



His contestatory democracy involves more popular engagement than Pettit's account. Also, he is prepared to be more explicit about the need for civic virtue (which Pettit prefers to call civility) and the central role of education in constraining the development of dominating ends (where Pettit gives a greater role to incentives). Whereas Pettit advocates a 'shared-value neutralism', Maynor describes his approach, while still instrumental, as a 'quasi-perfectionism'.

This book demonstrates convincingly that non-domination is a useful concept to apply to contemporary politics, though in places the discussion is somewhat hampered by the way in which the language of non-domination (for example, the tracking of interests) is spelled out rather abstractly, rather than being given more concrete meaning. The real strength and originality of this book is the way in which it brings non-domination republicanism to engage with the prevailing accounts of liberalism, and shows that the arguments for instrumental and participatory republicanism are less clearly separable than is sometimes assumed.

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**Metaphysics, Method and Politics: The Political Philosophy of RG Collingwood**

James Connelly

*Imprint Academic, Exeter, 2003, x+336pp.*

*ISBN: 0 907845 312.*

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RG Collingwood was once considered to be a neglected philosopher. No one could sensibly make such a judgement today. In part, this reflects changes in philosophical climate. In part, too, it indicates the willingness of contemporary philosophers to apply Collingwood's ways of thought to problems of their own — here Collingwood's writings on art are especially responsive to reconstruction and renewal, witness the recent revival of interest in Collingwood's expressivism. It also shows just how determined commentators on Collingwood are to plot the development of his thought. In this respect, the availability of Collingwood's manuscripts, together with their selective publication, is a powerful antidote to neglect.

Telling the story of Collingwood's thinking is James Connelly's aim in *Metaphysics, Method and Politics: The Political Philosophy of RG Collingwood*. It is a work that began life as a PhD dissertation and that has been thoroughly revised and brought up to date to take into account the more recent and



substantial contributions to Collingwood scholarship. In Part 1 of his book, Connelly seeks to demonstrate the overall coherence of Collingwood's work, and he identifies clearly what is wrong with the view that Collingwood in his later writing came to support historical relativism. In Part 2, Connelly explains Collingwood's philosophy of civilization in a manner that is especially useful to political philosophers since this is an area of his thought that has not received enough critical attention. Connelly's book is well argued, and complex manuscript material is efficiently arranged and presented. The conclusions he reaches regarding the coherence of Collingwood's writings are highly persuasive.

Connelly's aim in writing about the development of Collingwood's thought is not simply to find out exactly what he says about any particular topic. It is rather to reveal the unity of Collingwood's project. The claim endorsed and worked out in impressive detail in Connelly's book is that, throughout Collingwood's writings, a systematically pursued method is at work that shapes his conclusions, in particular, the kind of liberal politics he wishes to defend and support. Connelly's interpretation of Collingwood should not be thought remote from contemporary liberal theory. Indeed, liberals looking for a defence of their beliefs against non-liberals would do well to consult Collingwood's *The New Leviathan* (1942), where they will find, rather than a fully worked out account of toleration, a more vigorous explanation of the category of non-liberal than liberals are conventionally used to. So while Collingwood speaks hardly at all about justice, he does attend closely to the role of religion in civilization, and to reasons why, in particular, the liberal needs a grasp of the supernatural.

Such a synoptic commentary as Connelly's book seeks a comprehensive point of view that, once established and fully articulated, charts and explains both apparently wild fluctuations in thought and radical discontinuities of argument. What Connelly offers is not a biography of Collingwood in the manner of, say, Ray Monk writing about Wittgenstein or Russell. Enthusiasts of philosophical biography need to be patient because Collingwood seems to have taken a firm stand against the idea that a philosopher's thought can be approached through the study of his life. It is a stand that we might find a little surprising, especially when we remember Collingwood's keenness to find rapprochement between different ways of thinking and acting. Even so, rules of relevance have an important role to play. Philosophical biography for Collingwood means intellectual biography. Hence, Collingwood's refusal to countenance the notion of his own biography and the frequently quoted remark he makes in the Preface to his *An Autobiography* (1939) that 'the autobiography of a man whose business is thinking should be the story of his thought'.



Effectively, then, Connelly follows Collingwood's exclusion clauses, as he also does Ryle's dictum that coming to terms with a philosopher means finding and reflecting on the philosopher's 'big worry'. In this respect, Connelly's near encyclopaedic work is a history of Collingwood's 'big worry' and the many problems of interpretation that it has provoked. *Metaphysics, Method and Politics* is an invaluable guide to these refined exegetical controversies because it tells us, in clear terms, exactly why some accounts of the often meandering development of Collingwood's thought are unconvincing, and why it is essential to read Collingwood in the round. If this point of view is expressed a little too forcefully at times, we should consider this as a small price to pay for the compelling reconstruction of Collingwood that Connelly provides. Connelly's book is an object lesson in how to read published alongside unpublished work. Collingwood's 'big worry' — the nature of the unity of thought and action — could not have found a better or a more discriminating analyst.

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### **Hope and Memory: Reflections on the Twentieth Century**

Tzvetan Todorov (translated by David Bellos)

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Tzvetan Todorov's new book, like his several recent works, is an important contribution to moral and political debate. Todorov, who lived under communism in Bulgaria until the age of 24 (he left for the West in 1963), is one of France's most interesting intellectuals. In his widely acclaimed book *The Fragility of Goodness* (2001), Todorov shows the role of civil society organizations in saving Bulgaria's Jews during the Second World War. In *Imperfect Garden* (2002), Todorov analyses the works of major humanists to argue that humanism can help us rescue universality and reconcile human liberty with solidarity and personal integrity. These books, like the one under review, are accessible to the general reader, eloquent and wise works that got noticed and reviewed in mainstream journals and newspapers.

In *Hope and Memory: Reflections on the Twentieth Century*, Todorov focuses on the moral and political history of twentieth-century Europe, particularly on the conflict between totalitarian and democratic systems. Arguing that totalitarianism was the great innovation of the past century, he illustrates