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Garrett on the Irrationality of Pure Time Preferences

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Abstract

In “Experience and Time,” Brian Garrett poses a challenge to friends of the rationality of pure time preferences. In this discussion note, we accept the challenge and provide two kinds of cases wherein some pure time preferences could be deemed rational.

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Notes

  1. Conversely, a preference is an impure time preference if A prefers X not just because of its temporal location but because of some other nontemporal consideration.

  2. Many others philosophers have argued against the rationality of pure time preferences. Lowry and Peterson (2011) note that Henry Sidgwick, F. P. Ramsey, Derek Parfit, and John Rawls are among the critics of pure time preferences. In this paper, however, we will mainly focus on Garrett’s main line of argument.

  3. A rational evaluation here is defined as a decision-theoretic notion where one is rational in preferring an option if it maximizes expected utility (Peterson 2009: 65-73).

  4. Thanks to Brian Garrett for raising these worries in a personal correspondence.

  5. Formulating states in a B-theoretic language of earlier or later than relations follow the rules of some temporal logics, like that of Arthur Prior’s System I+, System IIIa, and the U-calculus. We could also formulate these states in an A-theoretic language with WILL and WAS as future and past-tensed operators, respectively. For an overview of these temporal logics, see (Venema 2001); (Prior & Fine 1977, Ch. V); and, (Prior 1968, Ch. IX).

References

  • Garrett, B. (2018). Experience and time. Acta Analytica, 33(4), 427–430.

  • Lowry, R., & Peterson, M. (2011). Pure time preference. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92(4), 490–508.

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  • Peterson, M. (2009). An introduction to decision theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Prior, A. N. (1968). Papers on time and tense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  • Prior, A. N & Fine, K. (1977). Worlds, times and selves. MA, USA, University of Massachusetts Press.

  • Venema, Y. (2001). Temporal logic. In L. Goble (Ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic (pp. 203–223). Oxford: Blackwell.

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Acknowledgements

My thanks go to Brian Garrett for interesting discussions on this topic over the years. For their useful comments and suggestions, I also thank Rene Betita, Robert James Boyles, Christine Calub, Mark Anthony Dacela, Fides del Castillo, Gina Espenilla, Adrianne John Galang, Leonila Gabiosa, Dante Leoncini, Jazmin Llana, Mary Grace Lopez, Cristina Loyola, Napoleon Mabaquiao, Zebedee Mateo, Jose Maria Arcadio Malbarosa, Benito Teehankee, this journal’s referee, and the students of my 2017–2018 class in Metaphysics. Special thanks to Hazel Biana for going over an earlier version of this work.

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Correspondence to Jeremiah Joven Joaquin.

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Joaquin, J.J. Garrett on the Irrationality of Pure Time Preferences. Acta Anal 34, 363–367 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-018-00379-5

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