, in fact, be thought to exhibit such a plan.

The issue in question becomes most obvious in the case of a global or other, more restricted, transnational legal and political order that succeeds in preventing wars, because the threat of war may then appear as an unlikely prospect to people who have become used to conditions of peace and who are likely to be more directly concerned with threats to their personal security and welfare with which a law-governed state is meant to deal. In the next section of this essay, I intend to explore some of the implications of this issue in relation to the philosophical approach to history that Kant's essay aims to promote. First, though, I want to show how Kant's appeal to the notion of a practical necessity generated by social antagonism or interstate hostility as a means of explaining legal and political change in no way favours a progressive historical narrative of the kind that he wants to offer in the *Idea for a Universal History*. Rather, using Machiavelli's analysis of the effectiveness of the institutions of the Roman Republic based on his reading of Livy's history of the same republic, I shall show how this approach equally invites a different regulative understanding of the direction that history is taking or will take.

According to Machiavelli, practical necessity and social antagonism both have a central role to play when it comes to explaining the Roman Republic's strengths. In fact, they can be shown to work together to produce a free and strong republic. The element of social antagonism concerns the open conflict between the plebs and the Roman Senate. The dissatisfaction of the plebs resulted in unrest that in turn compelled the members of the Senate, who, we may assume, would have preferred to act otherwise if another option had been available to them, to grant the populace a role in the administration of the republic. This arrangement in turn led to the introduction of laws and institutions favourable to the establishment of general freedom.¹⁰

¹⁰ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, trans. L. J. Walker and B. Richardson (London: Penguin, 2003), Book 1, Chapter 4.

Moreover, the good in question could not have been achieved in any other way, because ‘men never do good unless necessity drives them to it’.¹¹ Machiavelli’s account of the role played by practical necessity and social antagonism in the establishment of a legal and political order favourable to general freedom is in this regard merely part of a broader picture of human affairs. According to this broader picture, practical necessity, when viewed against a background of social antagonism, is something that may lead people to act in ways that produce different effects, including the opposite of those it produced in the case of the Roman Republic. It may, for example, lead people to act rashly with negative consequences for themselves and for others. There is accordingly no reason to associate its effects specifically with a progressive account of human history. Rather, practical necessity is equally compatible with a view of history that acknowledges the possibility of decline: ‘Since, however, all human affairs are ever in a state of flux and cannot stand still, either there will be improvement or decline, and necessity will lead you to do many things which reason does not recommend’.¹²

As we have seen, Kant claims that the evils associated with interstate hostility will compel human beings to take a step that reason tells them to take independently of the experiences and the desires that will actually motivate them to take it. At the same time, the idea of a hidden plan of nature implies that this step, once taken, is irreversible and, given the aim of nature, it will provide the foundation for further progress in the shape of the increasing development of distinctively human capacities, including certain moral powers. Kant does not, therefore, appear to think that progress and decline are equally possible outcomes of the social antagonism and practical necessity that characterize the phase of history that precedes the emergence of a ‘moral whole’. I shall argue that Kant’s account of the connection between practical necessity and historical progress, in so far as he measures this progress in terms the establishment of a global legal and political order, requires modifying the view of history for which he himself argues. This is because the lack of any convincing explanation of a moral transformation in what motivates individuals and the need to avoid the introduction of an external standpoint mean that his conception of universal history in effect conflicts with the aim of nature which is held to shape history and to explain its progressive character.

III

¹¹ Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, Book 1, Chapter 3.

¹² Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, Book 1, Chapter 6.

In the final proposition of his essay, Kant claims that if we may assume that nature operates according to a plan with a final aim (*Endabsicht*) even in the sphere of human freedom, it would then be useful to view history in terms of such a plan, which may 'serve us as a guiding thread for exhibiting an otherwise planless *aggregate* of human actions, at least in the large, as a *system*' (IUH, 8, 29). Kant proceeds to indicate how this approach might be applied to history beginning with the Greeks. It is not, however, simply a matter of organizing the material provided by history into an intelligible whole. Rather, the organization of this material must show how a hidden plan of nature is indeed gradually being realized in the course of history, allowing us to detect progressive tendencies in history, despite all appearances to the contrary. In this way, a teleological account of history along the lines proposed by Kant would provide an antidote to the view of 'the great stage of the world' as a place in which 'everything in the large is woven together out of folly, childish vanity, often also out of childish malice and the rage to destruction' (IUH, 8, 17-18).

As we have seen from Machiavelli's use of the notion of practical necessity, there is, however, no self-evident reason to assume the effectiveness and validity of such an antidote, since explaining human actions and the events that they help to produce in terms of practical necessity and social antagonism does not exclude the possibility of the absence of any long-term progressive political tendencies. Rather, practical necessity that has its basis in social antagonism is as likely to result in periods of decline as in periods of progress, given that there is no guarantee that individuals or groups will be constrained to act in ways that produce good consequences instead of potentially disastrous ones. A systematic account of history (that is, one organized in accordance with some overarching principle of historical development) that appeals to practical necessity and social antagonism does not, therefore, have to be one that posits unmistakable and irreversible progressive political tendencies in history. Instead, the material provided by history could with equal justification be organized according to a principle other than the hidden plan of nature identified by Kant. Such an alternative principle might be that history is essentially circular, in the sense that it repeats the same essential pattern of cultural and political progress followed by cultural and political decline. The idea that history proceeds overall in accordance with a plan of nature and thereby exhibits progressive cultural and political tendencies, if not strictly moral ones as well, is essential, therefore, to Kant's attempt to rule out such an alternative view of history, by showing not only that history is not a mere aggregate of chance, random events without any underlying law or principle, but also that the course of history obeys a law or principle that entails the existence of unmistakable, irreversible progressive tendencies. Thus, we are prevented from having to witness a spectacle

that ‘necessitates our turning our eyes away from it in disgust and, in despair of ever encountering a completed rational aim in it, to hope for the latter only in another world’ (IUH, 8, 30). The identification of a hidden plan of nature which is operative in history would provide, moreover, a means of predicting the course that history is likely to take in the future. When this function is taken together with the way in which such a plan provides an antidote to less edifying views of history, we are confronted with

a consoling prospect into the future (which without a plan of nature one cannot hope for with any ground), in which the human species is represented in the remote distance as finally working itself upward toward the condition in which all germs nature has placed in it can be fully developed and its vocation here on earth can be fulfilled. Such a *justification* of nature – or better, of *providence* – is no unimportant motive for choosing a particular viewpoint for considering the world. (IUH, 8, 30)

I think it is fair to say that judging from this passage, the systematic and predicative value of the idea of a hidden, providential plan of nature that realizes itself in the course of history is, for Kant, subordinate to the value that this plan possesses in virtue of its capacity to counteract the view that history provides no evidence of any unmistakable, irreversible progressive cultural or political tendencies, or the view that even if history does provide evidence of such tendencies, it exhibits to an equal (if not greater) extent evidence of regressive tendencies. After all, Kant stresses how the need to counteract such views of history provides a strong motive for choosing a particular view of history. I shall therefore focus on how the type of universal history proposed by Kant might be of value in this regard, relating it directly to the claim that the establishment of a global legal and political order forms part of a hidden plan of nature that realizes itself in the course of history. I shall then relate this conception of the aim of a philosophical history to the argument developed earlier that a moral transformation of individuals’ attitudes and that which motivates them is not sufficiently explained in the *Idea for a Universal History* itself in a way that would avoid the introduction of an external standpoint. Thus, that which motivates individuals once the transition to a global legal and political order has been made, cannot be thought to differ fundamentally from that which motivated human beings to establish such an order on the basis of certain common experiences that they suffered. The absence of any mechanism at work in history that would explain such a moral transformation makes it difficult to see what would motivate future generations in

particular to remain part of, and to help maintain, the same global and political order in the absence of the experiences that originally compelled human beings to establish it. We first need, however, to gain a clearer understanding of Kant's conception of the relationship between universal history and the writing of history, for it is here that the difficulty in question becomes most evident.

On the one hand, Kant clearly does not think that an *a priori* philosophy of history should replace the empirical discipline of history. The claim that it should do so would, he states, amount to a misinterpretation of his aim (IUH, 8, 30). On the other hand, this philosophical view of history must stand in some kind of relation to the material provided by the academic discipline known as history. From what has been said so far, one way of interpreting the relation of universal history to the empirical discipline of history is as follows: universal history provides the means of organizing the detailed material provided by this empirical discipline in a way that goes beyond what has already been achieved by the historian, and in a way that counters less edifying, but no less plausible, views of human history regarded as a whole. From this we may conclude that the material provided by history as an empirical discipline ought to be organized in accordance with the idea of a plan of nature that is gradually being realized in history. This approach will in turn satisfy certain fundamental human needs and interests, especially the need to find meaning in history and to possess grounds for hope in the future development of the human race.¹³

The little that Kant has to say on this matter is compatible with the interpretation of the nature of the relation of universal history to the empirical discipline of history just offered. He surmises that the advance of historical studies that one can expect to take place (presumably as a result of increasing culture and enlightenment) will present a problem for future generations. The problem in question concerns how these future generations will cope with 'the burden of history' left to them 'after a few centuries' (IUH, 8, 30-31). This burden can be identified with the vast amount of historical material that historians will by this point have amassed and organized in accordance with the demands of their discipline.¹⁴ This material is to be organized by the philosophical historian in the sense of being combined to form an intelligible whole that is capable of fulfilling the human need to find meaning in history and grounds for hope in the

¹³ For an interpretation of the text that stresses the second 'therapeutic' aim, see Arnd Pollmann, 'Der Kummer der Vernunft. Zu Kants Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichtsphilosophie in therapeutischer Absicht', *Kant-Studien* 102(1) (2011), 69-88.

¹⁴ The burden in question is not, therefore, to be understood as some form of historical guilt.

future of the human race. The last requirement in particular is suggested by Kant's claim that the process whereby future generations select what is of significance and value in that which has been handed down to them must proceed 'only from the viewpoint of what interests them, namely, what nations and governments have accomplished or harmed regarding a cosmopolitan aim' (IUH, 8, 31). He is assuming, therefore, that future generations will already be concerned with the establishment of a global legal and political order, in which they have an interest because only this arrangement can effectively prevent the evils generated by interstate hostility.

We may conclude, then, that the philosophical historian's task will be to interpret, select and combine the historical material provided by historians in accordance with an *a priori* plan of nature so as to show that this plan is being progressively realized in history, and that it provides a firm basis for hope in humanity's progression towards a better political future in which human capacities are increasingly able to develop in accordance with the final aim of nature. This task will arguably in certain cases require, however, downplaying or even ignoring altogether historical events, periods or phenomena that conflict with the idea of such a plan and the idea of its progressive realization in history, depending on the general cultural and historical tendencies exhibited by the age in which the philosophical historian lives.¹⁵ This is not to say that the philosophical historian must completely ignore any historical material that runs counter to the idea of the gradual realization of this plan of nature in history and the progressive view of history that it underpins. Rather, all that he or she needs to do is to show that overall the historical tendency is indeed a progressive one that can adequately be explained only in terms of such a plan. Nevertheless, the historical evidence must, on balance, support the claims that the philosophical historian wants to make, and this requirement would not be met if the evidence provided by history itself could be plausibly interpreted as pointing in the opposite direction. I now want to argue that this philosophical approach to the material provided by historians potentially conflicts with Kant's own account of the cosmopolitan aim of universal history. A tension in Kant's account of this aim arises because in the *Idea for a Universal History* he (1) explains human motivation in terms of a practical form of necessity that arises in connection with certain collective human experiences whose basis lies in social and interstate antagonism, but (2) does not identify a mechanism that explains how there would be a moral

¹⁵ Kant himself explicitly states that his age provides historical material that indicates progressive moral and political tendencies, namely, the enlightened tolerance which characterized the reign of Frederick the Great (E, 8, 40-41) and the disinterested and sympathetic response exhibited by spectators of the French Revolution (CF, 7, 85-86).

transformation in that which motivates individuals after the transition to a global legal and political order, however imperfect it may be, has been made.

If that which motivates individuals cannot be thought to change fundamentally even when a global legal and political order has been established, and given that the experience of certain evils connected with interstate hostility, especially war, is what motivates (or will motivate) human beings to establish such an order, it follows that a surrogate for the experiences connected with the evils generated by interstate hostility will be required. This surrogate for the experiences in question is required to explain what would conclusively motivate individuals to remain part of, and to help maintain, this global legal and political order, when they themselves do not suffer the same experiences that originally led human beings to establish it. Clearly, the experiences could not be the *same* ones, since human beings established a global legal and political order precisely to avoid having to suffer in the future the experiences that originally led them to establish this order. Indeed, the fact of continuing to suffer these experiences would demonstrate the futility of this step, whereas Kant's essay assumes that it would be successful. Although direct experience of the evils that motivated the establishment of a global legal and political order may not be necessary in the case of those individuals who *once* experienced them but no longer do so, nor even, perhaps, in the case of future generations for whom these experiences still form part of living memory, this is less obviously true of later generations. Rather, one would need to explain how the experiences in question, or to be more precise the memory of them, could be communicated with sufficient power to motivate these future generations to remain in, and to be committed to maintaining, the global legal and political order of which they are already members. This must be done, moreover, in relation to individuals whose attitudes and that which motivates them cannot be assumed to be essentially different from those of the individuals who were originally led to establish such an order as a matter of practical necessity.

One way of explaining how this might happen is through the writing of history and the subsequent teaching of it to generations that did not directly suffer the experiences that motivated earlier generations to establish a global legal and political order, and for whom these experiences no longer form part of living memory. The experiences in question would in this sense be preserved for future generations that did not directly experience them. These future generations might then be motivated to remain part of, and to help maintain, a global legal and political order which guarantees peace and stability as a result of their awareness of the evils that they themselves would in all likelihood suffer in the absence of such an order. This would require, however, a different approach to the writing of history to the one proposed by Kant,

when it comes to the selection and organization of the available historical material. For it would then be necessary to emphasize historical events, periods or phenomena that provide a spectacle that does in fact force us to turn away from history in disgust, as opposed to placing the emphasis on ones that suggest the existence of unmistakable, irreversible progressive cultural and political tendencies in history, tendencies whose existence can be made fully intelligible only in terms of a hidden plan of nature which realizes itself by means of human actions in the course of history. At the very least, any evidence of such progressive tendencies would have to be matched by evidence of destructive tendencies without, however, privileging the progressive tendencies in any way. Thus, I do not want to claim that what is required is the kind of pure negativism that stresses *only* the destructive tendencies evident in human history, and that even views these same destructive tendencies as bound up with technological progress, found in the following explicit denial of the essentially affirmative picture of human history associated with philosophers such as Kant and Hegel:

Universal history must be construed and denied. After the catastrophes that have happened, and in view of the catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that a plan for a better world is manifested in history and unites it. Not to be denied for that reason, however, is the unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and phases of history – the unity of the control of nature, progressing to rule over human beings, and finally to that over their inner nature. No universal history leads from savagery to humanity, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb.¹⁶

Clearly, we could not move too far in this direction if one of the fundamental aims of universal history, as understood by Kant, is not to be undermined, namely, the aim of satisfying the fundamental human interest that consists in not finding oneself confronted with a historical spectacle that is devoid of any evidence of progressive cultural and political tendencies in history, and instead gives rise to a sense of disgust. What matters, therefore, is to achieve an

¹⁶ Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 314. English translation: *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Continuum, 1973), 320. I have modified the translation. The extent to which Adorno himself appears to allow for the possibility of some of the essential features of universal history in Kant's sense, see David James, 'Self-mastery and Universal History: Horkheimer and Adorno on the Conditions of a Society "in Control of Itself"', *Philosophy and Social Criticism* (forthcoming).

appropriate balance depending on what is at stake.¹⁷ As regards the negative element consider, for example, the present-day European Union. Here we have an institution and project that exhibits some of the features of the type of global legal and political order envisaged by Kant, so that it might be regarded as paving the way for the ‘future large state body, of which the past world has no example to show’ that he mentions in the *Idea for a Universal History* (IUH, 8, 28). One argument for remaining part of, and helping to maintain, this institution and project would be that it has helped to secure peace and stability in Europe, whereas previous generations were frequently made subject to the evils of war and interstate hostility more generally.¹⁸ Making this argument effectively would require, however, emphasizing the evils and horrors of twentieth-century European history in particular, rather than pointing to advantages that are too closely tied to cultural and intellectual developments that would directly appeal only to a subgroup of European citizens, such as how the free movement of people facilitates the exchange of knowledge and ideas, thereby promoting enlightenment. It would also require stressing the very real possibility of a relapse into a condition characterized by such past evils and horrors, as opposed to the idea that history exhibits unmistakable, irreversible progressive cultural and political tendencies, despite all evidence to the contrary.

The picture of history offered here would have to be one that acknowledges that other possible ways of organizing historical material, such as the organization of it in accordance with the idea that history is essentially circular in nature, are no less valid than Kant’s idea of a universal history. Here a problem emerges for Kant’s regulative teleological understanding of history: what would be left of the subjective necessity that concerns the need to judge history in accordance with the idea of an aim of nature that is progressively realized through human actions in history if alternative ways of organizing the historical material handed down to future

¹⁷ This invites an instrumentalization of history that may itself be viewed as problematic. In this respect, the approach to history suggested by Kant in his *Idea for a Universal History* finds its logical development in the use of history made by his self-proclaimed follower, Johann Gottlieb Fichte. See David James, *Fichte’s Social and Political Philosophy: Property and Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 168-187 and David James, *Fichte’s Republic: Idealism, History and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 108-115.

¹⁸ This is just an example. I do not wish to claim that this type of argument would be sufficient even if it were valid. The lack of prominence given to this type of argument in the debates surrounding the recent referendum concerning the future of the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union and the result of this referendum make any claims regarding its effectiveness difficult to determine. Perhaps if this argument had figured more prominently in these debates, and had it been more persuasively presented, the result would have been different.

generations have an equal claim to validity? As we have seen, Kant's idea of a universal history might, in fact, even be thought to present certain dangers in relation to one of its fundamental aims, an aim whose progressive realization it not only seeks to describe and explain but also to help bring about by preventing people lacking or losing hope in the prospect of its eventual realization. This aim is the future existence of a global legal and political order in which latent human capacities can fully develop. For in stressing the existence of unmistakeable, irreversible progressive cultural and political tendencies, universal history runs the risk of neglecting features of history that point in the opposite direction, whereas these features of history must instead be accorded full recognition if people are to experience, however indirectly, the evils that motivated human beings to establish an order of this kind with the intention of preventing both themselves and later generations from having to suffer the same experiences in the future. Viewing history in the way that Kant proposes would in this respect appear counterpurposive, in that it threatens to undermine the legal and political conditions of the realization of the final aim of nature itself.

I have shown that this conclusion ultimately derives from Kant's attempt in the *Idea for a Universal History* to explain the establishment of a global legal and political order in terms of a practical necessity that arises in connection with certain collective human experiences whose basis lies in social or interstate antagonism, and how he does not also provide a convincing account of a mechanism that would explain how individuals would undergo a fundamental moral change in their attitudes and in that which motivates them even after the transition to a national and to a global legal and political order had been made. One might add, therefore, that any attempt to combine an account of increasing moral perfection with history carries with it certain dangers, by providing humanity with a flattering self-image that is liable to produce a form of moral complacency that can be sustained only by ignoring historical evidence which, if we were to focus on it, would undermine rather than reinforce this self-image. Although the historical signs to which Kant was himself witness may serve, or so I would argue, to exonerate him of the charge of seeking to foster such a flattering self-image – a self-image that corresponds to the 'smug imaginings about its excellences' which he attributes to the human species in the *Idea for a Universal History* (IUH, 8, 18), and that he is at pains to counter elsewhere¹⁹ – subsequent historical experience should have taught us to guard

¹⁹ Most clearly in his account of radical evil in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, in which he claims that '[w]e can spare ourselves the formal proof that there must be such a corrupt propensity rooted in the human being, in view of the multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human *deeds* parades before us (R, 6,

ourselves against a self-image of this kind, especially by means of our understanding and use of the material provided by historians and by human history itself.

Abbreviations of Kant's writings

CF = *The Conflict of the Faculties*, trans. Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor, in Immanuel Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

CJ = *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

E = 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?', in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

GMM = *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

IUH = *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim*, trans. Allen W. Wood, in Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, eds. Günter Zöllner and Robert B. Loudon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

PP = *Toward Perpetual Peace*, in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

32-33), but also in the *Idea for a Universal History*, where he claims that the human being needs a master for the following reason:

For he certainly misuses his freedom in regard to others of his kind; and although as a rational creature he wishes a law that sets limits to the freedom of all, his selfish animal inclination still misleads him into excepting himself from it where he may. Thus he needs a *master*, who breaks his stubborn will and necessitates him to obey a universally valid will with which everyone can be free' (IUH, 8, 23).

This passage not only refers to the lack of any necessary alignment between that which individuals recognize to be commanded by reason and that which they are actually motivated to do, but also points to an essential connection between Kant's legal and political philosophy and his theory of radical evil, in that both appeal to the idea of a disposition to exempt oneself, on selfish grounds, from obedience to a law whose validity one otherwise recognizes. For further discussion of this point, see James, *Rousseau and German Idealism*, 57-65.

R = *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, in Immanuel Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

All the above writings are cited according to the volume and page numbers of *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Königliche Preußische (later Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Reimer/de Gruyter, 1900-).