Crowder’s Value Pluralism: Autonomy and Exclusion
Matthew Jones: dr.matthew.r.jones@gmail.com
Draft Version; feedback welcome
Abstract
In Crowder’s reformulation of Berlin’s argument, not only does value
pluralism provide support for liberalism, it actually suggests a
version of liberalism that promotes the public use of personal
autonomy. For Crowder, personal autonomy is a necessary element
given value pluralism as it allows the individual to choose between a
plurality of incommensurable options. In order to advance personal
autonomy, Crowder advocates a robust account of freedom of exit
coupled with a form of autonomy‐facilitating education. To this effect
Crowder posits that it is acceptable to intervene in the lives of non‐
liberals in order to promote individual autonomy as a public ideal.
However, I argue that despite the positive implications that a pro‐
autonomy account of liberalism may have for both the individual and
the state, it will limit range of acceptable values within the liberal
state and thus undermine certain aspects of value pluralism.
Key words: autonomy, education, exit, liberalism, value pluralism
Value Pluralism: Outline and Implications
Value pluralism is most often associated with the work of Isaiah Berlin. While
Berlin did not develop his thesis of value pluralism in a systematic or coherent
fashion, his important contributions to this topic can be located throughout his
substantial body of work. As noted by George Crowder and Henry Hardy, “Berlin
had not written a systematic account of this topic [value pluralism], central
though it was to his thought, and his scattered remarks were tantalizingly
incomplete and, at times, frustratingly unclear or even (it seemed)
contradictory.”1 Despite the fragmented nature of Berlin’s writing, it is possible
1
to determine distinct elements of his value pluralism. In the analysis of both
Crowder and Steven Lukes, Berlin’s value pluralism is characterized by the
following four key elements: (1) the existence of universal values; (2) the
plurality of values; (3) conflict among values; and (4) the incommensurability of
many, but not all, values.2
Berlin developed his thesis of value pluralism partly as a rebuttal to the
development of monism in both moral and political thought. In its broadest
sense, moral monism is the belief that all ethical questions possess a single
correct answer, and it is therefore possible for all answers to be derived from a
single and coherent moral system.3 All other forms of morality and, by extension,
political association are considered defective to the extent that they fall short of
the standard set out by the monist super‐value. Alternatively, they have value
only insofar as they are a necessary step on the trajectory towards this monist
super‐value. With an acknowledgement to the ancient Greek originators of this
reductionist method, Berlin calls this search for the elusive monist value the
“Ionian fallacy”. This is the flawed belief that:
all genuine questions must have one true answer and one only, all the rest
being necessarily errors; in the second place, that there must be a
dependable path towards the discovery of these truths; [and] in the third
place, that the true answers, when found, must necessarily be compatible
with one another and form a single whole, for one truth cannot be
incompatible with another – this we know a priori.4
2
Examples of such forms of moral and political monism include Plato’s theory of
the forms, utilitarianism and its various accounts of utility, and anarchism.
Berlin suggests that we should be wary of moral and political monism for two
important reasons. First, it runs counter to the evidence of both human history
and human experience. Monism does not accurately represent the depth and
continued persistence of conflict in the human experience. Instead, as Berlin
notes, “the world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we
are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally
absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of
others.”5 Second, and perhaps more importantly for Berlin given the Cold War
context in which he was writing, monism has provided the foundation for
authoritarianism and totalitarianism, which were the cause of so much human
suffering and death in the first half of the twentieth century. While Berlin is
careful to note that monism does not automatically result in authoritarianism or
totalitarianism, the intellectual roots of these extreme regimes can always be
traced back to a belief in monism; monism always possesses the potential to lead
in the direction of such regimes, as both authoritarian and totalitarian ideologies
require the belief in utopianism.6
Much has been written about the differing interpretations and political
implications of Berlin’s thesis of value pluralism. To this effect, three divergent
political positions have emerged from these debates. The first takes as its
starting point a specific interpretation of Berlin’s plurality of values. Plurality, in
this context, is understood as referring to a plurality of different cultures and
3
ways of life, as opposed to a plurality among or within goods.7 The implication of
this plurality is that there will exist a diverse collection of different cultures and
ways of life. If ways of life and the political and moral goods they entail are both
plural and incommensurable, then we have no rational or a priori reason to
prioritize liberalism over any other form of political association. Accordingly,
value pluralism generates a number of valid forms of political association, of
which liberalism is but one. This interpretation therefore denies any positive link
between value pluralism and liberalism. This leads to a form of politics that is
based on modus vivendi, where different forms of political association seek
peaceful coexistence through negotiation and compromise. This interpretation of
value pluralism is most often associated with John Gray and his thesis of
“agonistic liberalism”.8
The second interpretation of the political implications of value pluralism, as
advocated primarily by William Galston, does provide a positive link to
liberalism.9 Here we see a shift from pluralism referring to different cultures and
ways of life, to a form of pluralism among goods and values themselves.
According to Galston, value pluralism suggests that liberal and non‐liberal values
are equally valid. In this context, a value pluralist account of plurality argues that
goods and values such as tradition, equality, community and solidarity are not
inherently superior or inferior to liberty, as they all possess value. Accordingly,
value pluralism leads to a defence of liberalism as it is the form of political
association best suited to maximally accommodating this mixture of both liberal
and non‐liberal values within the state. For Galston, value pluralism supports a
form of liberalism that shares many characteristics with Reformation liberalism,
4
particularly its focus on toleration and state neutrality. This Reformation account
of the state is preferable as it allows for the “expressive liberty” of its citizens,
allowing them to lead their lives as they see fit “within a broad range of
legitimate variation, in accordance with their own understanding of what gives
life meaning and value.”10 In contrast to Gray’s interpretation, here we see the
debate focusing on what happens within the state as opposed to between states.
The third interpretation also provides a positive link between value pluralism
and liberalism. However, unlike Galston’s account, this is not a form of
toleration‐based Reformation liberalism. Instead, it is a form of autonomy
facilitating liberalism that shares many characteristics with Enlightenment
liberalism. As value pluralism generates a range of valid goods, both moral and
political, it requires that the individual be able to make reasoned choices among
such options. Accordingly, it implies a strong defence of the kind of liberalism in
which the facilitation of autonomy is viewed as a legitimate political ideal.
Perhaps the strongest proponent of this third position is Crowder, and it is a
detailed examination of particular aspects of this argument that will be the focus
of this paper.
This paper will be divided into two main sections. The first will examine
Crowder’s argument, which provides a positive link from value pluralism to a
specific form of autonomy‐facilitating liberalism. The second section, which will
constitute the crux of this paper, will be a critical evaluation of the autonomy
facilitating aspect of Crowder’s argument. In particular, this section will examine
Crowder’s twin arguments of freedom of association and exit, and autonomy‐
5
facilitating education, as legitimate aspects of public policy. I conclude that while
a pro‐autonomy liberalism may produce both individual and societal benefits,
the restrictions that it places on acceptable forms of pluralism run counter to the
central thrust of value pluralism.
From Value Pluralism to Liberalism: Crowder’s Argument
While Crowder is not alone in his examination of Berlin’s contribution to political
thought and the history of ideas, it is perhaps he who has been more responsible
than anyone else for the development and exposition of value pluralism as an
important and coherent contribution to both moral and political philosophy.
Central to Crowder’s contribution is the argument that value pluralism leads
logically to a form of liberalism that is distinctly pro‐autonomy. This is not a
position that Crowder has always held. Indeed, in his earlier work on value
pluralism, published in 1998, Crowder argued that there was no positive
relationship between value pluralism and liberalism:
I cannot claim to have exhausted the possibilities for arguing from meta‐
ethical pluralism to liberalism but I think it fair to say that the failure of all
the arguments I have considered is strong evidence for the following
general conclusion: value pluralism has, of itself, no tendency to support
the case of liberalism.11
In Crowder’s initial analysis, not only does value pluralism fail to provide a
justification for liberalism, but it may instead result in illiberal outcomes: “Not
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only does [value] pluralism provide no support for liberalism, it positively
undermines the liberal case, since it is always open to the pluralist to ask, why
not the illiberal option?”12 Crowder’s position in this earlier manifestation is
congruent with that of Gray and the first of the three positions outlined above.
However, despite his earlier misgivings, Crowder now holds that value pluralism
does in fact provide a coherent and logical defence for liberalism. More
specifically, value pluralism provides a defence for a form of liberalism that
encourages and prioritizes the capacity for autonomous decision making within
the individual. In this context, Crowder holds that “value pluralism generates
arguments that decisively favour pro‐autonomy liberalism over the liberalism of
group toleration.” 13 This is not a defence of autonomy that is premised on
Kantian metaphysics, but rather one that focuses on the instrumental benefits
that autonomous decision making can provide the individual within an
environment characterized by a plurality of incommensurable values.
In order to understand Crowder’s specific line of argument, which provides a
positive link between value pluralism and (a pro‐autonomy account of)
liberalism, we must first examine briefly Berlin’s attempt to do likewise.
Crowder identifies in Berlin’s work two arguments that attempt to provide a
positive link from value pluralism to liberalism. The first focuses on choice: if
value pluralism is true, then it gives rise to the value of freedom, as freedom is
required to be able to choose between competing options.14 Crowder rejects this
argument as it contains “an obvious logical flaw” in that it violates “Hume’s law”
by attempting to derive values from facts.15 More specifically, Berlin attempts to
7
move directly from arguing that choice is unavoidable to valuing freedom of
choice itself. However, just because something is unavoidable does not mean it is
inherently valuable.
The second argument that Crowder identifies focuses on the impossibility of
moral and political perfection. Value pluralism rejects monism and therefore
rejects the possibility of political perfection. Accordingly, it should promote a
form of political association which both accommodates and facilitates this
inescapable imperfection, rather than a form which attempts to overcome it. This
suggests the form of Reformation liberalism that is associated with Locke and its
emphasis on toleration and human imperfection. However, for Crowder, this line
of argumentation is weak as it does not provide an argument from value
pluralism to liberalism and only liberalism. While Reformation liberalism is anti‐
utopian, it is not the only form of political association to be so. Conservatism also
shares this sceptical approach towards human perfection.
In order to avoid the violation of Hume’s law that Berlin falls foul of, Crowder
will need to demonstrate that his argument does not pass from fact to value, but
rather from value to value. It is not enough to show that liberalism is one
possible outcome; rather, if Berlin’s pluralism is true, then Crowder will need to
show that liberalism is a necessary outcome, and is best suited both to
accommodate and to facilitate pluralism. Crowder believes that this is indeed
possible, and to make it so he turns away from the defence of Reformation
liberalism and instead moves towards a formulation of liberalism that has much
in common with Enlightenment liberalism.
8
As with the first argument from value pluralism to liberalism that Berlin
proposes, Crowder’s argument also revolves around the issue of choice.
However, whereas Berlin focuses on the transition from the necessity of choice
to valuing the ability to make such choices, Crowder focuses on the character
traits required by those who must make such choices, in particular those hard
choices that are produced by value incommensurability.
Pluralism forces the individual to make choices. As there exists a plurality of
values and goods, which are at times in conflict, and which it is impossible to
order against some other ultimate‐value, Berlin’s pluralism, if correct, forces the
individual to make choices. It is at the point at which the individual makes such a
choice that Crowder’s argument from pluralism to liberalism is situated. At this
point, there are essentially two options: to select one option over the other on a
purely arbitrary, if not random, basis; or to follow a particular course of action
for “a good reason”. 16 Crowder’s argument from pluralism to liberalism is
contingent upon providing individuals with the intellectual tools that enable
them to formulate such “good reasons”. In Crowder’s reformulation of Berlin’s
argument from choice, these intellectual tools are only associated with the
specific liberal virtue of personal autonomy, as it is only through the use of
autonomy that such choices can be made for “a good reason”, as opposed to
arbitrarily or randomly.
There is at play here, however, an important assumption on the part of Crowder,
and this is something that he openly admits. 17 Crowder’s defence will be
9
successful only if the individual actually wants to make choices for “a good
reason”. If the individual in question wishes to submit their life to the winds of
fate and choose arbitrarily or at random, then Crowder’s argument fails.
Crowder believes, however, that there is sufficient justification for the individual
to be committed to reason and reasoned decision making in this context.
To this extent, Crowder draws upon the work of Martha Nussbaum, who argues
that reason − interpreted widely as meaning to incorporate practical reasoning
and critical reflection − is a vital human function as it allows the individual to
“organize and arrange all of the … other [human functions], giving them in the
process a characteristically human shape.” 18 More recently, Nussbaum has
incorporated practical reason into her “capabilities approach”, noting that it is
essential as it enables the individual to “form a conception of the good life and to
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s own life.”19 Without this
capacity for reason and reasoned decision making, it would be impossible to
select between incommensurable values. Any choices made in this condition
would be random, “arbitrary, incoherent and perhaps self‐defeating.”20 Crowder
is not so bold as to argue that a life without the capacity for reasoned decision
making is devoid of value.21 Rather that if pluralism is true, those individuals
who do possess this capacity for reasoned decision making are better placed to
make such important decisions given the options presented to them, compared
to those who do not possess such a capacity. As Crowder argues,
Pluralism does not imply indifference; on the contrary, it stresses the
intrinsic value of many goods. Practical reasoning is essential to the
10
honouring of these goods. Since practical reasoning under pluralism
requires personal autonomy, respect for plurality requires autonomous
thinking.22
To aid our capacity for reasoned decision making in the harsh light of
incommensurability, Crowder argues that we need to develop four particular
virtues and dispositions of character. The first of these is the “open‐mindedness”
we require in order to take the plurality of values seriously.23 Berlin’s pluralism
shows us that there is a wide variety of valid human values and goods, and these
possess some form of moral parity as there is no form of external metric against
which to quantify them. Furthermore, there is also a wide variety of valid forms
of human flourishing connected to these values and goods.
While Crowder makes no specific mention of them, incorporated under this first
“virtue” are the characteristics of Reformation liberalism, in particular the
promotion of tolerance as a political virtue. Tolerance, at its simplest, is
demonstrated when an individual or institution refrains from interfering with, or
extends a form of permission for, the practices or beliefs with which they
disagree.24 While we as individuals or members of a particular group may not
see the merit in all of the values and forms of human flourishing validated
through Berlin’s pluralism, we do need to acknowledge that for other people
they are of merit and are therefore valued.
Secondly, because of the implications of value incommensurability, we need to
be aware of the inescapable reality of the consequences of our decisions.25 The
11
choices that we make have real consequences, both moral and political. When we
choose to follow a particular course of action, we must do so from a position that
allows us to evaluate our options and acknowledge that our decision may have
both positive and negative outcomes. Following Berlin, Crowder refers to this as
“realism”.26 Similarly, Glen Newey refers to it as “agent‐regret”, in that we are
often faced with the “tragic choice” scenario whereby we acknowledge that in
order to pursue certain values others will need to be sacrificed.27
Thirdly, as pluralism necessarily entails the rejection of abstract rules and forms
of thinking and ordering that exist a priori, it should make pluralists both aware
of and attentive to the particular details of choice‐making situations, “including
the claims and circumstances of those people affected by the choice.”28 Here, it
appears that Crowder is influenced by Kant’s doctrine of respect for the
individual.
Finally, we come to the value of mental flexibility. As pluralism rejects monism
and the recourse to a monist super‐value, the individual who is attempting to
determine a course of action through practical reasoning will need to make
decisions that relate to their specific situation. As these situations change,
pluralists must possess sufficient flexibility within their mental architecture to be
able to accommodate such changes. As Berlin notes, “the concrete situation is
almost everything.”29
In order for individuals to be able to make reasoned choices between
incommensurable moral or political values in any given situation, they must be
12
able to judge for themselves what to do. They no longer have recourse to the
monist super‐value, as this is ruled out by pluralism, and thus the individual is
forced to make these difficult decisions independently, taking into account the
specifics of each particular case. Furthermore, as the nature of the good life is
subject to constant disagreement and will inevitably change over time, it cannot
be used as a base from which to permanently premise our decision making.
These bases must themselves remain open to constant analysis and revision, and
this is possible only through the exercise of personal autonomy.30
The argument that Crowder proposes is that these four pluralist virtues and
character traits − open‐mindedness, realism, the rejection of abstract rules, and
mental flexibility − are also distinctively and uniquely liberal virtues. The crux of
his argument is that in order for individuals not only to choose but to be able to
choose for good reason among any given set of incommensurables, they require
a particular mental architecture that allows them to do so. This mental
architecture is best expressed as the ability to exercise personal autonomy. As
Crowder concludes, “Pluralism, in short, imposes on us choices that are
demanding to a degree such that they can be made well only by autonomous
agents. If pluralism is true, then the best lives will be characterized by personal
autonomy.”31
The Tensions Within Crowder’s Liberal Pluralism
The emphasis that a value pluralist understanding of liberalism places upon the
diversity and pluralism inherent in human nature may prove beneficial to those
13
who are concerned with the demands of pluralism. Value pluralism recognizes
that diversity and conflict are an inevitable part not only of liberal tradition but
also of being human. A liberalism grounded in value pluralism is, potentially,
more likely to be open to the desires and needs of groups that have been
historically marginalized, such as women and various cultural or ethno‐religious
communities. It will allow these groups to challenge the strict application of
values such as liberty and equality, as well as the traditional classification of life
into the public political and private non‐political spheres. Furthermore, it will
allow the state space in which to re‐evaluate the construction and
implementation of these various structures and values, given the detrimental
effects they have on these marginalized groups.32
A liberal polity informed by value pluralism may be congruent with certain
forms of multiculturalism and cultural minorities. As this reformulation of the
liberal polity places an emphasis on the public use of autonomy, it may be
acceptable to those who demand special or differentiated rights for such ethno‐
religious communities while simultaneously positing that such communities still
hold that individual autonomy is a value of fundamental importance. (This can be
seen in Crowder’s defence of a robust right of exit and an account of autonomy‐
facilitating education, both of which will be examined in the following sections.)
Indeed, Crowder notes that on this point there are similarities between his work
and that of Will Kymlicka, who argues that cultural membership is important as
it allows individuals to make sense of their life choices.33 While Crowder and
Kymlicka take very different justificatory paths, their conclusions are quite
similar.
14
However, it is my contention that Crowder is blind to the potentially restrictive
and exclusionary effects of his account of liberal value pluralism. This problem is
not located in any theoretical deficiency or misreading of Berlin, but rather in the
actual social and political implications of his thesis. As I have already stated,
value pluralism forces the individual to make choices − often tragic choices −
between incommensurable options. For Berlin, this means that being free to
choose is of importance, and this capacity is best achieved through liberalism as
liberalism can be characterized as the political expression of negative liberty.
However, as Crowder notes, this is a violation of Hume’s law. What is important,
Crowder argues, is not only being free to make decisions but also being able to
make decisions for good reasons within any given context. As the contexts for
our decisions change, so too must our reasons for making such decisions. It is
only liberalism that allows us to develop the mental architecture necessary for
making such decisions in fluid contexts. Thus, a liberalism that is grounded in
value pluralism not only frees the individual to make decisions but also furnishes
them with the skill set necessary for making such decisions for good reason.
In order to secure the social and political conditions necessary for an agent to be
able to make decisions for “a good reason”, Crowder believes that the promotion
of personal autonomy is therefore a legitimate aim of public policy. As Crowder
writes, “I conclude, then, that pluralist multiculturalism will be framed by
Enlightenment liberal principles that include a public commitment to the
facilitation of personal autonomy among all citizens.”34 Indeed, for Crowder, this
gives rise to both negative and positive duties on behalf of the state: not only
15
should the state remove boundaries that restrict an individual’s ability to
exercise personal autonomy (negative duties), but it should also help individuals
acquire the skills that allow them to make such decisions (positive duties). To
this effect, negative duties are achieved through a robust account of an
individual’s “right of exit”, and positive duties are achieved through a distinct
form of liberal education that facilitates or enables the individual to develop and
employ autonomy when it is deemed necessary.35
I argue, however, that it is in the implementation of these two duties through
public policy that we can see the emergence of tensions within Crowder’s
account of liberal value pluralism, which may, ultimately, undermine the extent
to which it can facilitate and accommodate a true plurality of values. The exact
nature of these tensions will become clear through a detailed examination of the
right of exit and of an autonomy‐facilitating liberal education.
Autonomy and the Right of Exit
Freedom of association is an important characteristic of the modern liberal
democratic polity. Within such polities, citizens are often members of
associations, such as academic associations, sporting clubs, political parties, or
churches. Membership in such diverse forms of association reflects the
heterogeneous nature of the modern liberal democratic polity. A corollary of
freedom of association is freedom of disassociation, or the right of exit. Within
the modern liberal democratic polity, membership of any of these forms of
association must be voluntary. It would be a distinctly illiberal polity that forced
16
an individual to join a particular association, such as a (state‐sanctioned)
political party or religion.
Voluntary membership is perhaps most clearly expressed when an individual
chooses to join an association of which they are currently not a member. For
example, I may currently not be a member of a cricket club, and in order to
demonstrate my appreciation for the game, decide to join local cricket club “A”.
Similarly, due to a change in my geographic circumstances, I may choose not to
renew my membership with “A” and instead become a member of my new local
cricket club “B”. These two examples demonstrate an uncontroversial account
(at least within the liberal discourse) of voluntary membership – I have chosen,
without coercion, to join association “A”, and then to switch my allegiance from
association “A” to association “B”. Within liberal democracies this form of
voluntary association is most evident in sporting clubs and political parties.
This is very different, however, from membership of an association into which
one is born, rather than chooses to enter, such as an ethno‐religious community.
How do individuals demonstrate that they have chosen freely to remain a
member of an association or community they were born into? Person A’s
decision to join religion X is a less problematical demonstration of voluntary
membership than person B’s membership of religion X if the latter’s membership
was due to the circumstances of their birth. While they are both members of
religion X, it is more difficult for B to demonstrate that their initial and continued
membership is voluntary.36 In this context, an individual demonstrates genuine −
that is to say voluntary − freedom of association through their continued
17
membership even though they are given the option to leave. When an individual
refuses to exercise their right of exit from an association, their continued
membership could be considered as constituting voluntary membership.
However, this specific interpretation of voluntary association and freedom of
exit assumes that the only reason why an individual has not exercised their right
of exit is because they desire to continue their membership. It does not take into
account situations where an individual may wish to exercise this right, but where
the costs involved are too prohibitive to do so. As Neil Burtonwood notes,
“Membership of communities based on religion or culture is, for the most part,
the outcome of birth and [therefore] exit from such a community is of a different
order from resigning membership of the local golf or tennis club.”37 This may be
an issue for minorities, but it is a more pressing issue for those members who
feel oppressed within such minorities.
Within the modern liberal democratic polity, members of minorities tend to be at
a greater disadvantage than members of the dominant demographic, often facing
challenges that the latter would not encounter. However, it would be incorrect to
assume that these minority groups are homogenous; even within such groups,
internal minorities can and do develop. These sub‐groups are often particularly
vulnerable. As Leslie Green brings to our attention, “Minorities are badly off, but
internal ones are often worse off. They suffer from being members of minority
groups who need to defend themselves not only from the majority but also from
other members of their own minority.”38 Within the academic literature of
feminism, sociology, and cultural studies, this is referred to as intersectionality.39
18
Within the specific context of minorities, Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner‐
Halev refer to “minorities within minorities”.40
Examples of such vulnerable groups within minorities often include women and
children,41 as well as members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) community. Women within such communities are often presented with
limited educational opportunities, limits to control over their own sexuality
(sometimes enforced through violence), and forced marriages. Children, as James
G. Dwyer notes, are often “involuntary and unwitting participants” in such
communities.42 In such situations, particular members of these communities
within the liberal state may feel that their cultures are excessively patriarchal,
and are therefore detrimental to women and children. Similarly, those who
identify as LGBT and who are members of such restrictive communities may feel
unable to express their true sexuality for fear of isolation, expulsion, or violent
acts.
The traditional liberal defence against such restrictive behaviour is the
individual’s right of exit. That is to say that all individuals are protected against
such intra‐group oppression if they are free to leave such an oppressive group. If
they are denied this right, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, for the
individual to escape such oppressive practices.43 But what does it mean to be free
to leave a group in this context? What is it that actually constitutes the ability to
leave?
19
Does a strict negative interpretation of liberty help us here? In a negative liberty
understanding of the right of exit, all that is required to be free is that the
individual is not prevented from doing so by the use of force, or the threat of
such use.44 But this does not take into account the various “costs” that the
individual may suffer as a direct, or even indirect, result of their decision to
exercise their right of exit. An individual may be so embedded within a
community that they know of no other way of life. It may be that not only are
their friends and families connected to this way of life, but so also may be their
way of thinking. Even if we exclude issues of violence (both physical and
emotional), to exit this way of life would not only mean (potentially) losing one’s
friends and family, but also being removed from an environment that gives one’s
life meaning through a shared context. To what extent do these “costs” restrict
the freedom of exit?
In The Liberal Archipelago, Chandran Kukathas identifies two opposing positions
regarding this important question. The first concludes that these additional costs
in fact negate this “freedom of exit”. In reality, an individual “would be unfree…if
exit were extremely costly – as it often is.”45 Kukathas provides us with the
example of Amish teenagers: while they are free, in that there are no overt
barriers limiting their ability to remove themselves from their community, this
freedom comes at the unreasonable cost of their family, friends, and property.
While no one is physically forcing them to stay, their freedom to exit is not as
simple as merely not being actively prevented from doing so. As Kukathas
concludes, “they are not [free].”46 The Amish teenager is embedded too deeply in
20
their community to simply walk away without incurring substantial costs to
themselves, both mental and financial.
Opposed to this position one could argue that these additional costs, extreme as
they may be, do not negate an individual’s right of exit. At the core of this
position is the belief that ultimately, within a liberal democratic polity, an
individual still has the choice to leave their community. These additional costs
may make this process more difficult, but they do not remove this course of
action as a legitimate and viable option. As Kukathas notes, these costs “may
have a large bearing on the decision taken; but [they have] no bearing on the
individual’s freedom to take it.” 47 While there are undoubtedly substantial
obstacles that make the Amish teenager’s decision to leave their community a
difficult one, they still do possess the option to do so. A difficult option is still,
nonetheless, an option.
Kukathas rejects this second approach, and instead advocates a strict negative
liberty interpretation of the right of exit, as demonstrated in the following
extract from The Liberal Archipelago:
Consider the case of Fatima, the wife of a Malay fisherman living in the
state of Kelantan on Peninsular Malaysia. She is a Muslim, a mother, and a
wife; and her life is very much shaped by these aspects of her identity,
and also by her membership of the village community, which reinforces
the view – her view – that her life should be governed by her religion and
her duties as wife and mother. She has no desire to live elsewhere or
21
otherwise. If she did wish to live in some other way she probably would
have to live elsewhere, since it is unlikely that the village would tolerate –
let alone welcome – any deviation. Is Fatima free?48
It is Kukathas’ contention that Fatima is, in fact, free. While there are still costs
involved, she is free to leave the community in which she is embedded; no one,
other than herself, is stopping her from leaving. By implication, therefore, she is
also free “if she does not have any wish to leave − even if she is ignorant of the
possibility of leaving or living differently − and simply continues to live her life. A
society of villages such as Fatima’s is, on the view offered here, a free society −
whatever else may be said about it.” 49 Kukathas is aware that his specific
interpretation of the right of exit is open to question. He concedes that it would
be wrong to think that Fatima is free because she is autonomous and has chosen
freely her particular course of action, as this is simply not the case. As Kukathas
notes, “she has not ‘chosen’ it; she has simply not rejected it. She has acquiesced
in a life she has been raised to lead, but she has not embraced it.”50
How, then, does Kukathas consider Fatima to be free? It is his opinion that
Fatima is free “because she may live a life she has not rejected and is not forced
to live a life she cannot accept.”51 This is not a form of freedom that, contrary to
Kant’s reasoning, is dependent upon autonomy or any form of self‐direction.
Rather, for Kukathas, Fatima is free because she possesses “liberty of
conscience”. While this may be a deviation from the negative liberty informed
account of freedom, and therefore of a free society, it is consistent with Kukathas’
22
understanding of what a liberal, and therefore free, society should be. As
Kukathas argues,
A society is free to the extent that its members do not have to live lives
they cannot, in good conscience, accept. If this is so, then a society will not
be free simply because there are many options open to individuals. It can
only be free if individuals can dissociate themselves from options they
cannot abide.52
Thus, while Kukathas does not deny that there may be costs involved − indeed,
quite high costs − when an individual wishes to exercise their right of exit, this
does not constitute a barrier to that individual’s freedom to exercise such a right.
However, this is not a position that Crowder shares. For Crowder, a viable right
of exit is more than simply the lack of restrictive practices. It is in this context
that Kukathas’ argument is problematic, as it refuses to acknowledge the reality
that these additional costs have for the individual in question. This can be
illustrated by returning to the example of women within a liberal democratic
polity who may wish to leave their community due to excessive patriarchal
practices that are inimical to their personal autonomy. Here we can see how
difficult their right of exit is in reality. Drawing on the work of Susan Moller
Okin,53 Crowder correctly points out that women’s “choices in these contexts are
severely limited by lack of education, since girls are frequently thought less
worthwhile educating than boys, and by damaging education designed to train
girls to accept confining gender roles.” 54 The unfortunate result of these
23
restrictive practices is that they tend to leave the individual in such a limited
state that the idea of exiting such communities is rarely an option. Okin provides
us with the following example:
The words of a seventeen‐and‐a‐half‐year old Indian student from Fiji
capture the dilemmas such young women face. Suddenly faced with a
coerced marriage that would not allow her to graduate from high school,
she said: “I don’t know what to do now. My dreams and plans are all
messed up. …I am tormented.” But when a teacher suggested that she
need not, perhaps, go through with the marriage, she responded
indignantly: “In our religion, we have to think of our parents first. It
would kill them if I ran away and disobeyed them. …For me, I couldn’t
marry someone who wasn’t a Muslim. I will do it the Muslim way. And I
would never go against my parents!”55
For Crowder, what is required, therefore, is a right of exit that is more than
simply not being obstructed, or not being threatened with violence. We need an
understanding of the right of exit that takes into account the various obstacles
and costs that one may encounter. As Crowder argues, “Crucially, it seems, real
freedom of exit seems to involve the capacity to stand back from the group’s
norms and to assess them critically – that is, the capacity for autonomous
judgement.”56 How does an individual develop this capacity for autonomous
judgement? As in the case of a hypothetical liberal society that would be
characterized by Rawls’ political liberalism, in order for the individual to have
the capacity to make autonomous judgements they must be educated to do so.57
24
AutonomyFacilitating Liberal Education
In order to prevent the type of social conditioning that works against the
capacity for autonomous judgement, and that therefore restricts an individual’s
ability to exercise their right of exit, Crowder argues that we need to encourage
“the development in children of a form of character in which serious thought
along these [autonomous] lines is possible and valued.”58 It is not enough that
autonomy is required; rather, the argument actively promotes the “facilitation of
individual autonomy.” 59 Crowder is aware that by linking autonomy to
education, he could be guilty of advocating a form of comprehensive liberalism,
and thus suggesting a move towards a moral monist account of liberal
perfectionism. In order to avoid such a charge, Crowder, drawing upon the work
of Harry Brighouse,60 draws a distinction between “autonomy‐promoting” and
“autonomy‐facilitating” forms of liberal education.61
An autonomy‐promoting form of liberal education would be inexorably linked to
a comprehensive doctrine (such as Enlightenment liberalism), as it would shift
autonomy to the centre of a student’s life in an attempt to ensure that they
employ it whenever possible. In contrast, an autonomy‐facilitating form of
liberal education aims to “enable them to live autonomously should they wish
to.”62 It would operate in the same abstract way as the teaching of languages or
mathematics, in the sense that a student would have the capacity to use these
skills, but need not use them continuously. While a student may have the
capacity to speak a foreign language, they will only do so when the need or
desire arises. As Brighouse notes, “The [autonomy‐facilitating] argument
25
suggests that, other things being equal, people’s lives go better when they deploy
the skills associated with autonomy, but does not yield any obligation to
persuade them to deploy them: autonomy must be facilitated, not necessarily
promoted.”63 Crowder concurs explicitly with Brighouse on this point, suggesting
that:
the Enlightenment‐liberal state need only facilitate autonomy, not
promote it. Such a state need only ensure, principally through the
education system, that its citizens have the capacity to live autonomously;
it need not demand that its citizens’ lives be comprehensively
autonomous in content, like the energetically innovative lives celebrated
by J. S. Mill.64
It is Crowder’s contention, therefore, that a form of liberal education that is
autonomy‐facilitating, as opposed to autonomy‐promoting, will enable
individuals to make decisions autonomously without undermining any of their
other cultural values. While Crowder does acknowledge that this may “bring
changes to a traditional society,”65 the central thrust of his argument is that it is
erroneous to think that traditional (ethno‐religious) practices are necessarily
mutually exclusive of the liberal facilitation of an individual’s capacity to make
decisions autonomously.66
While I am sympathetic to what Crowder is trying to achieve in his bifurcation of
autonomy into its moral (autonomy‐promoting) and instrumental (autonomy‐
facilitating) aspects, it is my contention that he is too optimistic regarding the
26
extent to which this division can be successfully maintained. The distinction that
Crowder envisages may work at the abstracted level of ideal theoretical
scenarios, but when it is actually implemented at the level of real‐world
application (that is to say in the classroom environment), I suggest that the
boundaries that separate these two forms of autonomy would be less robust, and
more porous, than Crowder imagines. Accordingly, at the level of practice, it
would be very difficult to disentangle autonomy‐facilitating education from
autonomy‐promoting education. This is an important point that Crowder fails to
acknowledge. Indeed, this oversight of Crowder’s is exacerbated by the fact that
Brighouse, whose work Crowder draws on, acknowledges openly that the
collapse between these two forms of autonomy is a distinct possibility:
“Although the methods recommended will be more somber than evangelizing, it
may be hard to distinguish autonomy‐facilitating from autonomy‐promoting
education in practice.”67
It is on this important point that parallels can be drawn between Crowder’s
emphasis on a form of autonomy‐facilitating liberal education and the
educational demands of Rawls’ promotion of autonomy within the public
political sphere. In Rawls’ later work, particularly Political Liberalism, autonomy
is promoted as a political rather than a moral good. The justification for this
politicization of autonomy is to avoid the restrictive effects of a comprehensive
form of perfectionist liberalism, such as that developed in A Theory of Justice. For
Rawls, autonomy is to be promoted only insofar as it allows individuals to make
decisions in relation to the constitutional essentials of society, as opposed to
being a necessary metaphysical element that provides the foundation of the good
27
life. Yet, as Andrea Baumeister correctly brings to our attention in relation to
Rawls, and contrary to what Crowder argues, it is wrong to assume that
autonomy can be compartmentalized and brought out only when required. In
this sense, the learning of autonomy, even in its facilitating context, cannot be
equated with the learning of mathematics or languages.68
For many students in secular schools, the teaching and prioritization of
autonomy pose no problem. However, for some (but by no means all) religious
students, the teaching and prioritization of autonomy, even in its facilitating
context, may challenge and undermine certain aspects of their faith, for example
by challenging the epistemological foundations of, say, the Qur’an as the revealed
word of God. Furthermore, how would this autonomy‐facilitating education sit
with the school curriculum in what are referred to in the United Kingdom as
“faith schools”? While many of these schools may reject an autonomy‐promoting
based curriculum, would they also place restrictions on autonomy‐facilitation if
the results of such a programme included the questioning of fundamental
beliefs? If so, would this mean they are to be deemed unreasonable and therefore
excluded from Crowder’s value pluralist liberal polity? I am not suggesting that
religion should be assigned a privileged position within society, or excluded from
critique. Indeed, within the modern liberal democratic polity, I believe that
religion should be scrutinized, particularly with regards to both the public
sphere and education. However, my point is that the restriction of autonomy to
the public sphere, and its valuation solely as a political and instrumental good, is
not as simple as either Rawls or Crowder argue.
28
Exclusion through Restriction
This move towards the active promotion of autonomy has important
implications regarding the role of the state. If, given Berlin’s value pluralism,
personal autonomy is a necessary attribute, then this presents, prima facie, an
argument that the state ought not only to prevent restrictive actions that
discourage the development of autonomy but also to actively promote its
development. What is required is more than negative liberty regarding the
development of autonomy; non‐interference in its own right does not go far
enough. Crowder argues that the existence of a dominant liberal society outside
the walls of a non‐liberal community will not prevent the restriction of
autonomy within such non‐liberal communities. Such autonomous attributes are
often actively discouraged, and various non‐liberal communities have developed
effective means of isolating themselves from these external influences.69 The
Amish and Mennonite communities in America are obvious examples of groups
who have been very successful in minimizing external influences that oppose
their traditional beliefs.
It is perhaps only now, after a detailed analysis of Crowder’s particular
interpretation of a pro‐autonomy liberalism premised upon value pluralism, that
the tensions within it become evident. Value pluralism tends to oppose forms of
perfectionist liberalism, such as Enlightenment liberalism, because they use
autonomy as the ultimate value against which everything is measured. Value
pluralism may, at least on an initial reading, suggest a form of liberalism that
does not prioritize autonomy. But when Crowder’s liberal value pluralism is
29
examined in more detail, we see that autonomy re‐emerges as a value of
particular importance.
This is not to suggest that Crowder’s reformulation of autonomy takes on the
same degree of importance as does a super‐value within a monist form of
political association. Crowder prioritizes autonomy for instrumental rather than
metaphysical reasons; it is a value that enables individuals both to make choices
for “a good reason” and to actively exercise their right of exit from groups as they
see fit. As Crowder concludes, “the exigency of choosing well among
incommensurables points to an emphasis on personal autonomy.” 70 In this
context, Crowder shares with Rawls and Nussbaum an interpretation of
autonomy that is not linked to a specific formulation of Kantian metaphysics but
is, rather, implemented and valued as a political tool; not for what it is, but for
what it does.
Accordingly, my argument is not meant to challenge the benefits of a pro‐
autonomy account of liberalism. Indeed, I agree with Crowder’s belief that an
individual’s capacity to make decisions for themselves, particularly among
incommensurable options, is enhanced by their ability to reason autonomously.
Furthermore, this ability to reason autonomously is bolstered by a robust
account of freedom of exit combined with some form of autonomy‐facilitating
education. However, while the autonomous individual that resides within the
Crowderian liberal polity may be better equipped to make decisions when faced
by incommensurable values, the number of values that may be open to them to
choose from has been greatly reduced.
30
By assigning to autonomy (even when restricted to its instrumental aspect) a
privileged position, Crowder’s liberal value pluralism is effectively pre‐
determining the parameters of his liberal polity. It is only those who are willing
to accept a liberal polity that upholds individual autonomy as a necessary public
good who will be accepted. Those who, for whatever reason, do not share this
specific liberal formulation will be forced either to modify their internal
practices (and perhaps, ultimately, their beliefs), or alternatively to reject the
liberal polity.
The effect of pre‐determining the parameters of a value pluralist liberal polity in
such a way, either by design or by unintended consequence, is to restrict the
forms of pluralism that can be successfully incorporated. Thus, the issue
becomes a question of the extent to which forms of pluralism can be translated
successfully into a liberal discourse and polity that intentionally promotes
autonomy as both a public and a private good. If it is possible for forms of
pluralism to be translated in such a way then they can be incorporated under
Crowder’s value pluralist liberal paradigm. However, if they are either unwilling
or unable, then according to Crowder’s analysis they cannot be incorporated.
As we have already seen, Berlin’s thesis of value pluralism provides the
foundation for both an ethical and a political defence of a broad array of values.
However, Crowder’s specific interpretation of value pluralism excludes many of
these values through his continued emphasis on autonomy. It is therefore my
contention that a value pluralist liberal polity may have the potential to
31
accommodate a wide variety of values, but not in the specific form in which
Crowder presents it.
1
George Crowder and Henry Hardy, “Berlin’s Universal Values – Core or
Horizon?” in The One and the Many: Reading Isaiah Berlin, eds. George Crowder
and Henry Hardy (Amherst, NY.: Prometheus Books, 2007), 293.
2
George Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2004), 132; George Crowder, Liberalism & Value Pluralism (London and New
York: Continuum, 2002), 2, 45; and Steven Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals: The
Implications for Diversity (London: Verso, 2003), 90. Crowder and Lukes are not
entirely aligned in their analysis. For example, Lukes does not include the
existence of conflict between values in his analysis. Furthermore, Lukes separates
value incomparability from value incommensurability, whereas I interpret
Crowder’s definition to collapse these two points under the single banner of
value incommensurability.
3
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays
on Liberty [1969], ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 212‐
213; Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of
Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (London: John Murray, 1990), 5‐6; Isaiah Berlin, The
Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, eds. Henry Hardy and Roger
Hausheer (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997), 5‐6; Isaiah Berlin, The Power of
Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (London: Chatto & Windus, 2000), 5‐7.
4
Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 5‐6.
32
5
Berlin, Liberty, 213‐214.
6
Crowder, Isaiah Berlin, 130. A similar argument is proposed by Karl Popper in
The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge, 2003 [1944]).
7
For more on these three interpretations of Berlin’s plurality of values, see John
Gray, Isaiah Berlin (London: Harper Collins, 1995), 43‐47.
8
John Gray, PostLiberalism: Studies in Political Thought (New York and London:
Routledge, 1993); John Gray, Isaiah Berlin; John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake:
Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age (London and New York:
Routledge, 1995); and John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity,
2000).
9
William Galston, “Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory,” American
Political Science Review 93, no. 4 (1999): 769‐778; and William Galston, Liberal
Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
10
Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 3.
11
George Crowder, “Pluralism and Liberalism,” Political Studies 42, no. 2 (1994):
303. Emphasis added.
12
Crowder, “Pluralism and Liberalism,” 304.
13
George Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism,” Political Theory 35, no.
2 (2007): 122‐123.
14
Berlin, Liberty, 214
15
Crowder, “Value Pluralism and Liberalism,” in The One and the Many, 211. See
also Robert B. Talisse, Pluralism and Liberal Politics (New York: Routledge,
2012), 34.
33
16
George Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” in Islam Beyond Conflict:
Indonesian Islam and Western Political Theory, eds. Azyumardi Azra and Wayne
Hudson (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 150. See also George Crowder,
“Pluralism, Relativism and Liberalism in Isaiah Berlin” (paper presented at the
Australasian Political Science Association Conference, University of Tasmania,
Hobart, Tasmania, Australia, September 29 – October 1, 2003): 14; Crowder,
“Value Pluralism and Liberalism,” 225; and Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal
Pluralism,” 136‐137.
17
Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 150.
18
Martha Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in Liberalism and the Good,
eds. R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald M. Mara, and Henry S. Richards (London:
Routledge, 1990), 216.
19
Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), 41.
20
Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 150.
21
“…I do not claim that lives in which personal autonomy plays little or no part
are wholly without value. Such lives may exhibit many other goods that are
valuable from a pluralist point of view, and must therefore be judged to be good
in some degree. Indeed, such lives may well be better than autonomous lives in
certain respects.” Ibid., 152. Elsewhere, Crowder notes that “People who are not
equipped to think critically will be to that extent ill‐equipped to cope well with
the hard choices that, on the pluralist view, will inevitably confront them. This
does not mean that heteronomous lives are valueless. Such lives may exhibit
many genuine goods. But heteronomous lives cannot be among the best possible
34
overall, judged from a pluralist perspective, since they lack a capacity for good
decision‐making in the fact of inevitable and profound value conflict.” Crowder,
“Value Pluralism and Liberalism,” 226.
22
Crowder, “Value Pluralism and Liberalism,” 226.
23
Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 150.
24
Monique Deveaux, Cultural Pluralism and the Dilemmas of Justice (London:
Cornell University Press, 2000), 43. See also Andrew J. Cohen, “What Toleration
Is,” Ethics 115, no. 1 (2004): 69.
25
Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 150.
26
Ibid., 150; Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (London: Hogarth, 1978), 111, 207.
27
Glen Newey, “Metaphysics Postponed: Liberalism, Pluralism, and Neutrality,”
Political Studies 45, no. 2 (1997): 299.
28
Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 150.
29
Isaiah Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” in The Crooked Timber of Humanity
(London: Fontana Press, 1991), 18.
30
Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 151.
31
George Crowder, “Multiculturalism: A Value‐Pluralist Approach,” in Political
Theory & Australian Multiculturalism, ed. Geoffrey Brahm Levey (New York:
Berghahn Books, 2008), 53.
32
Andrea Baumeister, Liberalism and the ‘Politics of Difference’ (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 186.
33
Crowder, “Multiculturalism: A Value‐Pluralist Approach,” 54. For more on
Kymlicka’s argument, see Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A
35
Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Will Kymlicka,
Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001); and Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political
Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
34
Crowder, “Multiculturalism: A Value‐Pluralist Approach,” 54.
35
Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism”; Crowder, “Multiculturalism: A
Value‐Pluralist Approach”; and Crowder, “Value Pluralism and Liberalism.”
36
Some religious traditions, such as Catholicism, have specific rituals that
demonstrate full acceptance of that religion. Such rituals, broadly referred to as
“confirmation”, are said to demonstrate voluntary membership of the religious
community. In Eastern Churches, confirmation is often conferred on infants
straight after their baptism. In Western Churches, such rituals are usually
performed at a later age, when the participants are deemed to have reached the
“age of reason”, that is, they are old enough to understand fully the consequences
and obligations of their promises to the church. However, even here,
confirmation is taken under the age of eighteen, and often as young as twelve. In
these cases, the crux of the issue is whether such decisions are indeed voluntary
and fully informed, and free from family or societal pressures. Accordingly, I do
not consider this form of voluntary membership to be as voluntary or un‐coerced
as an individual who decides to join a new cricket club due to geographic
changes.
37
Neil Burtonwood, Cultural Diversity, Liberal Pluralism and Schools (London:
Routledge, 2006), 88.
36
38
Leslie Green, “Internal Minorities and their Rights,” in The Rights of Minority
Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 268.
39
See, for example, Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,”
Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241‐1299; and Leslie McCall, “The
Complexity of Intersectionality,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society
30, no. 3 (2005): 1771‐1800.
40
Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner‐Halev, “Introduction,” in Minorities Within
Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity, eds. Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner‐
Halev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
41
See, for example, Susan Moller Okin, “Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some
Tensions,” Ethics 108, no. 4 (1998): 661‐684; Susan Moller Okin, “‘Mistresses of
Their Own Destiny’: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit,” Ethics
112, no. 2 (2002): 205‐230; Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural
Differences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001);
James G. Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children’s Rights (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell
University
Press,
1998);
and
Robert
Reich,
Bridging Liberalism and
Multiculturalism in American Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2002).
42
Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children’s Rights, 106.
43
This traditional liberal approach of framing the problem in such an “either/or”
way (either the individual accepts this patriarchal behaviour as being part of
their community, or they choose to exercise their right of exit, and leave their
community) tends to ignore a viable third option of an individual choosing to
37
remain as a member of their community and attempting to implement reforms
from within. An example of this third option would be the feminist theology
movement, with their desire to reform certain aspects of religious practice from
within the various religious traditions themselves.
44
Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism,” 127.
45
Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and
Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 107.
46
Ibid., 107.
47
Ibid., 107.
48
Ibid., 113.
49
Ibid., 113.
50
Ibid., 113.
51
Ibid., 113.
52
Ibid., 113‐114.
53
Okin, “‘Mistresses of Their Own Destiny’: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic
Rights of Exit.”
54
Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism,” 127.
55
Laurie Olsen, Made in America: Immigrant Students in Our Public Schools (New
York: New Press, 1997), 124, quoted in Okin, “‘Mistresses of Their Own Destiny’:
Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit,” 222.
56
Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism,” 128. Emphasis added.
57
John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005), 199‐200.
58
Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism,” 128.
38
59
Ibid., 128. Emphasis added.
60
Harry Brighouse, “Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy,” Ethics 108, no. 4
(1998): 733‐34; and Harry Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000), chaps. 4 and 5. Brighouse is not the only author
to draw such a distinction. David Johnston makes a distinction between “moral”
and “personal” autonomy [David Johnston, The Idea of a Liberal Theory
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 71‐74]; Kwame Anthony Appiah
makes a similar distinction between “strong” (Kantian) autonomy and a “core of
personal autonomy” that furnishes the individual with an “availability of options,
an endowment with minimum rationality, an absence of coercion” [Kwame
Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005), 40]; and Martha Nussbaum distinguishes between “practical reason”,
which is necessary in order to “organize” other goods, and a stronger and more
comprehensive form of liberal autonomy [Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human
Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 82, 220].
61
Crowder, “Multiculturalism: A Value‐Pluralist Approach,” 54.
62
Brighouse, “Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy,” 734. Emphasis in the
original.
63
Ibid., 734.
64
Crowder, “Multiculturalism: A Value‐Pluralist Approach,” 55.
65
Ibid., 55.
66
Ibid., 55.
39
67
Brighouse, “Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy,” 734. I find this oversight
by Crowder to be all the more problematical as Brighouse’s warning is clearly
stated on the same page (734) that Crowder cites with approval.
68
Andrea Baumeister, “Cultural Diversity and Education: the Dilemma of
Political Stability,” Political Studies 46, no. 5 (1998): 922; and, Baumeister,
Liberalism and the ‘Politics of Difference’, 60.
69
Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism,” 139.
70
Crowder, “Value‐pluralism and Liberalism,” 227.
40