Mansplaining and Illocutionary Force

Authors

  • Casey Rebecca Johnson University of Idaho

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5206/fpq/2020.4.8168

Keywords:

Speech Act Theory, Mansplaining, Illocutionary Force, speech acts, Discursive injustice

Abstract

In this paper I describe three kinds of mansplaining, “well, actually” mansplaining, straw-mansplaining, and speech act–confusion mansplaining. While these three kinds have much in common, I focus on speech act–confusion mansplaining and offer a speech act theoretic account of what goes wrong when people mansplain in this way. In cases of speech act–confusion mansplaining, the target of the mansplaining is not able to do what she wants with her words. Her conversational contribution is taken to have a different force than the force she intends. This contributes to women’s discursive disablement and to the restriction of women’s participation in epistemically relevant exchanges.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Downloads

Published

2020-12-14

How to Cite

Johnson, Casey Rebecca. 2020. “Mansplaining and Illocutionary Force”. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 6 (4). https://doi.org/10.5206/fpq/2020.4.8168.

Issue

Vol. 6 No. 4 (2020)

Section

Articles, peer-reviewed

License

Copyright (c) 2020 Casey Rebecca Johnson

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

The authors of work published in FPQ under the Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 License retain copyright to their work without restrictions and publication rights without restrictions. However, we request that authors include some sort of acknowledgement that the work was previously published in FPQ if part or all of a paper published in FPQ is used elsewhere.