Abstract
In his 2000 book Logical Properties Colin McGinn argues that predicates denote properties rather than sets or individuals. I support the thesis, but show that it is vulnerable to a type-incongruity objection, if properties are (modelled as) functions, unless a device for extensionalizing properties is added. Alternatively, properties may be construed as primitive intensional entities, as in George Bealer. However, I object to Bealer’s construal of predication as a primitive operation inputting two primitive entities and outputting a third primitive entity. Instead I recommend we follow Pavel Tichý in construing both predication and extensionalization as instances of the primitive operation of functional application.
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Jespersen, B. PREDICATION AND EXTENSIONALIZATION. J Philos Logic 37, 479–499 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9079-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9079-6