Abstract
This paper replies to a commentary by John-Stewart Gordon on our paper, “The Moral Standing of Social Robots: Untapped Insights from Africa.” In the original paper, we set forth an African relational view of personhood and show its implications for the moral standing of social robots. This reply clarifies our position and answers three objections. The objections concern (1) the ethical significance of intelligence, (2) the meaning of ‘pro-social,' and (3) the justification for prioritizing humans over pro-social robots.
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Jecker, N.S., Atiure, C.A. & Ajei, M.O. Two Steps Forward: An African Relational Account of Moral Standing. Philos. Technol. 35, 38 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-022-00533-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-022-00533-3