

2. Trusting as adapting

Svein Tvedt Johansen, Bjarne Espedal,
Kjell Grønhaug and Marcus Selart

Trust both reflects and transforms a social reality. Whereas the trust literature has successfully described how trust reflects a social reality or how people make decisions to trust someone based on experience, we know little about how trust transforms social situations or how people trust other people without experience or obvious good reasons for trusting them (Möllering, 2006). We know even less about the relationship between the two: trust as a reflection of a social reality and trust as a force capable of transforming social reality. A process model of trust must accommodate both views as well as explaining how trust can move from merely reflecting to transforming a social world. To understand such shifts, we need to understand how people experience and understand trust. Situations here give meaning to trust and motivate behaviour that again shapes situations (Johansen et al., 2013). Importantly, a process view needs to account for changes in trust, including changes in the meaning that people ascribe to trust (Knee et al., 2003; Möllering, 2013).

In this chapter, we view trust in relation to people's adaptation to social situations involving uncertainty and vulnerability. Looking at trust through the prism of adaptation brings several advantages. First, adaptation is by definition context-dependent. Viewing trust in relation to adaptation compels us to consider how social situations and their structural features influence trust and behaviour. Adaptation thus directs our attention to the relationship between individual needs (for example for security) and the situation (dependency and uncertainty) and to the way in which people's experience of trust in turn may influence the situation through evocation, selection, manipulation or transformation (Buss, 1987; Kihlstrom, 2013). Viewing trust as adaptation also draws our attention to the existence of different forms of adaptation and the fact that different situations afford or allow for different strategies (Balliet and Van Lange, 2013; Buss, 1987; Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). Different adaptations correspond to what we will refer to as three different forms

or metaphors of trust (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003): 'trust as a decision', 'trust as a performance' and 'trust as an uncontrollable force'. We argue that different situations afford and motivate different strategies for managing dependence and uncertainty in social relationships and are likely to activate different metaphors and implicit theories of trust that support and coordinate such strategies (Knee et al., 2003; Patrick and Lonsbary, 2003; Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003; Tamir et al., 2007).

Viewing trust as adaptation offers a framework for integrating different conceptualizations of trust across the literature, bridging the gap described above between trust as reflecting and trust as transforming social reality. Viewing trust as adaptation also squarely positions the actor in our theorizing on trust and is consistent with a more embodied view of trust. An embodied view of cognition sees cognition as taking place in very particular and often complex environments, serving practical ends while exploiting and manipulating external props as thinking aids (Anderson, 2003, p. 91; Chemero, 2013). Thinking reflects people's subjective experience of having a body and of being in the world as well as interacting with a physical and social world (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Trust here constitutes an integral part of adapting to a social situation, as opposed to a precursor or consequence of adapting: Trust is what we feel, think and experience while being in and seeking to understand and manage social situations involving interdependence and risk. Viewing trust as adaptation also connects to what Möllering (2013) refers to as trusting as becoming, in which trust refers not so much to something that people *have* as to something that people *live* or *are*. Trusting here is seen as part of 'the actor's continuous becoming' (Möllering, 2013, p. 293). People become who they are and assume their identities as a result of trusting other people (Wright and Ehner, 2010).

In the rest of the chapter, we continue by examining existing conceptualizations of trust before presenting our own definition. We describe the structural features of social situations that influence people's adaptation to vulnerability and uncertainty and describe three forms of trust that correspond to different adaptive strategies. We present a tentative research model delineating the relationships between situations, trust and strategies for managing vulnerability. Finally, the last section reviews the contribution of the chapter and offers suggestions for further research. We variously refer to adaptation, strategies and in some cases adaptive strategies. The term 'adaptation' here refers to people's attempts to align themselves with a social situation. A strategy here refers to a set of coherent actions designed to ensure adaptation. A strategy may or may not be conscious, intended or successful.

DEFINING TRUST: TRUSTING AND ADAPTING

Trust has been defined in different ways, as a belief, an attitude, an intention or a choice. Whereas some definitions emphasize beliefs, others emphasize intentions or equal trust with manifest behaviour or cooperation (Kramer, 1999). A much-used definition integrates previous conceptualizations by describing trust as 'a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another' (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). Common to these definitions is the assumption that trust reflects a set of expectations founded on knowledge or experience about a trustee or a specific situation (Burke et al., 2007; Kramer, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). Mayer et al. (1995), in their seminal integrative model of trust, exemplify this position as seeing trust as reflective of people's beliefs, which again reflect experience and information accumulated over time. Trust interacts with perceived risk, influencing what Mayer et al. refer to as risk taking in relationships. Typologies of trust differentiate between different forms of trust based on the content or what trust is about (Das and Teng, 2004; Sheppard and Sherman, 1998) or the basis or foundation upon which trust is built. Thus, Lewicki and Bunker (1996) describe trust as undergoing a series of developmental stages in which trust changes from presumptive, calculative (or deterrence)-based trust to trust based on actual experience (knowledge-based) and to identity-based trust in which a trustor and a trustee come to identify with each other's needs and motives. Initial trust models portray initial trust as founded on a combination of institutional safeguards, normative beliefs, categorization processes and role enactment (McKnight and Chervany, 2006; McKnight et al., 1998; Meyerson et al., 1996).

Situational features, including the degree of interdependence (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998), social affiliation (Tyler and Degeoy, 1996) or the degree of vulnerability (Kramer, 1996), have been found to influence the content of trust or what trust is about. However, while these contributions focus on how people's perception of the trustee changes, they stop short of investigating people's adaptations or strategies. The extant literature largely tends to focus on how people react to other people – based on the information that we have about other people, we either trust or do not trust them. The existing definitions of trust thus tend to emphasize the role of information and uncertainty reduction as bases for trust, yet such definitions at the same time exclude the potential importance of other strategies to people's experience of trust. Thus, managing vulnerability by seeking to influence a trustee to cooperate

constitutes another, more proactive adaptation that is likely to influence people's experience of trust.

However, situations involving vulnerability in the form of unilateral dependence and conflicting interests (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003, p. 363) have been found to trigger a series of highly involved and effortful responses – people, when confronted with new and potentially threatening information, seek more information about other people to be able to predict their behaviour or intentions or to seek to influence them (Fiske and Depret, 1996; Johansen et al., 2013). People actively seek to influence their destiny and are acutely aware of and responsive to their own attempts to exert control (Bandura, 1989; Greenberger and Strasser, 1991; Scherer et al., 2001). People do not confine themselves merely to observing a trustee but actively seek to influence events (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003).

The trust literature exemplifies the range of such adaptations. While Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) and Kramer (1996, 2006) describe trust as resulting from carefully evaluating signs or keeping scores of other people's behaviour, assuming the role of what Kramer refers to as 'intuitive auditors', Luhmann (1979) and Szerszynski (1999) suggest that trust can be seen as a form of 'altercating' or 'performative act'. Flores and Solomon (1998, p. 205) see trust as 'social practices defined by our choices, to trust or not to trust'. Consistent with the view of trust as a performative act, Salamon and Robinson (2008) find in a study of a retail chain that employees' collective experience of being trusted by the management was associated with stronger responsibility norms and improved performance (sales and customer service).

While each of these contributions purports to offer a general description of trust, we suggest instead that they can be seen as representing context-dependent theories of trust and trusting. Such theories, as suggested by the examples above, are reflected in the research literature as well as in the often-implicit lay theories that people use when thinking about trust, social interaction and relationships (Dirks et al., 2009; Kneec et al., 2003). Such theories are likely to reflect pragmatic adaptations to different social situations (Fiske, 1992b; Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). Hence, people may be expected to invest more resources in developing trust in situations in which a relationship is seen as important and valuable (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) and in which people see themselves as capable of exerting influence.

Like Rousseau et al. (1998), we see trust as a 'psychological state that comprises an intention to accept vulnerability'. Instead of linking trust directly to positive expectations, however, we suggest that the psychological state will be based on people's cognitive and affective experience

of adapting to situations involving vulnerability. Such strategies do not in themselves constitute trust but are likely to shape how people experience trust. Strategies here include searching for, acquiring and assimilating information, but can also include more proactive attempts to influence the expectations and the behaviour of the trustee.

Thus, our revised definition defines trust as a *psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on people's cognitive and affective experience of adapting to situations involving vulnerability and uncertainty*. This definition thus brings together trust and situational adaptation to vulnerability and situations. We suggest that different situations bring about different forms of adaptation and different types of trust, which in turn can reproduce, change or transform situations, which again can influence people's adaptation. The conventional view of trust as primarily reflecting people's appraisal of a trustee – through observations or third-party information – here constitutes one of several possible forms of adaptation in which a trustor seeks control through acquiring information (Skinner, 1996). Still other types of adaptation may include proactively seeking to influence the situation through giving and in return expecting trust. Here trust may be seen as constituting a performative act or a form of altercating (Luhmann, 1979; Salamon and Robinson, 2008). Willingness to trust associated with such forms of adaptation will be distinct from traditional notions of trust yet still commensurate with the present definition. Such types of adaptations range from seeing trust as a performative act or altercating, which influences other people and their trustworthiness (Luhmann, 1979), to more detached strategies of observing and responding to a trustee. Both types of strategy involve information processing, yet the focus and type of information processing are likely to be different. Thus, linking trust with people's subjective experience of adapting to vulnerability opens up a range of different types of trust reflecting different forms of adaptation to different situational contingencies. Common to these different forms of trust, however, is the common notion of adaptation and of a trustor seeking to adapt him- or herself to a social situation using the best of his or her resources. The effects of trust are likely to be influenced by the way in which people construe trust in specific situations – people are not merely passive recipients of information but bring their own understanding of trust to social situations, which is likely to influence how they set about developing relationships as well as the amount of effort that they are willing to expend. The definition contributes to a better understanding of trust in at least three ways. First, viewing trust as an experience associated with adapting broadens the view of trust to include forms that were previously excluded. While including the forms captured

in the existing definition, it also leaves room for other forms, in which trust constitutes a more active type of altering or performative act. Second, the definition, apart from being broader, also helps to explain trust by linking it as an experience with adaptation. Finally, by highlighting adaptation, the definition suggests a more agentive and embodied view of trust, which sees trust from the perspective of a trustor who acts in and on the world as opposed to observing and thinking about it passively (Anderson, 2003).

In the following, we present three forms of trust. To offer a better description of the forms and the differences between them, we present them as three metaphors for trust: trust as a decision, trust as a performance and trust as an uncontrollable force (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Schön, 1993). These metaphors link to implicit theories that include assumptions about the locus of control (who or what controls or influences the development of trust and the nature of a trustee's trustworthiness (fixed, malleable or ephemeral)) (Dweck and Leggett, 1988; Knee et al., 2003).

SITUATIONS, STRATEGIES AND TRUST: THREE FORMS OF TRUST

If different forms of trust represent adaptations to social situations, we first need to describe the situational features that are likely to influence how people adapt. We do so by drawing on interdependence theory (Kelley et al., 2003; Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). According to Rusbult and Van Lange (2003, p. 353), the 'situation structure specifies the interpersonal reality that social cognitive activity is about, in that cognition is frequently oriented towards understanding (a) situations, or the unique problems and opportunities inherent in a given situation, ... and (b) persons, or a given interaction-partner's goals and motives'. Situations, argue Rusbult and Van Lange, afford 'the expression of some motivations and some personal qualities but not others'. Situations also differ with respect to which adaptive strategies are feasible. Thus, some situations may allow for extensive communication, while other situations leave little room (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003).

Here we reduce structural properties to three main categories of situational features that we suggest are likely to influence the activation of different trust metaphors and corresponding strategies for managing uncertainty and vulnerability. The first dimension involves the degree to which the interests of the parties conflict or converge (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). Trust here has been found to be more important in

situations involving larger as opposed to smaller degrees of conflicting interest (Balliet and Van Lange, 2013). Such situations or social dilemmas introduce greater risk as the parties cannot accommodate the interests of their partner without sacrificing some of their own interest. Thus, people become dependent on the goodwill or benevolence of the other person (Mayer et al., 1995). Interactions involving few conflicting interests are unlikely to raise issues of trust as the parties can pursue their self-interest with little or no harm to the other party.

The second feature, given that we see the trust as relevant, is value, or the extent to which people see potential for a constructive relationship with the trustee. This is likely to reflect the perceived value of outcomes, which can be accessed through the relationship or relationship-specific motives. Some relationships are more attractive than others because other people possess attributes or resources that we cannot easily obtain elsewhere or because we care about the relationship for a series of reasons (for example a coach might take pride in his or her team performing or people come to identify with the other party and the relationship). Thus, relationship-specific motives (the value of a relationship) are likely to influence how many resources people are willing to invest (or sacrifice) to preserve or build a particular relationship.

The third category, which we refer to as control, consists of situational features that influence a trustor's expectation that he or she can actually influence the views and motivations of a trustee and the situation (transforming a competitive situation into a more collaborative situation) (Skinner, 1996). Situations that involve an area of common interest, which extends over time, provide the trustor with ample information and allow free communication between the partners, thus suggesting greater potential for influencing a trustee and a relationship than situations that involve little common ground, are one-off encounters, provide the trustor with little or no information about his or her motives and provide little room for communication (Wildschut et al., 2003). Thus, communication has long been known to enhance cooperation in social dilemmas, with a stronger effect for face-to-face communication than written communication (Balliet, 2010). Similarly, the expectation of repeated (as opposed to single) interaction has been found to promote cooperation in social dilemmas (Van Lange et al., 2011). A common explanation is that repeated interaction allows the parties to sanction cooperation and non-cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Van Lange et al., 2011). A similar argument, which also connects to the previous argument about the effects of communication, is that repeated interaction allows more room for communication (of which sanctioning is one form). Together, value and control correspond to the distinction in attitude models between valence,

or the evaluation of an outcome as valuable or desired, and expectancy, or the belief that a behaviour will lead to a desired and intended outcome (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1972).

Different appraisals of situations are likely to be associated with different forms of adaptation or coping strategies that reflect salient goals (such as how important a particular relationship is) as well as people's expectations about their ability to influence the outcomes or control (Skinner, 1996). Buss (1987) thus identifies three ways or strategies in which people can affect their environment: (1) evocation; (2) selection; and (3) behavioural manipulation. Evocation refers to the situation in which the presence of a person in an environment alters that environment. In some cases, individuals, by their very presence (such as standing out as the only man or woman in an otherwise all-female or all-male group), may alter the social dynamics within that group. Selection occurs when people make choices about which environments or relationships to enter. Manipulation occurs when people seek to change a chosen environment in a particular way. Kihlstrom adds a fourth strategy, which can be used in combination with the others: transformation, in which people, through covert mental activities, alter their mental representation of their subjective environment or their private experience of the environment (Kihlstrom, 2013). Associated with these different adaptive strategies, we argue that there are three different forms or metaphors for trust (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003) that represent three different experiences of trust (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). These forms constitute well-learned behavioural repertoires and schemas (Bargh and Ferguson, 2000) for managing dependence and uncertainty in social situations. Our primary interest here, however, is not in schemas or cognitive structures as such. Instead, we suggest that different situations naturally lend themselves to or afford different forms of adaptation and that our experience of trust in the continuation of this will reflect the situation. The metaphors and implicit theories can be seen as adaptive in that they prepare and facilitate adequate responses and reactions to specific situations (Fiske, 1992b; Rusbult and Van Lange, 2003). Thus, a 'trust as a performance' metaphor prepares people to shape and in some cases transform social situations when a relationship is seen as important and when such influence is seen as possible. A 'trust as a decision' metaphor suggests prudence and care in situations in which a trustor does not expect to see the trustee again and/or in situations in which a trustor is likely to have little influence over a trustee. A 'trust as an uncontrollable force' metaphor likewise can be adaptive in situations in which people have little or no control or information and need to align themselves with that situation.

We refer to the first form of trust as *trust as a decision*. This form of trust corresponds to what Buss refers to as selection. We adapt to vulnerability by selecting situations or selecting our exposure to vulnerability in that situation. Trust as a decision is likely to occur in situations that are seen as less important or consequential and/or in which communication is limited or difficult and there is little expectation of repeated encounters. To use Gambetta and Hamill's example of taxi drivers, a driver is unlikely to be able to reform a hardened criminal in a one-time encounter (Gambetta and Hamill, 2005). This could also be the case when trust is seen as inconsequential or easy and people as a result are less inclined to invest in costlier and more risky strategies, such as trying to influence a trustee through unilateral displays of trust (trust as a performance) (Weber et al., 2005). Here trust is essentially seen as a reflection of properties of the benefactor of trust, the trustee. Developing trust here involves the task of unpacking a 'true and assumed unchanging' identity of the trustee as either trustworthy or not. This is likely to involve a second, more basic metaphor that sees trustworthiness as a hidden, fixed quality of the trustor (Molden and Dweck, 2006). Trust here is often seen as developing over time, 'largely as a function of the parties having a history of interaction that allows them to develop a generalized expectancy that the other's behavior is predictable and that he or she will act trustworthily' (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, p. 121). This first view of trust is expressed in the question: to what extent can I trust him? Because outcomes (trust) according to this metaphor are seen as being caused by the trustee, trust here is likely to be associated with other-directed emotions that include gratitude or anger (Weiner, 1985). The 'trust as a decision metaphor' is also likely to influence people's reactions to trust in that there is likely to be a close correspondence between people's construal of the other as trustworthy or not and their behaviour towards the trustee. Because trustworthiness is seen as a fixed quality of the trustee, the trustor is likely to see little reason to repair broken relationships. Thus, for the 'trust as a decision' metaphor, the trustee, not the trustor, drives the formation and development of trust. The trustor has moderate control – the trustor can decide whether or not to expose him or herself, but cannot influence the trustworthiness of the trustee. Trust here is accompanied by other-directed emotions (directed towards the trustee), including gratefulness or (if trust is breached) anger. We refer to the second form as *trust as a performance*. This form corresponds to what Buss refers to as manipulation, as well as to what Kihlstrom refers to as transformation (Kihlstrom, 2013). We adapt to vulnerability and uncertainty by seeking to influence other people's trustworthiness through our own behaviour and communication of norms

and expectations (Luhmann, 1979; Salamon and Robinson, 2008; Szerszynski, 1999). The trust as a performance form sees trust as a performative act that involves effort and perseverance (Szerszynski, 1999). Unlike the former case, in which trust is seen as reflecting a hidden given property of the trustee, trust is seen here as resulting from a process that the trustor initiates and supports. People here hold a stronger interest in the relationship and hold more opportunities to influence a trustee through multiple encounters. As shown in the literature, trust in people we know, or seek to get to know, invokes a very different and more emotional form of trust (Rempel et al., 1985). The 'trust as a performance' metaphor thus has very different implications for how people approach the formation of trust. Unlike in the trust as a decision metaphor, trust is seen here as an emerging quantity and at least partially as a reflection of the trustor's efforts. In showing trust and offering to cooperate first, a trustor may shape the trustee's perception of the relationship, communicate a set of common norms, limit the range of acceptable choices and increase the likelihood of cooperation and hence the trustworthiness of the trustee. Hence, this second metaphor highlights the agency of the trustor and the consequences of showing trust (and particularly of not trusting) as opposed to the consequences of being right or wrong about a trustee. Emphasis here is likely to be on impact – a trustor's ability to influence the trustee through the demonstration of trust and faith (Salamon and Robinson, 2008). This suggests a greater emphasis on direct and close contact even when this contact is likely to bias the trustor's impression of the trustee. Thus, this second view of trust is captured in the question: how can I trust her? Trust as a performance is likely to involve different sentiments from the first metaphor. Thus, the prominent emotions associated with this second trust metaphor may include self-directed emotions, including pride or shame, as the experience of trust reflects back on the trustor and the trustor's initiatives and performance in the relationship (Weiner, 1985). In terms of reactions to trust, trust associated with this second metaphor would suggest self-conscious monitoring of both the experience of trust and the trustor's behaviour based upon whether these reactions are seen as furthering the relationship or not. Breaches of trust are less likely to be seen as fatal as the trustor sees trust as an incremental emerging quality of the relationship that can be influenced by his or her actions. Breaches of trust are thus likely to be associated with intensified attempts to repair trust, reflecting an expectation that breaches can be mended and that such efforts can even strengthen a relationship (Knee et al., 2003). In the trust as performance metaphor, the locus of trust lies with the trustor – trust reflects a decision or effort on the part of the trustor. The trustor

constitutes the causal agent that drives the formation and development of trust. The trustor has considerable control, including the capacity to influence the motivations and actions of the trustee. Trust here is associated with self-directed emotions, including pride or shame (when trust fails).

Finally, in other situations, people may have little or no experience of interacting with a trustee (for example a distant leader) or people may have little prior experience of a specific type of situation. In such situations, in which people neither have much prior experience to use to evaluate the accuracy or quality of information (trust as a decision) nor see themselves as incapable of influencing the situation or the trustee, people may resort to using basic affective reactions as information (Forgas, 1995; Schwarz and Clore, 1983). The third form thus sees *trust as an uncontrollable force* – in which the trustor has little or no control over or insight into why he or she trusts someone. This third metaphor is less easily classified in Buss's (1987) framework but may correspond to evocation in that trust results not as much from choice or actions but from being present and receptive. This third form finds expression in statements like 'I cannot help but trust him', 'you just have to trust her' or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, 'I just don't trust him or her'. Trust here is attributed to psychological processes that are only partially open to introspection, a force to be reckoned with or for which trustors will need to take precautions, but that otherwise leave the trustor with little choice or opportunity for agency. This can be likened to similar metaphors for creativity, in which people see creativity as a divine revelation that cannot be forced (Runco and Albert, 2010). The essence of this perspective can be expressed in the question 'how do I feel about trusting him?' The 'trust as an uncontrollable force' metaphor also has different implications for people's reactions to trust. Since trust as an uncontrollable force cannot be controlled or even forecasted, the third metaphor suggests a preoccupation with the here and now of trust in a relationship. People respond to their experience of trust in the present. Because trust is seen as uncontrollable and without a clear locus, we expect trust here to be associated with general and non-specific emotions, like contentment or anxiety (Weiner, 1985). Because trust as an uncontrollable force introduces an element of randomness, it is less likely to generate substantial investments in a relationship. Because people see themselves as exercising little control, breaches of trust may be fatal as people see themselves as unable to restore trust once it is seen as lost. For the 'trust as an uncontrollable force' metaphor, the locus of trust is seen as existing outside both the trustor and the trustee, and the trustor possesses little control over the development of trust (Tamir et al., 2007).

Table 2.1 summarizes the differences between the three trust forms. Different situations, described through the dimensions of value and control, here elicit different trust forms (trust as a decision, a performance and an uncontrollable force). These differ with respect to assumptions about locus or what influences the development of trust (the trustee, the trustor or neither), as well as assumptions about the trustee's trustworthiness, such as whether the trustworthiness of the trustee is assumed to be constant or entity-like, incremental and susceptible to influence (Dweck and Leggett, 1988) or ephemeral. Finally, we suggest that different forms of trust are likely to be accompanied by different sets of emotions.

Table 2.1 *Characteristics of different forms of trust*

Situation	Trust form	Locus of control	View of the trustee's trustworthiness	Accompanying emotions
Low to moderate/low to moderate	'Trust as a decision'	Trustee	Entity	Gratitude/anger (other-directed)
High/high	'Trust as a performance'	Trustor or joint trustor and trustee	Incremental	Pride/shame (self-directed)
Low to moderate/low force'	'Trust as an uncontrollable force'	Neither	Ephemeral	Contentment/anxiety (non-specific)

As shown in Table 2.1, in the 'trust as a decision' metaphor, trust reflects an innate quality of the trustee. The trustor has control to the extent that he or she has knowledge and can predict the likely outcome of engaging in a relationship with the trustee, but the trustor cannot change the trustworthiness of the trustee (which is assumed to have a fixed, entity-like quality). Accompanying emotions are directed outwardly towards the trustee (gratitude or anger). In the 'trust as a performance' metaphor, the trustor initiates trust by showing trust. Control is high as trust as a performative act is seen as capable of influencing the trustworthiness of the trustee. In contrast to the 'trust as a decision' metaphor, the trustworthiness of the trustee is seen as malleable — people can be made trustworthy. The accompanying emotions are self-directed (pride, shame). Finally, in the 'trust as an uncontrollable force' metaphor, the locus of control lies neither with the trustor nor with the trustee. The trustor's experience of control is at its lowest as the trustor has little

insight into why he or she trusts or on what basis, and is unable to influence the trustee in any significant way. The accompanying emotions are non-specific (contentment or anxiety).

A TENTATIVE TRUST PROCESS MODEL

Figure 2.1 describes the relationships between situations, trust and strategies. Different situations here afford and motivate different strategies and lead people to activate different trust metaphors that help them to coordinate and make sense of actions and strategies for managing uncertainty and vulnerability. The relationship between situations, metaphors and strategies, however, is not one-directional. Metaphors and strategies also influence how people see and understand social situations. Thus, the 'trust as a performance' metaphor, once activated, is likely to influence how people see the trustee and social situations, increasing the salience of metaphor-consistent situational features over non-consistent features (Sedikides and Skowronski, 1991). Moreover, the experience of engaging in a specific adaptive strategy reinforces people's understanding of a specific situation, hence reinforcing the activated metaphor. Failure to fit a strategy to a specific situation, on the other hand, may weaken the activated metaphor, causing people to question its underlying assumptions. Trust as a psychological state comprising an intention to accept vulnerability is seen here as influencing and being influenced by the specific strategies that people use to manage and deal with uncertainty and vulnerability, hence the bidirectional arrows. People's willingness to accept risk will reflect their adaptation and affective and cognitive experiences associated with adapting. Performing a given strategy (for example seeking information or seeking to influence a trustee) is likely to influence how people feel about the strategy as people are likely to search out information that is consistent with or reinforces a chosen strategy (Gollwitzer, 1990).

The relationship between a given situation and the activation of different strategies and trust metaphors are also likely to be moderated by personal and cultural traits and personality differences. People first tend to understand and see situations differently. They bring their capacities, traits and experiences to the situation. According to Mischel and Shoda (1995), personality traits can be seen as tendencies to interpret and respond to ambiguous situations in specific ways. Thus, people may attach different values to social interaction and affiliation (Mikulincer and Selinger, 2001) or see themselves as being more or less capable of influencing a specific situation (Skinner, 1996). Some may be more

prone to seeing trust as an uncontrollable force or emotion, something that they simply feel (Tamir et al., 2007), whereas others may tend to see trust as a choice or ambition (Baier, 1986).

In the same way that different people may respond differently to situations, we also suggest that cultural norms, values or assumptions affect how people conceive of and manage social situations involving vulnerability and uncertainty. This also follows a view of trusting as an embodied and situated activity involving interaction with and manipulation of external props (Anderson, 2003; Wilson, 2002). How people feel and think about trust at a given point thus may rely heavily on their interaction with other people and objects and associated cultural scripts and schemas. Dependency and vulnerability constitute core features of any community and strategies for handling such uncertainty and vulnerability; hence, they are likely to become features of common cultural scripts and schemas in most cultures (Fiske, 1992a; Keesing, 1974; Taras et al., 2010). The forms of trust described here also potentially offer a better understanding of the way in which culture and cultural scripts influence people's experience of trust, not only regarding how trust is produced but even with respect to how people understand and experience trust in different situations.

Over time, people's adaptations are likely to influence the perceptions and actions of other people and hence shape the structural conditions that gave rise to the initial reaction in the first place. Based on this, we can think of different trajectories. One trajectory described in the literature (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) is for people over time to learn to know the other party as well as to come to identify with the other person and the relationship. Here the value of the relationship has increased (we wish for the relationship to continue), as has control (we no longer see ourselves as capable just of understanding, but also of influencing the trustee). Hence, people's views of trust, we argue, are likely to shift from the 'trust as a decision' metaphor to a 'trust as a performance' metaphor. Linking trust to different strategies and metaphors of trust presents us with the tools to conceptualize how such changes occur. The model is shown in Figure 2.1.

Here situations described in structural terms (conflicting interests, value and control) lead people to adopt different adaptive strategies, accompanied by different forms of trust. We suggest that a person's view and experience of trust in a given situation are likely to reflect a given strategy. Whereas partially conflicting interests, moderate interests or stakes in the relationship and low or moderate control would be expected to be associated with the 'trust as a decision' form, a greater interest in the relationship when combined with greater control would be expected




Figure 2.1 A tentative process model of trust

to be associated with the 'trust as a performance' form. The activation of different strategies is likely to occur automatically as situations tend to favour one strategy over others and as people are highly trained and socialized into adapting to social situations (Bargh and Ferguson, 2000).

The framework presented here is not complete. A more complete framework should include the effects of actual experience and describe how experience and the activation of different forms of trust interact. Favourable experience with a trustee, for instance, may increase a trustor's motivation to pursue a relationship as well as raising his or her expectation of being capable of influencing the trustee, hence causing a trustor to adopt the 'trust as a performance' form. A more active form of trust (trust as a performance), by inviting a trustee to cooperate, may become a self-fulfilling prophecy initiating a virtuous cycle of trusting and trustworthy behaviour. The model, we believe, is therefore consistent with Lewicki and Bunker's (1996) stage model of trust, in which trust is seen as progressing through a series of stages from calculative to knowledge- and identity-based trust. However, in contrast to Lewicki and

Bunker's model, trust in our model is seen to be influenced not only by what happens within the relationship but also by factors outside the relationship. Thus, a number of factors external to the relationship could make a relationship more valuable (for example career changes may make a particular relationship more important or a shift in status may make someone more likely to exert control in a relationship). More generally, the model adds explanatory power by enabling us to describe outcomes that are not otherwise captured by the existing trust models. Thus, we can think of two individuals who are both experiencing strong trust in a trustee, yet because one sees trust as a decision and the other sees it as a performance, the two individuals may still respond differently to the trustee. For instance, a person who sees trust as a performance may be expected to pursue opportunities for trust building more actively than another person who sees trust as a decision.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In this chapter we have presented what could be described as an embodied and situated perspective of trust, suggesting that trust is understood better when viewed in relation to people's attempts to deal with vulnerability and uncertainty in social interaction. We set out to show how different situations motivate and allow for different forms of trust and described and explained three forms of trust that have different implications for the ways in which people see, interact and invest in relationships.

The definition and framework described here, we believe, thus contribute to a better understanding of trust and trust as a process in several ways. First, an embodied perspective of trust highlights the role of the trustor as an active, purposeful agent, with goals and plans that respond not only to information in the form of experience, institutional safeguards or third-party opinions, but also to his or her experience of acting in and on a social world, striving to manage relationships and attain valued outcomes. We believe that an embodied view of trust presents us with a richer and more realistic representation of how people actually experience trust and forms a better basis for understanding trust processes (Anderson, 2003; Chemero, 2013). Related to this, the framework also offers a different take on the relationship between trust defined as a psychological state and behaviour and strategies. Rather than seeing trust as an attitude or intention that precedes adaptation, we see the experience of trust as an integral part of adapting to social dependence and vulnerability in social situations. People's understanding and experience

of trusting guides and supports their attempts to deal with specific situations. Thus, people's experience of trust is seen here not merely as a basis for making decisions, but as helping to orchestrate and support a chosen strategy (Ferguson and Bargh, 2004).

Finally, the model describes the relationships between structural features of social situations, trust metaphors and strategies. The theories presented here expand our understanding of trust beyond the existing distinctions, such as resilient or fragile (Ring, 1996), cognitive or affective (McAllister, 1995) or calculative, knowledge-based or identity-based trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Viewing trust as a performance, we believe, offers insights into how trust forms under less than ideal circumstances and how people in some cases are capable of transforming social situations through unilateral displays and communications of trust. Rather than trust merely reflecting a social world, trust here may instead help to create or transform the social world.

The model raises new questions that need to be addressed. While we have focused on people's understandings of trust, we have said little about how different trust metaphors interact with experience. A performative view of trust ('trust as a performance'), for instance, may be more resilient in the face of ambiguous or even negative information in the early stages of a relationship deemed to be potentially valuable by a trustor. The 'trust as a decision' metaphor, on the other hand, may be better suited to detecting uncooperative and untrustworthy individuals in situations that warrant vigilance but are less conducive to forming new relationships (Murray et al., 2008).

Trust, as is often pointed out, is a relational phenomenon (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). Whereas the focus here has been on individual trustors' reactions to social situations, people's understanding of trust is also likely to be influenced by the way in which other people understand and experience trust. People's experience of trust as a result is likely to take on emergent properties that cannot easily be attributed to one individual trustor. A more relational and emergent perspective on trust is likely to add complexity, yet it does not negate the underlying insight that people's experience of trust is likely to reflect their experience of adapting to situations involving vulnerability and uncertainty.

Seeing trust as linked to adaptation may conflict with the way in which people normally think of trust, as a comparatively stable psychological state that changes only slowly and gradually over time and with experience (Kramer, 2006; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). One way to reconcile these different views may be to differentiate between a more basic and stable type of trust based on a common history and experience of interaction and a more variable, situationally contingent form of trust.

Here the first, more basic form of trust would form a foundation for the second type (Gill et al., 2005). A view of trust as stable and invariant, however, may also reflect a (Western) preference for consistency and coherence in our attitudes towards other people across situations (Leising, 2011; Suh, 2002). Hence, in hindsight, people may overestimate the consistency of their attitudes, including trust in other people.

Future studies will need to begin by describing people's implicit theories of trust and trusting. To our knowledge, no such studies exist yet. Not only should future studies seek to describe such theories, but they should also seek to describe the origin of such theories, their use as well as their consequences (including in combination) for social interaction and relationships (Tidwell et al., 1996). Research of this kind, we believe, offers substantial rewards but will require rich, unfiltered and preferably longitudinal data. Since people may often be unaware of their implicit theories, enabling participants to think aloud and reason about trust in real-life situations is likely to be important. Possible research designs here include time-series data in the form of scheduled interviews, diaries (Bolger et al., 2003) or forms of thinking-aloud procedures (Someren et al., 1994).

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