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Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide

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Abstract

More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these norms are not problematic in the way critics have suggested they would be. In particular, these norms do not guide thinking by motivating intentional agents to (intentionally) accord with them; as a result, no obvious vicious regress threatens the theory. In the final section of this paper, I argue that accepting this teleological theory of intentionality need not commit one to thinking that intentionality is the product of natural selection.

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Notes

  1. Kripke (1982). For examples of different defenders of CIN, see Dummett (1959/1978), Boghossian (1989, 2005), Millikan (1990), Wright (1992), Tanney (1999), Brandom (2000), and Wedgwood (2007).

  2. See, for instance, Horwich (1995, 1998, 2005, 2006), Papineau (1999), Dretske (2000), Hattiangadi (2006), and Glüer and Wikforss (2009).

  3. Glüer and Wikforss (2009, p. 31).

  4. Cf. Boghossian (2005) and Hattiangadi (2006). The critiques of CIN may be due at least partly to advocates only partially understanding the proper motivations of their own view.

  5. I assume that “norms guiding performance” in the sense relevant to the Glüer-Wikforss premise requires that an agent intentionally follow the norms, i.e. that an agent follows the rule by using some sort of practical reasoning. In another sense of “norms guiding performance,” the performance of a well-designed coke machine is guided by the norms of its design; it does what it’s supposed to do (i.e. it distributes coke when the appropriate amount of money is inserted) because it was designed to do so. As far as I can see, the arguments Glüer and Wikforss deploy do not establish that norms inherent to content cannot “guide performance” in this sense, so either they have overlooked this sort of performance guidance (which occurs when something fulfills its telos because it has that telos), or the Glüer–Wikforss premise asserts something stronger. The most charitable interpretation, I think, is to assume the latter.

  6. I argue for these points in works in progress. Because I think this picture of intentionality best fits our folk conception, I think it would be more charitable to interpret Kripke (1982) with this picture rather than the “regulative” version of the CIN thesis.

  7. See Stalnaker (1984, p. 6). Fred Dretske frequently compares artifact detectors of various sorts with mental states. See, for instance, Dretske (1986, 1988).

  8. Gibbard (2003) discusses the idea that norms might be constitutive of content.

  9. Indeed, there is even a temptation to think that this telos is the telos of the substance, especially if we suppose the substance is wholly useless as a means of purification before the gods due to the fact that these particular gods don’t even exist.

  10. Here I engage directly with Glüer and Wikforss (2009, p. 36). Suggesting that correctness is normative is compatible with the idea that correctness directly entails some sort of permission rather than some sort of obligation. Cf. Whiting (2010). When I say that there ought to be a structural resemblance between the object that represents and what is represented, I intend to suggest that there ought to be a structural resemblance given that there is representation at all.

  11. The distinction I draw between meeting standards and those standards applying is, of course, wholly analogous to the distinction often made between conforming to a rule and following it.

  12. Cf. Glüer and Wikforss (2009, pp. 37–39).

  13. This undercuts the supposed difficulty for CIN spelled out in Glüer and Wikforss (2009, pp. 39–41).

  14. One of the faults of Boghossian (2005) is that he fails to recognize that there is as much reason to think that there is inherent normativity in the case of desire as there is in the case of belief.

  15. Of course, there might be a perfectly respectable sense in which we can judge the performance of maps if all this amounts to is judging how well they do as maps. There is also a perfectly respectable sense in which this sort of performance can be guided by representational norms. The fact that this map does well as a map might well be at least partly explained by the fact that the map is supposed to look that way. There will be an analogous sense in which intentional states perform, and which this performance can be guided by representational norms. See footnote 5.

  16. The “ought”–“can” principle is the focus of a criticism of CIN found in Hattiangadi (2006).

  17. See Prinz (2002, Chap. 9) for one discussion of problems with causal theories of mental representation.

  18. Cf. Millikan (1989).

  19. Putnam (1975).

  20. Ironically, the same sorts of thought experiments that motivate the causal theory of reference/representation also undermine it. Cf. Putnam (1981, Chap. 1).

  21. Richard Heck pointed out to me that this conclusion might explain why it may be a mistake to begin the search for mental representation by looking at information, cf. Dretske (1981), which is not teleological in nature. It’s not obvious we should count information or Grice’s “natural meaning”, cf. Grice (1989), as a form of genuine representation.

  22. I am actually inclined to think that the inherent normativity of teleology is platitudinous, so that anybody who denies it is either confused or has some other concept of teleology in mind. Nonetheless, the burden rests on me to argue that this sort of teleology is generally exhibited by artifacts.

  23. Cf. Lewis (1984).

  24. It’s worth saying that I’m not committed to thinking that game norms and teleological norms more generally can’t derivatively give us reasons for action. They might in this way sometimes guide performance. I merely intend to suggest that they don’t do so inherently. Thanks to Richard Heck for this point.

  25. As the functioning of this something can be explained by the fact these norms have been established, these norms cannot be purely evaluative norms. See footnotes 5 and 14.

  26. Dretske (2000, p. 247).

  27. I would be willing to concede that there is a sense of “correspondence” in which it just means resemblance or even structural resemblance. In this latter sense of “correspondence,” we might say that the details of a painting correspond with the features of the valley even if the painting does not represent the valley. Henceforth, I will only use correspondence in the relevant sense, that is, correspondence as it relates to representation.

  28. Cf. Lewis (1984).

  29. A clear example of this tradition is Fodor (1990), but any non-normative “referentialist” will do.

  30. Cf. Field (1994).

  31. Fodor (1990) does admirably well considering the challenge, but I don’t ultimately find his asymmetrical dependence view very convincing. See the essays of Loewer and Rey (1991) for some criticism.

  32. Cf. Austin (1950).

  33. I discuss this question further in work in progress.

  34. This is particularly clear in Dretske (2000), but the same might be said of Horwich (1998, Chap. 8).

  35. Cf. Horwich (1998, Chap. 8).

  36. Cf. Horwich (2005, Chaps. 5–6).

  37. Cf. Boghossian (2005).

  38. Glüer and Wikforss (2009, p. 37).

  39. Regulative norms are governed by what is sometimes called the “internalist” constraint. For some discussion see Korsgaard (1986) or Wedgwood (2007, pp. 25–27).

  40. Cf. Korsgaard (1996).

  41. See Wedgwood (2007), pp. 119–120 for some discussion.

  42. See footnotes 5 and 14.

  43. Cf. Dretske (1988).

  44. See Block (2007, p. 24).

  45. I am not necessarily committed to the idea that biological function is inherently teleological.

  46. Cf. Millikan (1984, 1993), Neander (1991a, b), Godfrey-Smith (1994), and the essays of Ariew et al. (2002).

  47. Wright (1973). See Godfrey-Smith (1993) for a useful summary of the literature.

  48. Boorse (1976). I’m inclined to think that there is a perfectly respectable notion of etiological function that is distinct from teleological function. Counterexamples to Wright’s analysis understood as an analysis of teleological function would not be counterexamples to it understood as an analysis of etiological function.

  49. Precisely just this sort of vicious cycle seems to have played out in Japan over the last 20 years.

  50. See Bedau (1991).

  51. Allen and Bekoff (1995).

  52. Cummins (1975).

  53. Cf. Kitcher (1993).

  54. The thought that these various sorts of functions might all be distinct is consonant with those philosophers who suggest we ought to be pluralists about function. See Godfrey-Smith (1993).

  55. Bedau (1992).

  56. Swampman is the famous example of Davidson (1987).

  57. Cf. Bedau (1992). Thus, I think psychology is likely to be autonomous of biology.

  58. This is not to say that less might not also be sufficient.

  59. See Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007, pp. 210–215) for a brief discussion.

  60. Cf. Bedau (1990).

  61. I have some sympathy with skeptical dissenters. See Bedau (1991).

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Acknowledgements

I would particularly like to thank Richard Heck, Christopher Hill, Joshua Schechter, Jamie Dreier, Jonathan Ichikawa, Michael Young, and Katherine Rubin for their comments and discussion on this or other closely related projects. This paper was presented at a research seminar jointly hosted by Arché Research Centre (The University of St. Andrews) and Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (The University of Oslo). I offer my gratitude to the participants of that seminar.

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    Benjamin W. Jarvis

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Jarvis, B.W. Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide. Philos Stud 157, 1–25 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9610-4

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