Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Rationalizing Focal Points

  • Published:
Theory and Decision Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Focal points seem to be important in helping players coordinate their strategies in coordination problems. Game theory lacks, however, a formal theory of focal points. This paper proposes a theory of focal points that is based on individual rationality considerations. The two principles upon which the theory rest are the Principle of Insufficient Reason (IR) and a Principle of Individual Team Member Rationality. The way IR is modelled combines the classic notion of description symmetry and a new notion of pay-off symmetry, which yields different predictions in a variety of games. The theory can explain why people do better than pure randomization in matching games.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Bacharach, M. (1991), Games with Concept-Sensitive Strategy Spaces. Oxford University, mimeo.

  • Bacharach, M. (1993), Variable universe games, in K. Binmore, A. Kirman and P. Tani (eds.), Frontiers of Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge,Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bacharach, M. and Bernasconi, M. (1997), An experimental study of the variable frame theory of focal points, Games and Economic Behavior 19: 1-45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Colman, A. and Bacharach, M. (1997), Payoff dominance and the Stackelberg heuristic. Theory and Decision 43: 1-19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crawford, V. and Haller, H. (1990), Learning how to cooperate: Optimal play in repeated coordination games. Econometrica 58: 571-595.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gauthier, D. (1975), Coordination. Dialogue 14: 195-221.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilbert, M. (1990), Rationality, coordination and convention. Synthese 84: 1-21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goyal, S. and Janssen, M. (1996), Can we rationally learn to coordinate? Theory and Decision 40: 29-49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harsanyi, J. and Selten, R. (1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. MIT Press, Cambridge,Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Janssen, M. (1998), Focal points, in P. Newman (ed.), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (vol. II). MacMillan, London, pp. 150-155.

    Google Scholar 

  • Janssen, M. (2000), Rationalizing Focal Points. Tinbergen Institute, Discussion Paper 00-05.

  • Lewis, D. (1969), Convention. Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mehta, J, Starmer, C. and Sugden, R. (1994a), The nature of salience: An experimental investigation of pure coordination games. American Economic Review 74: 658-673.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mehta, J, Starmer, C. and Sugden, R. (1994b), Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation. Theory and Decision 36: 163-185.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, T. (1960), The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard UP, Cambridge,Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sinn, H.-W. (1980), A rehabilitation of the principle of insufficient reason. Quarterly Journal of Economics 94: 493-504.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sugden, R. (1991), Rational choice: A survey of contributions from economics and philosophy. Economic Journal 101: 751-786.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sugden, R. (1995), Towards a theory of focal points. Economic Journal 105: 533-550.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Maarten C.W. Janssen, Department of Economics/micro, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Maarten C.W. Janssen

Authors
  1. Maarten C.W. Janssen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Maarten C.W. Janssen.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Janssen, M.C. Rationalizing Focal Points. Theory and Decision 50, 119–148 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010349014718

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010349014718

Search

Navigation