Essay reviewPhenomenology of illness, philosophy, and lifePhenomenology of illness, , Oxford University Press, Oxford (2016), pp. xi+248. Price US$50 hardback, ISBN 978-0199669653
Section snippets
Illness
To experience illness, ageing, and dying is intrinsic to the human condition. This set of truths prompted Alasdair MacIntyre (1999), almost twenty years ago, to call for a radical reorientation of moral theory. We ought to start our reflections on the good life from our status as ‘vulnerable, dependent, afflicted’ creatures. A wider community of feminist and care ethicists and disability theorists had long made similar calls (see Jaggar, 1992; Silvers, 2016). Conceptions of the good life
Phenomenology, naturalism, and illness
The majority of contemporary philosophical work on somatic and psychiatric illness has drawn upon the phenomenological tradition. Its relevance lies in its capacity to describe the changes in the structure of lived experience caused by pathological experiences. Carel focuses on chronic somatic illness, though makes regular remarks on non-chronic and psychiatric illnesses (see Ratcliffe, 2014).
Carel characterises illness as ‘a complete transformation of one's life’ that entails a set of radical
The body, world, and breathlessness
A distinctive reason for the epistemic significance of a first-person stance on the lived experience of illness is the central role of the body. Carel emphasises that chronic illness, especially, can ‘permanently and radically modify my bodily experiences’. She develops this theme using Sartre's account of the ‘orders of the body’ and Heidegger's account of ‘equipmental breakdown’ (p.59). Chapter three therefore focuses on ‘the body in illness’, honouring Merleau-Ponty's celebrated remark that
Wellbeing, death, and authenticity
The latter half of the book – chapters six to ten – is devoted to a wider set of ethical, epistemic, and metaphilosophical issues. It shows how phenomenology of illness can inform a range of topics of wider philosophical interest.
The theme of chapter six is the question of whether wellbeing is possible within illness. A negative answer may seem obvious, but the empirical evidence surprisingly shows that many ill persons argue the opposite. Chronic illness does not substantially diminish one's
Testimony, intelligibility, and epistemic injustice
Illness and death are difficult to talk about by virtue of their emotionally and personally demanding realities. Even if we set aside the complex analyses of ‘being-towards-death’, temporal finitude, and ‘resolute coping’, there are many barriers to talking about and understanding illness and death. Earlier chapters surveyed several of the reasons, including our pathophobic culture and the psychological constraints on our capacity to imagine the lives of the ill. In chapter eight, Carel moves
Philosophy, illness, and life
Carel ends the book by identifying ways that philosophy can be enriched through a more robust engagement with illness. The enrichment lies not only in the novel means for ethical, epistemic, and axiological debate, but also in new conceptions about the aims and practices of philosophy.
The tenth and final chapter, ‘The Philosophical Role of Illness’, offers a manifesto for future projects in philosophy of illness. Carel starts by outlining a range of ways that illness can enrich philosophy.
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