Abstract
Much work in social ontology analyzes how social entities are based on collective intentionality. A neglected perspective is, however, the distinction between those social entities that are explicitly established (often called formal institutions, like marriages), those that are established but not explicitly (informal institutions, like friendships), and those that are not established at all (social macro entities, like episodes of inflation). To shed more light on this trichotomy, a collection of examples taken from the works of John Searle will be discussed, comprising money, marriages, friendship, cocktail parties, natural language, and episodes of inflation. The chapter argues that explicit establishment confers certain typical characteristics on formal institutions that informal institutions lack, thus explaining the typical differences between marriages and friendship. The focus on explicit establishment further develops Khalidi’s classification of social kinds, and it contributes to Epstein’s quest for grounds and anchors of social entities. It can thus contribute to overcoming the narrow focus on collective intentionality.
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Acknowledgments
Previous versions of this chapter have been presented at workshops and conferences in Bonn, Tampere, and Graz. Part of the material has already been published in the JOWO proceedings (Jansen 2019). I am indebted to the audiences at these events for inspiring feedback, and especially to Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Brian Epstein, and Jenny Pelletier for written comments on an earlier version of the chapter. Research for this chapter has been supported by the German Research Foundation under the auspices of the project ‘Formal Causation in Aristotle and in Analytic Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science’ (JA 1904/4-1).
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Jansen, L. (2023). Social Entities with and without Explicit Establishment. In: Pelletier, J., Rode, C. (eds) The Reality of the Social World. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23984-7_8
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