Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-ttngx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-02T15:34:54.791Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Lure of the Simplistic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

John Dupré
John Dupré*
Affiliation:
University of Exeter
*
Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Sociology, University of Exeter, EX4 4RJ, UK; J.A.Dupre@exeter.ac.uk.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper attacks the perennial philosophical and scientific quest for a simple and unified vision of the world. Without denying the attraction of this vision, I argue that such a goal often seriously distorts our understanding of complex phenomena. The argument is illustrated with reference to simplistic attempts to provide extremely general views of biology, and especially of human nature, through the theory of evolution. Although that theory is a fundamental ingredient of our scientific world view, it provides only one of a number of perspectives that are required for an understanding of biology in general, and human behaviour in paticular. The argument is connected to the replacement of views of science in terms of universal laws with views that emphasise ranges of models more locally suited to specific phenomena.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 69 , Issue S3 , September 2002 , pp. S284 - S293
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Becker, G. S. ([1981] 1991), A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. (1995), Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
Dupré, J. (1998), “Against Reductive Theories of Human Behaviour”, Against Reductive Theories of Human Behaviour 72 (Supplement): 153–171.Google Scholar
Dupré, J. (2001), Scientism and Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Friedman, M. (1974), “Explanation and Scientific Understanding”, Explanation and Scientific Understanding 71:5–19.Google Scholar
Gould, S. J., and Lewontin, R. C. (1979), “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme”, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme 205:581–598.Google Scholar
Kitcher, P. (1981), “Explanatory Unification”, Explanatory Unification 48:507–531.Google Scholar
Kitcher, P. (1993), The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusion. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pitt, J. C. (ed.) (1988), Theories of Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Searle, J. R. (1995), The Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin Books.Google Scholar