Abstract
Much attention in philosophy of religion has been devoted to the question of whether faith is epistemically rational. But is it morally and practically permissible? This paper explores a response to a family of arguments that Christian faith is morally impermissible or practically irrational, even if epistemically justified. After articulating the arguments, I consider how they would fare if they took seriously the traditional notion that genuine faith is always accompanied by Christian hope. I show how the norms of hope regulate Christian faith in such a way that it does not involve, and certainly does not entail, the morally and practically problematic attitudes and behaviors with which it is associated.
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Notes
Although we can imagine that certain religions have the resources in their central doctrines to do just that, others may have more difficulty (if, for instance, the object of hope is that each woman will be subjugated to one man in polygamous marital relationships in heaven, this will hardly get rid of the moral worry about misogyny). Thus, considerations of space limit what I can say here about religious faith more generally.
The probabilistic form of the argument is arguably closer to Hume’s considered view. He later maintains that there could be a “true religion” which would not lead to moral corruption, but that this is not the religion that “has commonly been found in the world. See Hume (1947, pp. 220, 223). For interpretive issues see Streminger (1989).
Growing up in a household where parents count themselves religious can hardly be said to be an accurate measure of the character trait, faith. Yet that was the measure being used in the aforementioned study.
Rejection of this amounts to committing the Pelagian heresy.
I owe this point to Aaron Cobb.
For more comprehensive discussion of perfectionism which admits that autonomy has value, other things equal, see Steven Wall (1998), especially Pt. II.
As Kevin Vallier has recently argued, pace Wall, “for any moral code that requires religious toleration, there exists an intolerant code that promotes the candidate goods more effectively,” (Vallier 2013, p. 650).
For recent examples, see Human Rights Campaign Staff (2016), Dennett (2007), Harris and Nawaz (2015). Dennett lists bigotry among the “negative effects” of religion: “bigotry, murderous fanaticism, oppression, cruelty, and enforced ignorance, to cite the obvious” (Dennett 2007, p. 56; Ciarrochi and Heaven 2012).
For instance, Francis Collins was accused of holding bigoted attitudes towards atheism. William Ramsey argues that this way of speaking is misleading because bigoted attitudes cannot take beliefs as their objects; rather, they must take persons as their objects Ramsey (2013).
Of course, many Christian denominations deny that this is an object of faith; but members of denominations that do take it to be an object of faith, or that hold onto an interpretation of Scripture which would entail it, come under fire for being bigoted. So I think it is an important example to consider even if it only applies to a subset of Christians.
For discussion of a slightly different construal of the argument, but one which similarly operates on the idea that there is something morally impermissible in forming a belief that doesn’t conform to evidence, see Peels (2010).
Someone might stop me here because it sounds like I am assuming people can believe at will, and as Pamela Hieronymi aptly demonstrates in “Controlling Belief,” it is not conceptually possible to believe at will. I am rather joining Hieronymi in saying that we can exercise managerial and evaluative control over what we intend to believe, and in doing so successfully we can actually form beliefs. But this is not an instance of believing at will.
For discussions of how demotion can be epistemically rational see Bergmann and Kvanvig (2015, p. 26).
Here I am borrowing from Samuel Baker’s work on the principle of charity (in progress).
For a Kierkegaardian take on the relationship between faith and hope, where faith is a ground for hope, see Bernier (2015, pp. 187–211).
Reliance will not suffice either, as presumably demons can use claims like “Jesus is the Son of God” in their practical reasoning like persons of faith do but for different ends, and so do not have faith.
Most current accounts of faith acknowledge the need for a pro-attitude, but their proponents assume that the pro-attitude must be a constituent of faith rather than a necessary condition for it. I will claim that hopeful attitudes are at least a necessary condition.
This case draws on a case Daniel Howard-Snyder uses to discuss propositional faith (2013).
Sometimes, she must rely on her religious community to help her practice hope. I am thinking here of the work of Aaron Cobb and Adam Green on the social virtue of hope and scaffolding of individual hope by the community.
For fuller treatment see Olivier (1963). Saint Paul writes, “If we hope for that which we do not see, we wait for it in patience,” (Romans 8:25).
The Christian’s vision of justice can be largely shared by those of other religions or no religion; so her pursuit of justice doesn’t give her any more reason to reduce religious diversity through coercive political action than it would give a secular person or person of another religion. I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
I’m grateful to Robert Pasnau and Samuel Baker for the suggestion to consider this issue more carefully. The suggestion that Christians should put hope in God to bring his kingdom instead of intolerantly imposing it here and now is not merely an antiquated idea. Modern Catholic and Protestant theologians from Karl Barth to Jurgen Moltmann have been keen to argue that Christians ought not try to construct a utopia or theocratic political order to challenge secular ones here and now. An excellent survey of the theological history of Christian hope can be found in Hebblethwaite (2010). Hebblethwaite details how liberal Protestantism of the nineteenth century tended to equate the coming of God’s kingdom—with progression towards a perfect ethical and political community on earth (123). It was in part a reaction against this account of the object of Christian hope that Barth et al. developed their views that deemphasized the human part in bringing about the kingdom and threw into focus hope set on God’s accomplishment of that work, using Christian suffering and efforts for the bettering of their societies on earth in service of it.
Both Chrysostom (1888) and Aquinas (in the Summa Theologica II.II q. 11 a. 3) make this point. Admittedly, Augustine looks to have changed his position on religious toleration after the Donatist schism, going on to argue that violence and compulsion were appropriate means of bringing people to right faith—a form of discipline. But the literature is divided on the extent of the shift, and on whether we should see Augustine as advocating religious intolerance in his letters regarding the Donatists. For a book-length treatment, see Lamirande (1975).
See 2 Peter 3:15.
See Romans 15:4.
In laying out his position on whether heretics are to be tolerated, Aquinas’s remarks show that excommunication and death are last resorts when there are no more grounds for hope. But, “On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of the wanderer”—that is, hope for her conversion to right faith—“wherefore she condemns not at once but ‘after the first and second admonition,’ as the Apostle directs: after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him…” (Summa Theologica II-II q. 11 a. 3, emphasis mine).
It also does not consider the value of hope as held in communities, which can combat the tendency of individuals who have aspiring but not genuine faith, who are part of religious communities, to hold bigoted attitudes. See Green and Cobb for more on shared hope (manuscript).
This sermon of Augustine’s—Sermo 21, 13—is quoted in Trabbic (2011).
Thanks to Aaron Cobb for pointing me to the Pope’s recent express affirmation of this point.
Martin writes, “Hope is answerable to the evidence for the outcome’s probability,” (2013, p. 62).
In Bovens (1999), hope is depicted as helping us to accept more risk and thus take gambles that will prove beneficial in the long run.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Max Baker-Hytch, Matthew Benton, Michael Bergmann, Rebecca Chan, Dustin Crummet, Liz Jackson, Gideon Jeffrey, Jeff McDonough, Carl Mosser, Mark Murphy, Sam Newlands, Michael Rea, Allison Krile Thornton, and Ted Warfield for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also received valuable feedback from audiences at the Notre Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion Spring 2016 Workshop, Notre Dame’s Food for Thought lecture, and the Hope and Optimism Midpoint Collaboratory Conference. I owe gratitude to the guest editors, Dan Howard-Snyder, Daniel McKaughan, and Rebecca Rice for organizing the publication of this special issue of the journal. This project was made possible through a generous Grant from the John Templeton Religious Trust; the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the trust.
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Jeffrey, A. Does hope morally vindicate faith?. Int J Philos Relig 81, 193–211 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9603-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9603-0