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Mental models and pragmatics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2000

P. N. Johnson-Laird
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 phil@clarity.princeton.edu www.cogsci.princeton.edu/~phil/rmbyrne@tcd.ie
Ruth M. J. Byrne
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Trinity College, University of Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland www.tcd.ie/Psychology/People/Ruth_Byrne/

Abstract

Van der Henst argues that the theory of mental models lacks a pragmatic component. He fills the gap with the notion that reasoners draw the most relevant conclusions. We agree, but argue that theories need an element of “nondeterminism.” It is often impossible to predict either what will be most relevant or which particular conclusion an individual will draw.

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Author&s Response
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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