

# 2 Climate change and human moral enhancement

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## **Introduction: Education for change**

Contemporary science is providing more and more evidence that climate is indeed changing and that at least part of the cause lies in factors related to human activity. Strong emphasis is placed on raising public awareness about the need to conserve the environment in order to remove, or at least alleviate, the worst consequences of climate change. However, research has shown that only a small share of, for example Croatian, population considers environmental concerns to be the most important social issue (cf. DOMAZET, DOLENEC and ANČIĆ 2012, 31). Also, very few people are willing to change their behaviour in aid of environmental protection and sustainable development if it means sacrificing their own economic interests (DOMAZET, DOLENEC and ANČIĆ 2012, 43). There are many reasons why people are not willing to modify their behaviour. I will name just a few.

Firstly, not everyone is convinced that climate change is indeed happening under human influence. A possible reason for this is that, upon considering different scientific theories, they might think that the arguments in support of the thesis that climate change is the result of human activity are just not strong enough. A second possible reason is that the scientific theories which explain processes that lead to climate change are too complex to understand, even when presented in simplified form.<sup>1</sup> Failing to understand a certain theory is often accompanied with reluctance to accept the theory.

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**01** Environmental psychologists claim that for most people it is difficult to understand even some basic concepts associated with climate change, e.g. difference between a deterministic weather prediction and a statistical climate projection. “[T]he explanation is complex to the journalist, the policy maker, and the general public, despite every effort to use simple language” (NEWELL and PITMAN 2010, 1004).

In addition, even those who believe that climate change is the result of human activity, and who have the knowledge of how they should alter their behaviour, often lack the motivation to do so. Some of them know that a significant part of their actions will only have a long-term impact, affecting generations that will come after them. Others are not motivated to change because their actions affect population in remote parts of the world. In both cases, spatial or temporal distance leads to weaker interest and concern among individuals for those who are affected by the negative repercussions of their actions. In addition to the individual level, this problem is encountered on the group level as well, especially in the activity of businesses and countries that refuse to change and choose the politics of waiting instead.

How can individuals be moved to change their behaviour towards environmental protection and sustainable development? Having analysed relevant data, the authors of the study *We Need to Change* conclude that “citizens with higher level of educational attainment more often perceive environmental issues as important, they less frequently see economic growth as damaging for the environment and they are more willing to accept a reduction in living standards for the benefit of the environment” (DOMAZET, DOLENEC and ANČIĆ 2012, 47). Why is it that education, especially higher levels of education, lead to greater degrees of sensibility towards issues of environmental protection and sustainable development? Answers to this question seem to lie in the very structure of education processes and their intended goals. According to the understanding prevalent in contemporary Western liberal democracies, education comprises at least two significant components. The most prominent component, which is often considered to be the fundamental goal of education, is the transfer of knowledge and development of different skills and competences. This knowledge and these skills can have a wide variety of possible applications, such as reading and writing, or they could be limited to more narrow areas, like knitting lessons or constructing bridges (BAILEY 1984, 14). The second, equally important, component of the standard Western process of education is related to upbringing, socialisation and internalisation of civic virtues. In terms of environmental protection and sustainable development, education can offer individuals information about the challenges that we face due to climate change, to provide them with the knowledge and capabilities to cope with these challenges, and to acquaint them with the principles and values which they must uphold in their actions. Without these three constituents of education, humanity is highly unlikely to sustain itself and progress.<sup>2</sup>

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**02** There is no room here to enter into elaboration of general strengths of education for sustainability, which can be found elsewhere in this volume (DOMAZET and ANČIĆ, THIS VOLUME).

To what extent is it possible to achieve these educational goals through traditional modes of education? As can be expected, education would be the best way to fulfil the goal of informing people about climate change, about harming the environment and harming-related hazards. We can approach this goal by placing emphasis on making tertiary education more accessible, as, according to statistics, people with tertiary education attainment express the greatest concern for environmental issues (DOMAZET, DOLENEC and ANČIĆ 2012, 32). The capabilities of the current education model to transfer the knowledge and abilities necessary to tackle climate change-induced issues depend on the capabilities of science to generate this knowledge. Given the complexity of processes that affect climate change, many doubt that science is capable of achieving this to the degree necessary to deter impending environmental disaster (cf. HUESEMANN 2000; 2006). However, even those who are more optimistic believe that science can only help resolve these issues if it is accompanied by a shift in awareness and values that guide our actions. At the same time, it is highly unlikely that the education system will be able to carry out a quick and radical enough change in our understanding of what we are morally obliged to do in order to prevent climate change that could have a disastrous impact on human survival. This primarily involves our tendency to put our short-term interests before long-term ones, and to ignore the negative repercussions that our actions have on other people who are most often removed from us in terms of space and/or time.

Although research has shown that people are willing to modify their behaviour in order to contribute to the protection of their living environment, their readiness for change drops if they are expected to sacrifice their lifestyle (KEMPTON, BOSTER and HARTLEY 1995; DOMAZET, DOLENEC and ANČIĆ 2012, 46). Educational and other institutional measures (taxation, incentives, and the like) can to a certain extent encourage people to alter their behaviour. However, as some authors state, traditional measures of moral education were able to achieve only “modest success” during the last few millennia (PERSSON and SAVULESCU 2012, 9). The limiting factor in the internalisation of principles and values crucial to the preservation of humankind in the light of global climate change (as well as tremendous distributive inequalities, threats of terrorism and possible nuclear war) is our moral psychology, which has not altered significantly since the emergence of humankind (PERSSON and SAVULESCU 2012, 1). Namely, our moral psychology is better suited for living in small communities that operate with simple technologies than for today’s way of living in multi-million population countries that use advanced technologies. The shortcomings of our moral psychology are evident in the lack of altruism towards people with whom we do not interact closely, a consequence of which is our reluctance to alter

our actions that cause climate change. Actions that we take today will only reach their full effect in several decades, impacting generations that will come after us. Also, the present consequences of our actions are seriously affecting the population of remote countries and parts of the world. The limitations of our moral psychology, which motivates us to have concern for those who are near and dear to us, prevent us from changing harmful patterns in our behaviour.

In order to avoid the worst consequences of climate change caused by human activity, it will be necessary to reach a sustainable level of consumption of natural resources on the global scale. According to some estimates, however, a sustainable level of consumption presupposes that the material welfare level enjoyed by citizens of Western democracies would have to decrease significantly (PERSSON and SAVULESCU 2012, 76). Namely, even the current level of consumption necessary to sustain the lifestyle of one billion population of the rich West is considered to require an overall unsustainable level of consumption. Things get even more complicated when we take into account the aspirations of the rest of humanity to reach a higher level of welfare. In addition, moderate projections by United Nations experts estimate that the population growth might exceed ten billion people by the end of the twenty-first century (UN 2013, 2). These data support the thesis that human behaviour and approach to the environment must change as soon as possible.

### **Biomedical moral enhancement**

Apart from the technologies we use to exploit natural resources, there are other contemporary technologies (specifically, nuclear and biological weapons) that enable humankind to inflict immense damage upon humanity itself as well as the world it lives in. Given this greatly increased possibility of humans causing damage or even complete destruction, Savulescu and Persson believe that humans should be morally enhanced so that they could apply these technologies responsibly. Starting with the assumption that our moral behaviour is based in biology and is a product of the process of evolution, Persson and Savulescu's solution proposes the research and, if possible, application of biomedical modes of moral enhancement (PERSSON and SAVULESCU 2012, 106; 2013, 124). These authors consider it to be one of the ways we *must* test in order to reduce the risks we face from reckless and malevolent use of power enabled by contemporary technology.

According to one of the originators of the idea of moral enhancement by biomedical means, "a person morally enhances herself if she alters herself in a way that may reasonably be expected to result in her having morally better future motives, taken in sum, than she would otherwise have had"

(DOUGLAS 2008, 229). What could therefore be done to improve people's motives for action, thereby changing their behaviour and starting to make sustainability-oriented decisions? Whereas traditional methods of education did this indirectly, informing people about available options and the effects of particular choices, the idea of biomedical enhancement considers the option of directly influencing the biological and psychological basis of human motivation. There are three basic ways to do this – with the help of drugs, genetic engineering, and using technical devices connected to the brain. All these methods are in very early stages of testing and are very far from being applied on human beings (DOUGLAS 2008, 233). Those who are optimistic about biomedical moral enhancement of humans rest their hopes on two research projects that are exhibiting somewhat promising signs of progress in this area.

The first project is tied to the research into the activity of the hormone and neurotransmitter oxytocin. It was found to enhance certain morally relevant characteristics and was popularly dubbed “the cuddle hormone.” Apart from the oxytocin released by the posterior lobe of the pituitary gland, the hormone can also be introduced into the body via pills or nasal spray. Research has shown that persons who are administered with a dose of oxytocin exhibit a higher level of trust and readiness to cooperate than those left untreated (KOSFELD et al. 2005; ZAK, KURZBAN and MATZNER 2005). Also, oxytocin was found to be helpful in fostering fidelity in monogamous couples (SCHEELE et al. 2012). However, other studies have found that the application of oxytocin does not really corroborate the arguments of those in favour of biomedical moral enhancement. Namely, quite contrary to the idea that oxytocin might help extend altruism, trust and cooperation to include persons beyond our immediate social group, these studies have shown that oxytocin primarily enhances prosocial behaviour within the group, and can even encourage sacrificing outsiders if it could benefit members of the group (DE DREU 2010; 2011; 2012).

The other method that is often seen as a potential way of influencing our moral behaviour is the application of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which are used to treat depression, anxiety and personality disorder. Similar to oxytocin, SSRIs stimulate cooperation, but they also seem to affect our sense of fairness. Experiments have shown that SSRI-treated individuals are more willing to offer fairer conditions of cooperation than the control group which was left untreated (TSE and BOND 2002; WOOD 2006). As with oxytocin, the current state of research has at best provided a mere hint that the application of SSRIs might have a positive effect on human behaviour. Further research in this area indicates that technological advancement might lead to these methods becoming more precise and having a stronger effect on human behaviour.

These and other lines of research into ways of biomedical enhancement of human morality are seen by some authors as a promising solution for shortcomings of the human nature that lead to the resources depletion, climate change, and global inequality. The main argument behind this view is the following: if drugs and medical treatments could be used to make people care for the wellbeing of other human beings that are temporally and spatially distant, these bioenhanced people will be more willing to adopt sustainable ways of behaviour.

Persson and Savulescu believe that “[i]f safe moral enhancements are ever developed, there are strong reasons to believe that their use should be obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, since those who should take them are least likely to be inclined to use them. That is, safe, effective moral enhancement would be compulsory” (PERSSON and SAVULESCU 2008, 174). However, even if biomedical methods are sufficiently improved to be used safely and effectively on humans, the question remains of how justified it would be to try and influence human moral behaviour in this way.

### **Arguments against the biomedical moral enhancement project**

According to an influential school of ethical thought, the only way to morally improve humans is connected to the enhancement of our cognitive abilities. The more we know, the less we err. Those sceptical of biomedical intervention in the basis of human moral motivation refer to the philosophical understanding that goes back to Socrates, according to which the root of immorality is false belief, which is best eliminated by cognitive improvement and education. For instance, John Harris thus claims that “[t]he most obvious countermeasure to false beliefs and prejudices is a combination of rationality and education, possibly assisted by various other forms of cognitive enhancement, in addition to courses or sources of education and logic” (HARRIS 2011, 105).

The most prominent representative of this branch of ethics is most definitely Immanuel Kant, for whom morality is based in rationality. He, as well as his subsequent proponents, would find the very idea of affecting morality by altering our emotional psychological inclinations such as altruism completely misguided. Namely, moral actions are those that result from duty which is based in rational thinking, not in inclination (KANT 2011, 24). Acting upon our inclinations, whether natural or acquired, cannot be free according to Kant. When we act upon our inclinations, we are slaves to our own emotions or customs. The only free actions are those which result from our ability to think rationally. Therefore, in order to achieve moral improvement, we must improve our rationality, not the emotional aspect of our character. Attempts at improvement that are

carried out through direct enhancement of emotions, such as suggested by Douglas, Persson and Savulescu, cannot therefore be *moral* improvements (HARRIS 2013).

Also, opponents of biomedical moral enhancement might object that mandatory subjection to moral enhancement would narrow the subjects' freedom, namely in two respects. Firstly, no one asked them whether they wanted to undergo moral enhancement. From a liberal standpoint, this is a serious encroachment upon human freedom in a particularly sensitive area like private moral beliefs. One of the basic tenets of liberal political philosophy, built into the foundations of more or less all Western democracies, is the principle of state neutrality, according to which the state must not favour any one moral belief or understanding of human good (cf. DWORKIN 1978, 127; RAWLS 1993, 179). For instance, communitarians might therefore object that state-imposed "moral enhancement," which would motivate us towards greater concern for the needs of outsiders, is detrimental to the interests of our own community, which is, according to the communitarian moral outlook, a fundamental moral value. Without assessing the rectitude of this moral view, it is evident that the idea of mandatory subjection to biomedical procedures of moral enhancement is at least *prima facie*, for lack of better justification, contrary to the tenets of liberal political philosophy.

The second objection is not so much concerned with political restrictions of freedom as with our understanding of what it is that makes a certain action morally good. With posthumans, which is the common name for humans who have undergone some sort of biomedical enhancement, their improved nature causes them to have different motivation in certain situations than they would have had without the moral enhancement. Neither the motivation that they would have had without the moral enhancement, nor the motivation caused by moral enhancement is the result of these individuals' independent choice; in that respect, posthumans are no less free than common people.

However, sceptics might argue that moral enhancement deprives posthumans of the ability to demonstrate strength of character in certain situations, resisting the supposedly poorer motivation that they would have had without the moral enhancement. They are thwarted from demonstrating their moral excellence, which derives its specific moral value from overcoming their biological predispositions. Certainly, there will be differences in moral excellence among posthumans as well, since even morally enhanced individuals will exhibit different degrees of being able to turn the good motivation laid down by biomedical engineering into morally good action. However, the excellence of an individual who has had their psychological process biomedically altered is not ascribed solely to their moral character, but also, at least in part, to the biomedical treatment to which they were

subjected. The virtue of marital fidelity displayed so beautifully by Penelope as she waited for Odysseus to return from his voyages will no longer be ascribable solely to the character of the spouse, but a well-administered cocktail of medication and genetic intervention as well.<sup>3</sup>

This line of thinking led John Harris to state the following: “Without the freedom to fall, good cannot be a choice; and freedom disappears and along with it virtue. There is no virtue in doing what you must” (HARRIS 2011, 104). Changes that are brought about by enhancing psychological characteristics of humans are changes in behaviour alone, and not in the human understanding of *morality*. If biomedical enhancement can someday make people choose to act in such a way that is more responsible to the interests and needs of temporally and spatially remote strangers, to the natural environment and threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, this will on the one hand be morally good, useful, and commendable.

However, the problem from the standpoint of morality is that these actions will not have been deliberate choices of moral actors, thereby having no intrinsic moral value. Biomedical enhancement of our emotional psychological characteristics is thus revealed not only as being no moral enhancement at all, but sacrificing a major aspect of the moral character of humans as well.

### **Biomedical enhancement and liberal democracy**

What are the potential counterarguments that advocates of biomedical enhancement could provide in response to the abovementioned objections? In response to the objection that mandatory moral enhancement curtails human freedom, it could be said that freedom is not the only value humans care about. Although exceptionally important, freedom can be restricted in certain circumstances, especially in situations of threats to human safety or the very survival of humankind.

There are many who believe that humanity will face such a challenge, if not today, then in the near future. Climate change, environmental devastation and threats of terrorism, combined with the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, will seriously endanger the chances of human survival. A possible way to deter this threat is the moral enhancement of humans.

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**03** As regards proposals to stimulate marital fidelity through biomedical enhancement, please see WUDARCZYK et al. 2013. Earp, Sandberg, and Savulescu 2012 believe that this form of enhancement should be mandatory for couples who are parents.

However, it seems that this enhancement would have to be applied on a wider scale if it is to be effective.

This would require something that could be described as a “biological contract,” which would oblige all people to undergo biomedical enhancement procedures in order to secure the survival of humankind and make Earth a safer place to live. In other words, people would relinquish part of their sovereignty over their biological characteristics to the state. In this respect the “biological contract” is similar to the social contract in which people relinquish part of their sovereignty over their freedom to state, which then take it upon itself to secure peace and safety for its citizens.

Is this justification of mandatory moral enhancement plausible? It could be, if certain conditions are met. Just like in the natural state in social contract theory, what needs to be shown is that humans are in a situation, or that their way of life will necessarily lead to it, where normal functioning of society is threatened. That humanity is indeed in such a situation is what Persson and Savulescu are claiming. They believe “that the development of science and technology turned for the worse, all things considered, at the point at which it put in the hands of humankind the powers of doing ultimate harm” (PERSSON and SAVULESCU 2011, 441). According to them, “something could be ultimately harmful by forever extinguishing sentient life, or by damaging its conditions so drastically that, in general, life will not henceforth be worth living” (ibid.).

A major difference between the biological contract and the social contract is that the social contract stems from the fact that the war of all against all, which occurs in the natural state, is unbearable. According to Hobbes’ famed description of the disadvantages of the natural state, human life in it is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (HOBBS 1998, 84). But is not human life, at least that of most citizens of Western democracies, everything but that?

Savulescu and Persson acknowledge that most people are not aware of the risk we are faced with, and they partially ascribe this to our innate cognitive bias to objects and events that we find familiar and available: “we are fixated on the possible occurrence of events of which we have readily available images, largely as a result of recently having experienced events of these kinds. Our emotions are geared to how vividly we imagine possible events rather than simply to how we abstractly estimate their value and probability” (PERSSON and SAVULESCU 2011, 442). But is humanity truly headed for destruction? And could biomedical enhancement save us from it? These questions are, as admitted by Savulescu and Persson as well, “so complex that it is difficult to be confident of not going astray somewhere” (PERSSON and SAVULESCU 2011, 444). They become especially difficult to an-

swer when it is not possible to attribute an exact, or at least approximate, degree of probability to different outcomes.<sup>4</sup>

Some reckon that even in these circumstances it is possible to apply the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, which requires regular citizens, as well as the government, to take extra precautions when assessing potentially catastrophic situations (SUNSTEIN 2007, 122). But even if we agree that climate change and other threats that accompany the development of contemporary technologies represent a potentially catastrophic danger, which requires precautionary measures that involve various forms of action to deter this danger, it obviously does not mean that any and all precautions are justified.

For instance, although I am in danger of contracting a virus in contact with other people, it does not mean I have to accept avoiding all direct social contact as precaution. I can just get inoculated against the most dangerous diseases for which there is reasonable probability of getting infected. It is therefore not only in our interests to identify challenges in connection to the threat we are facing, but also the challenges that accompany potential solutions. Apart from the potential dangers of climate change and weapons of mass destruction, we should assess the dangers that come with biomedical enhancement as one possible solution to these issues.

Earlier in this text, I claimed that biomedical intervention aimed towards improving human behaviour that is considered moral improvement by its advocates is, in fact, no moral improvement at all, and that it also restricts moral and political freedom. If this reasoning is correct, the project of biomedical improvement could be justified solely if it was the *only* way to save humanity from destruction.

However, not even advocates of biomedical enhancement believe that; they see this method as an accompanying measure that could contribute to resolving the problem (PERSSON and SAVULESCU 2012, 121). They consider it necessary because they are convinced that liberal democracy as the political order of the developed West is not capable of making changes that would deter the threat of catastrophic predicament and secure sustainable development. The democratic process makes change impossible as long as the majority of citizens put their short-term interests before long-term interests. Politicians likewise avoid proposing and carrying

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**04** Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change provide rough estimates of the probability of climate change impact on human life. The reports confirm, with a high degree of reliability, that economic losses due to weather- and climate-related setbacks are on the rise and that developing countries are particularly affected. However, the reports are highly reserved when it comes to estimates of the magnitude of losses and damages that climate change will cause in the future (IPCC 2012, 234 and IPCC 2013).

out unpopular measures whose impact would only be felt in the distant future, for fear of losing elections. Another solution would be to accept a form of benevolent authoritarian government which would be successful in putting unpopular decisions into action. But the authoritarian form of government cannot be a serious solution because it has so far invariably failed in the area of freedom and human rights.<sup>5</sup>

Were Persson and Savulescu perhaps too quick to write off liberal democracy? Although their analysis of liberal democracy reveals that it is faced with serious problems, the practice of liberal democracy per se has in the course of history displayed an amazing capability of self-correction. The development of Western democracy in the past two hundred years has shown that democracy was able to find it in itself to respond to some of its own shortcomings, such as the tyranny of the majority and the abuse of power. Since democracy is never a finished project, these responses must always be examined and improved anew. The development of democracy primarily depends on developing awareness among its citizens of the need for its continuous improvement. For instance, the development of civic awareness of gender equality led to enfranchisement of women. Raising awareness of the gross injustice of subjugating religious, racial and ethnic minorities led to effective legislation which guaranteed equal rights for all citizens. In these cases, the enfranchised ruling majority was able to put aside its own short-term interests and support a politics that would benefit the long-term interests of society on the whole.

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**05** Not all threats of potential catastrophic damage originate from the shortcomings of liberal democracy. Among the potential dangers that ought to incite our moral improvement is the misuse of nuclear weapons. However, history has come to show that, after the sobering effect of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were never used again. Perhaps we owe the fact that a nuclear event did not occur during the Cold War to the so-called “balance of power,” but almost a quarter of a century after its end, no country seems to be ready to use nuclear weapons either. Persson and Savulescu are more concerned with the level of technological development, which they consider to have made available the knowledge and necessary materials to produce a nuclear bomb to smaller groups or even individuals; they are also apprehensive that terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons through stealing (PERSSON and SAVULESCU 2012, 47). Without a doubt, there are terrorist organisations that would gladly get their hands on nuclear weapons, either by producing or by stealing them. But neither option is that simple. Despite the fact that knowledge on producing nuclear weapons is fairly easily available, we bear witness to the fact that not even those countries that possess far greater resources than terrorist organisations are capable of it. Still, the threat of nuclear weapons theft is far smaller today than in the 1990s, when the nuclear weapons storage facilities of the former Soviet Union were virtually unguarded.

Although problems related to climate change, excessive use of natural resources, and the misuse of weapons of mass destruction open up a great number of queries, uncertainties and fears from today's perspective, the hope remains that humans are capable of seeing the steps that need to be taken in order to deter at least the worst repercussions of these threats. Past experience has shown that humans were able to overcome their misconceptions and limitations without biomedical enhancement to establish a more equitable and long-term sustainable society. To be able to do this in the future, additional efforts are required to develop awareness of the problems we are facing. The research data we provided at the beginning of this article indicate that a higher level of problem awareness and higher level of educational attainment lead to a greater willingness to sacrifice one's own interests and embrace necessary changes. Year after year, science gains more knowledge about human impact on climate change; this new knowledge strengthens public conviction that it is necessary to change how we relate to the world we live in. There is also growing awareness that economic growth and protection of the living environment are not mutually exclusive. Countries are becoming more serious about focusing on sustainable forms of development and ecological sources of energy. It might not be enough, but it still leaves hope that the road to change can be reached without biomedical enhancement that would require us to sacrifice part of our freedom.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter I have discussed a recent proposal according to which human beings are in need of moral enhancement by novel biomedical means in order to reduce the risk of catastrophes that could threaten the very possibility of continued human existence on this planet. According to the proponents of this position, our moral psychology – evolved for a life in small societies with primitive technology – is no longer able to cope with the challenges of modern technologically developed and globalized world. Since these authors believe that the traditional means of moral enhancement such as education had only a modest effect in the effort to adjust our moral behaviour to the challenges of modern world, they propose that it is necessary to examine and (if proven safe and effective) adopt alternative ways of moral enhancement by biomedical means. Their hope is that once human beings become morally enhanced by traditional and biomedical means, they will be able to overcome the affectionate limitations of our psychology. These limitations are most obvious in our inclination to take care primarily only of those that are near and dear to us, whereas this “near” should be understood in its spatial and temporal meaning. One of the main

tasks of moral enhancement is to strengthen our altruistic feelings toward strangers. Once we are morally and psychologically equipped to take care of the needs and interest of those with whom we do not share spatial and temporal proximity, we will be more willing to change our behaviour in accordance to the more sustainable modes of development.

In my discussion I raised two objections to this proposal. The first objection claims that the idea that human beings could be morally enhanced by altering our emotional psychological inclinations, such as altruism, is misguided. In the line with Kantian understanding of morality I argue that our morality is based on rationality and not on inclinations. If we take this view of morality it becomes clear that the proposed enhancement by biomedical means cannot be moral enhancement. What is enhanced is emotional aspect of our character, not our morality. People enhanced in this way would not act on the basis of their deliberate choices but on basis of preprogramed psychological inclination. This would in turn undermine our basic moral concept of freedom and, thereby, of moral responsibility. The second objection to the proposal show how the idea that moral enhancement by biomedical means should be mandatory violates political freedom of citizens. Faced with the objection that moral enhancement by biomedical means could be necessary in order to prevent catastrophic destruction of environment, in the final part of this chapter I try to point to education and liberal democracy as the alternative and morally acceptable ways of changing our behaviour. ●